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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of the impact of British politics on 
Indian policy during the twenty year period which followed the re­
newal of the East India Company's Charter in 1833. The view taken 
is that the policy of the Home Government of India is inseparable 
from that of the Ministry generally. Within the 'dual1 system of 
the Home Government the Cabinet Minister for India, the President 
of the Board of Control, is seen to exercise a dominant role while 
the Court of Directors of the East India Company, a body of Indian 
experience, act, with a varying degree of success, the part of a 
check upon his authority. The changes centering around the Reform 
of Parliament in 1832 redefined the basis of British politics and 
gave rise to a "precocious development of party politics" with an 
accompanying alternation of party governments which continued 
throughout the twenty years under review. Owing to this development 
two sets of Indian policy emerge during this period, one proper to 
the years of Whig administration and one associated with those of 
Sir Robert Peel's Conservative Ministries. The pervasive influence 
of Ministry and party extends even to the highest offices in the In­
dian administration at this time for, starting with Auckland, the 
Governors General are selected from their respective Cabinets and 
go out to India in the full knowledge of the views of the British Govern­
ment. The determining role of British history on Indian development
is therefore observed as it acts through the work of the Cabinet 
Minister for India in association with the Ministry's appointee, 
the Governor General.
The twenty years over which this study extends provide a 
sufficiently long time to trace the development of significant 
aspects of Indian policy in four principal areas, those of finance, 
foreign affairs, the native states and law reform.
4PKEIVICE
As this thesis is concerned with the work of successive 
Cabinet Ministers for India the private papers of British states­
men have provided the most important sources of material. The 
greater part of these papers are to be found in the India Office 
Library, the Public Record Office, and the British Museum and I 
should like to thank the staff, in general, of these institutions 
for the kind help they have always given me. To meet the expenses 
incurred in viewing papers outside London the Central Research Fund 
of the University has provided the necessary funds. The Charles 
Henry Foyle Trust and the Mercerfs Company of the City of London 
have also provided timely financial help while the Institute of 
Historical Research has supplied a tranquil place in which to write.
thanks also go to Mr. S.W.Shelton of Glyn's Bank in Lombard Street 
and to Miss K.E.Bryon of Martin's for the time they took in showing 
me the papers in their keeping bearing on East Indian affairs.
My work was commenced under Mr. John Harrison of the School 
of Oriental and African Studies and completed under Professor K. 
Ballhatchet. Under the tolerant guidance of Mr. Harrison I was able 
to develop.my own approach to this study while under Professor 
Ballhatchet's direction I was able finally to come to an end of my 
Odyssey. Professor C.H.Philips kindly read and commented on part of 
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Introduction
THE PERIOD AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
9
INTRODUCTION
This study is set amidst years of great transformation:.!]! 
Britain, years which saw "fundamental political and constitutional 
reforms, deep sectional and sectarian controversies ... an extra** 
ordinary and precocious development of party politics, some epoch- 
making administrative innovations and the elaboration of fiscal 
and financial policies which set the pattern for the rest of the 
century11. The three and a half decades following Waterloo were 
in fact 11 the formative period of Victorian Britain11.^  This study 
commences in the middle of that period, at a time when the Great 
Reform of Parliament, Toy giving political recognition to the economic 
and social consequences of the Industrial Revolution, had profoundly 
altered the conditions of British politics.
As with Britain, the years from Waterloo down to the end of 
our period were of fundamental importance in the development of modem 
India. With the final collapse of Maratha power in l8l8 British para- 
mouncy was an undisputed fact. As in the British case, it was the 
l830s which saw a fundamental political redefinition in India by 
Parliamentary enactment. By the Charter Act of 1833» one of a series 
of measures associated with the Great Reform of 1832, the Governor 
General df Bengal became the Governor General of India. In the hands
^See N. Gash, The Age of Peel, p.l.
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of the Supreme Government at Calcutta was centralized all legis­
lative and executive power while a Law Commission, charged with 
the task of elaborating a system of laws, judiciary and police, 
common to all British India was created and attached to it. The 
act of 1833 also terminated the trading activities of the East 
India Company leaving it a purely administrative body completely 
under the authority of the Crown’s Board of Control. Much in the 
act had a bearing on the social condition of the natives of India, 
and the years that followed saw the emergence of a national system of 
education, a public works program, the beginningcf the Government's 
association with the construction of the Indian railway system, the 
institution of the penny post and the telegraph system. They saw 
too, the creation of the Indian Finance Department and the reform 
of the Indian tariff system, controversies on the Government's re­
lationship to the religious practices of Indians, about slavery in 
India, and the exportation of Indian labour overseas, the conquest 
of the Sind, of the Punjab, and Pegu and the annexation of a number 
of princely states.
The remarkably comprehensive character of the Charter Act of 
1833 was to a large extent an expression of the nature of the Reform 
Ministry which brought it forward and the reformed Parliament which 
enacted it. That this Act forms a watershed in the development of 
modern India is reflected by the fact that it forms the terminal
point for a number of studies and the starting point for a number 
of others. C.H.Philips has brought the study cf the influence of 
the Home Government upon British policy in India down to the year 
1834. Among the works that have followed since the publication of 
his 'East India Company 1782f-l83/t , B.B.Misra has provided a study 
of 'The Central Administration of the Eat India Company 1773-1832*- » 
and A. Tripathi one of Trade and Finance in the Bengal Presidency, 
1793-1833 . Among those taking the Charter Act of 1833 as a start­
ing point have been P. J.Thomas in his Growth of Federal Finance in 
India from 1833 to 1939 , S.V.Desika Char with Centralized Legis­
lation, A history of the legislative system of British India from 
183^ to l86l and A.C.Banerjee*s f,,fhe working of the Supreme Govern­
ment of India and its constitutional relations with the Home Author-
itiesm 1833-53".
Important though the Charter Act of 1833 was for the subse­
quent conduct of Indian government}this thesis is not chiefly con­
cerned with the immediate or prospective provisions of that great 
act of Indian policy. It is concerned rather with the continuing 
effect of British politics on Indian policy throughout the period.
Thus while an entire chapter is devoted to the formulation and passage 
of the Charter Act of 1833 it is in terms of the duration of successive
■^Cambridge, M. Litt., 1967.
Ministries, Whig or Conservative, 1 that this study is thereafter 
organized. The extent to which the Cabinet Minister for India, 
the President of the Board of Control, was able to dominate the 
machinery of Indian government in England is in itself a measure 
of the potential influence of British politics upon Indian policy 
and the question of the control he could exercise constitutes, there­
fore, a major theme in the discussion of the organization of the 
Home Government in the first chapter. This chapter is concluded by 
a complementary discussion of the manner in which British politics 
acted upon Indian policy in our period. In the second chapter the 
Charter of 18^3 is examined as an act of Indian policy on the part 
of one Ministry, the Whig Government of Lord Grey, while the criti­
cism of the Conservative Opposition is regarded as a statement of an 
alternative approach. In chapter three the whole range of Indian 
policy, analyzed in this thesis, is presented for the first time 
both under a Whig President and then under a Conservative during 
Peel*s brief first Ministry, l83*H35- Chapter four brings a new 
phenomenon in the appointment of a Governor General, Lord Auckland, 
from among the Ministers of the day with the resultant intimate con­
nection between his conduct and that of the Cabinet Minister for India
1
The term Liberal as applied to the Whigs aid their allies was gaining
currency by the end of the period.
during the years of Lord Melbourne's administration, l833-*fl.
The following chapter presents the contrast of Conservative Ministers 
for India working with Conservative Governors General during the years 
of Peel's second administration. Chapter six witnesses the return of 
the Whigs in 1846 with Peel's appointee, Lord Hardinge, left in India 
till the beginning of l8 f^8 . He is then succeeded by the appointee 
of the Russell Ministry and a consequent shift in policy occurs. 
Russell's Government is followed in 1832 by the short-lived one of 
Lord Derby which provides an example of the effect that a particularly 
weak Ministry has on Indian policy. This last chapter concludes with 
the advent of the Aberdeen Coalition in 1833 which embodies both Peel- 
ite and Whig approaches to Indian questions. In the Conclusion a 
summary is made of both Whig and Conservative policy towards India 
over the twenty years of this study.
Besides the intrinsic importance of the years with which this 
study is concerned there is another very important aspect of our period 
deriving simply from its length. These twenty years extend into eight 
Ministries and five Governor Generalships. They provide a long enough 
time span to permit of an unhurried observation of the emergence and 
development of policies and thus minimize the risk of attributing too 
much to one administration or one individual. They provide, too, the 
enormous advantage of being able to compare and contrast what was 
done under one Ministry with what was done under preceding and subse­
quent Governments.
Chapter One
THE HOME GOVERNMENT: ITS ORGANIZATION
AND THE ROLE OF THE MINISTER FOR INDIA, THE 
COURT OF DIRECTORS. AND BRITISH POLITICS
DURING * THE YEARS 183^-55
Chapter 1
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”If the East India House only arrests the eye of the passenger, 
there is nothing in the building particularly calculated to make him 
pause in the midst of the busy thoroughfare of Leadenhall Street”, 
we are told by an observer of the London scene about 1843."** ”The 
howling and the yelling of the bidders” at the Company’s sales which 
had once been heard as far away as Leadenhall market were a thing of 
the past. For under the Charter Act of 1833 the United Company of 
Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies, after an existence 
of over two hundred years, had been commanded by Parliament to sus­
pend its commercial activities and to hold ”in trust for His Majesty ...
2
for the service of the Government of India” all its assets whatsoever. 
The long process by which the East India Company had evolved from a 
trading into a purely administrative body had thus been brought to 
its final and abrupt completion.
^"Charles Knight, London, vol. 3i P*^9*
^3 8c 4 William IV, c 83 s 1. The Charter Act of 1833 received the 
Royal Assent on 28 August 1833 and took effect from 22 April l83^«
Over the next four years the Company substantially completed the 
task of winding up its commerce. Under the disadvantage of forced 
sale it disposed of its tea and sold its indigo, pepper, salt­
petre, silk and silk piece goods for some £8,000,000. Its ships, 
ships stores, warehouses and other property wer„ sold for rather 
under £1,000,000, while its liquid assets brought the total realized 
to just over £13,000,000. P.P. 1837-38* vol. XLI, paper 206.
The East India Company as a corporate entity did not, of course, 
disappear. But henceforth it was to be simply ,!an organ of Govern­
ment for India11 and as such its every act was to be under the "super­
intendence, direction and control" of the Ministry of the day, through
the instrumentalityfcf the Crown's Board of Control. The continued 
existence of the Company, however, ensured the survival of those 
traditions of government which had evolved with the rise of British 
dominion in India. How effective the tradition of the Company ad­
ministration would be and what authority its Directors, Proprietors 
and permanent officials would wield under the new dispensation intro­
duced by the Charter Act remained to be discovered. It was believed 
or asserted that the dual system of government in England, by both 
Crown and Company would provide a check against an uncontrolled ex­
ercise of power by a single body. Commenting on the ’India Bill', 
the Governor General, Lord William Bentinck welcomed the preservation 
of the Company as an intermediate, counselling body. The President 
of the Board was, he said, "an accidental and ever changing figure", 
but the Court of Directors would serve as a valuable check on hasty
Ministry’s spokesman for the Bill, argued in the Commons "that the 
Crown must have a certain authority over India, that there must be
measures, and legislation 1 Thomas Babfcington Macaulay, as the
■^Bentinck, Minute on the India Bill, 29 January 183^, Bengal Secret 
Consultations, I.
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an effective check on the authority of the ■■Crown11 and that "We 
have such a body - the Company".^
The question of whether Macaulay*s statement was more than a 
rhetorical flourish, an appeal to the constitutional philosophy of 
Locke's Two Treatises on Government to justify a plan for the govern­
ment of India which retained a Chartered Company in an age of reform, 
is more than an invitation to the always enjoyable task of assessing 
Macaulay's objectivity. The Reform Act of 1832 and the Charter Act 
of the following year profoundly altered the circumstances of British 
politics and Indian government, the influence of the former upon the 
latter became more far reaching and intense. As a Cabinet Minister 
the President of the Board was naturally more subject to these in­
fluences than were the men at the India House who were primarily a 
body of Indian experience . How and in what manner the Company really 
could serve as a check upon the power of the Minister in the new 
state of things is a question of major importance for this study, 
one to which the following section, besides fulfilling the obligation 
to describe the complex system and the various establishments of the 
Home Government, should provide the material for an answer.
^Hansard, 3S, XVIII, 3 1 House of Commons, 10 July 1833
The Select Committee of 1832, on the affairs of the Company, 
stated that since Pitt's India Act of 1784 the Proprietors of East 
India Company stock had been "virtually precluded from all substantial 
interference in the affairs of I n d i a . T h o u g h  the Proprietors were 
not without significant effect on the composition of the Company’s 
administration, functionally, at least, they were the least import­
ant part of the home government. By the terms of their renewed 
Charter the Proprietors became annuitants on the finances of the 
Government of India. In return for the transfer of the Company's 
assets to the Government, the dividend on their stock which had long 
stood at 10^/2°/° per annum was guaranteed to the Proprietors at that
rate for the next forty years, at the end of which period payments
2
would cease and their principal would be redeemed.
P.P.1831-32, vol.VIH,p.ll. Prior to 1784 the Proprietors had had 
the power to rescind or alter resolutions of the Court of Directors, 
occasioning ’'prolonged and bitter strife between the two bodies". 
Philips, p.3«
^3 & 4 William IV, c.8 3, ss 11 & 12. Their principal was to be re­
deemed at £200 (roughly the market value in 1832) for every £100 
worth of stock, which would involve a payment of £1 2,000,000 in 
1874. Irrespective, then, of what Parliament might decide at the 
Charter renewal of 1833 a statutory limit had been put on the Com­
pany’s existence as a corporate body. Though it ceased to be an 
administrative body by Act of Parliament in 1838, the Company’s 
legal existence continued until 1874.
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The quarterly meetings of the Proprietors, the General Courts,
held in the old Sale Room of the India House,^ were regularly called,
however, and continued to serve as a forum for the public debate of
Indian affairs though the attendance was now numbered in tens rather
2
than in the hundreds of former years. The Court of Proprietors re­
tained its right to petition Parliament in the name of the Company, 
and to call for any papers in the possession of the Court of Directors - 
all of which powers they frequently exercised. The Chairman of the 
Court of Directors who presided over the debates usually managed to 
avoid or delay the adoption of a motion that would prove embarrassing. 
But on occasion the Directors themselves might be found among the 
critics of a particular policy and ready to make use of the Court of 
Proprietors, for we find one President of the Board irritatedly re­
marking of the Directors: "All that they can do if they wish to make
their dissents public /jls/ to get some meddlesome gentleman to move
The meetings were held in March, June, September and December.
Special meetings could be called on the petition of nine or more 
Proprietors.
^Philips. p.3 i gives two or three hundred as a representative figure 
during the early part of the century. The published Debates at the 
India House, 1843-38 give figures for divisions on important questions 
ranging between thirty and seventy votes. See also PIP, 1852-53* 
vol.XXX, 0. 332.
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for them either in the Court of Proprietors or in Parliament. But 
even then the President has the power of refusing to give any 
paper connected with the Secret Committee; and if the Government 
has a majority in Parliament may easily dispose of any motion to 
that effect11,'1’ a remark which reveals something of the relation­
ship of these General Courts to the larger arena of public opinion
on India. The Proprietors1 debates did provide a valued platform
2
for the more outspoken critics of the Indian administration, and
the fact that journalists were allowed into the gallery of the old
Sale Room, and that such specialist periodicals as the Asiatic
Journal and the Indian News reported the debates in detail ensured
3
that their criticism would receive some publicity.
^Home Misc., 8^9» p*21*f, John Cam Hobhouse to Lord Dalhousie.
2.Some of the more outstanding of these were - the ubiquitous radical 
Joseph Hume, the father of Alan Octavian, one of the founders of the 
Indian National Congress; Malcolm Lewin, brother-in-law of the 
historian George Grote, who came into serious collision with the 
Governor of Madras, Lord Tweedale; George Thompson, agent for 
the King of Delhi and instrumental in the founding of the British 
India Society; John Dickinson at whose house in St. James* Square 
the British India Society was formed; Holt Mackenzie and John 
Sullivan.
^The reports of these debates give us the onl^4erbal accounts of 
the opinions of the Directors other than Parliamentary Reports and 
private correspondence and their dissents from decisions of the 
Court as a whole. The Minutes of the Court of Directors give no 
record of the acts of individuals, simply that of the Court as a 
whole.
O ~2
More important to the home government than the above function 
was the fact that the Proprietors formed the electoral body for 
the Court of Directors of the Company. The voting qualification^ 
unchanged by the latest Charter, were at least £1,000 of India Stock 
for one vote, £3 ,0 0 0 for two votes, £6 ,0 00 for three and £10,000  
or upwards for the maximum of four votes. In 38^ 2 there were 1,763 
Proprietors entitled to vote and of these 413 were entitled to more 
than one vote, bringing the total of votes which could be cast to 
2,332.^ The franchise, then, was quite broadly distributed and from 
1834 onwards the Proprietors were able to vote by letter of attor­
ney if they did not wish to make the journey to the India House.
Thty provision profoundly affected the nature of the canvass 
made for a seat in the Direction, for as a candidate who was at 
length successful relates, the time was gone when "the united in­
terests of influential London Merchants and bankers could secure an
election. Every one of the 2300 ^ic/Proprietors had to be soli-
2
cited in person or by letter".
2
The number of Proprietors with the vote in 1832 was some 211 more, 
namely 1 ,976, while the number of votes that could have been cast 
was 336 greater or 2,668. P.P.1831-32, vol.IX, q. 12; P.P.1832,
vol. X, Appendix, p.343*
^H.T.Prinsep. Three Generations in India, p.271. See also Testimony 
of W.6.Bird, P.P.1852. vol. X , q.ll49.
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One of the main motives of the Proprietors in continuing 
to exercise with such care their right to elect the Directors was 
that this gave them a claim to a share in the patronage enjoyed by 
the latter. Openings in the Directorate were few and keenly con­
tested, so that the voters could require of those who solicited 
their support a due reward in civil and military appointments for 
their families, friends or clients.'*' However private interest and 
public responsibility did not prove mutually exclusive within the
proprietory body. Many Proprietors were personally connected with 
2
India, as the Select Committee had noted, and actively interested 
in its affairs. The result was, as John Stuart Mill pointed out to 
the Select Committee of 1832, that those who possessed influence, 
exercised it with a sufficiently strong sense of responsibility
3
to prevent them from selecting any person unfit to fill the post.
The Report of the Select Committee of 1832 gives as reasons, in 
addition to a profitable investment, for becoming a Proprietor, 
"connection with that country (India) ... a desire to take part 
in the discussion of Indian affairs at the General Courts; and 
for the purpose of promoting the election of their friends and 
participating in the patronage". P.P. 1831-32» vol.TO, p.11.
The occupations of the Proprietors are not known in their entirety, 
the Company*s stock ledgers give only partial evidence on this 
subject. See P.P. 1831-32, vol.IX , q.26 and Appendix B, p.323- 
Prom scattered references and from the known occupations of the 
fathers of the Company servants, many of whom were Proprietors, 
we know that aside from Company servants, who were not much more 
than a seventh of the total, there were widows, spinsters, officers 
of H.M.*s forces, clergymen, members of the gentry and a few of the 
nobility, and members of the banking and commercial communities - 
these last were less numerous after the cessation of the Company*s 
trade. See also PP.1832-33, vol.X^C, q.3007.
1852-53. vol.XXX, q. 3OO6.
There is a parallel here with Parliamentary elections prior to 
1832 - but also with the gradually rising standards of public be- 
haxiourr visible in the politics of early Victorian England.
The greatest deterrent to men whose experience and standing 
made them eligible for a seat on the Direction were the rigours of 
the canvass of the Proprietory body. Prom five to seven years were 
commonly required of a successful candidate, involving travelling 
about the country, attending election committees and maintaining a 
private clerk - all at considerable expense.'*' Some of the Company’s 
most distinguished civil and military servants confessed themselves 
dissuaded, by this 'undignified* ordeal, from attempting to obtain 
what should have been the complement to their careers in India, although
it was claimed that had they come forth they would have been elected
2 3in due course. Nonetheless testimony before the Select Committee
of 1832 shows that it was clearly a matter of concern that 'parti­
cularly distinguished Indian servants' should be elected or appointed
^P.P.1832, vol. X , q.1735, Testimony of the Director W.H.Sykes, 
who expended £2 ,228 on his canvass.
P.P.1832,vol. X, q.73^- The list of candidates given in the 
Asiatic Journal, 3S, vol. 2, Nov. 18^3-April l8Mf, appears to sup­
port this assertion. Over half were successful including the two 
most outstanding, R.D.Mangles and H.T.Prinsep, both former members 
of the Supreme Government of Calcutta.
■2
Prior to the Charter Acts if 1833 and 183^ there were of course 
Parliamentary investigations. The Select Committee of 1832 was on 
the affairs of the East India Company while that of 1832 was, sig­
nificantly, on the affairs of the Indian Territories.
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to the Directorate with less difficulty than had been the case. 1
Despite initial proposals to the contrary, the constitution 
of the Court of Directors had been left unchanged by the Charter 
of 1833• This branch of the home government continued to be formed 
from a body of thirty men - twenty four of whom at any one time 
formed the Court, each Director serving for four years and going 
’out by rotation' during the fifth. At the general election, 
which took place each year on the second Wednesday in April, the 
six Directors who were 'out1 were re-elected by the Proprietors 
as a matter of form from the 'House List' which was submitted to
2
them by the Court. It was in fact only by the death or resignation
of a Director that new men could enter the Court, and such oppor-
3
tunities arose at the rate of slightly more than one a year.
^.P. 1832, vol. X , qq. 172 and 2kl&-2k. The proposals put forth 
by W.H.Sykes, ahd Vipoount Haydihge. tof Lahore.
2
The customary method of resignation was for the Director to reduce 
his India Stock below the required £2 ,0 00 and thus to 'disqualify*.
In the twenty years after 1833 twenty-two new Directors were elected, 
fifteen upon the death of the Director they replaced, seven because 
of a resignation. In the former case an election during the course 
of the Company year, from April to April, was necessitated. The 
incoming Director would, in such a case, assume the duties of the 
Director he replaced.
If we ask what manner of man secured election we find that 
the fifty~two men who were members of the Direction between 
l83 f^ and l833» some thirty-three had served in a civil, military 
or legal capacity in India.^ Of the nineteen others, five had 
served in the Company's maritime service, two had been supercargoes 
at the Canton factory (abolished by the Act of l833)> five were
2
merchants,and seven were bankers who had never resided in the East. 
Significant for the trend it reveals is the fact that of the twenty- 
two men who entered the Direction after April 183^ only two, both 
bankers, had no personal experience of India or China. It was in­
deed their continuing interest in matters Indian, and the appetite 
for managing policy and the habits of action formed in responsible 
positions in the Company's service, which led men on retirement to 
seek a place within the Directorate. Colonel A. Galloway thus con­
fessed to Bentinck when soliciting his help in the canvass, "I 
know not what it is but I feel quite lost for want of some employment -
By the term "legal" we wish to distinguish those Directors who had 
occupied posts in the King's Courts in India. It was of course 
normal for Company'civil servants to perform magisterial and judi­
cial duties.
2
These categories are not mutually exclusive. Ex maritime servants 
were quite likely to become merchants. The great majority of Directors 
were however retired with no duties more demanding for example than 
serving on the Board of Governors of an'insurance company.
26
except indeed that I am undergoing the drudgery of electioneering11.^
There is some evidence too that the Company servant who aspired to
a seat on the Direction did not lack the encouragement of his
fellows in his particular branch of the service to make or make good 
2
his candidacy. For merchants and bankers , however, the Direction
of the Company had become less attractive with the cessation of the
Company's trading activities. As John Stuart Mill put it, there were
"not the same inducements as formerly ... either to hold stock, or to
3
become Directors", and this would explain the smaller number of men 
in these professions who were prepared to attempt the canvass of 
the Proprietors.
The choice of men, many of whom had seen years of service in 
India and had undergone the lengthy process of selection for a 
vacancy in the Court, ensured that the Directors were by and large 
men of mature years. 'Our Eastern Sages' or 'those old men' was 
the sort of epithet an impatient or petulant President of the Board 
might use about them. And indeed some of our Directors had begun 
their careers in the days of Cornwallis and Wellesley - over a third
^Bentinck Mss., Galloway to Lord William Bentinck, 6 Nov. 1833*
2Ibid.
3P.P. 1852-53. vol.XXX, q.3007.
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had entered the service before the clear establishment of 
British supremacy in India consequent on the fall of the Maratha 
empire in l8l8. Acutely aware that the manner in which the empire 
had been obtained had often required the acquiescence or even the 
support of the Indians themselves, the Directors were less open to 
those forces exerted on the Minister for India which, favouring
A
change, would blur the tenets of caution. To them, the continuance, 
the very existence of British rule in India depended on restraint 
or non-intervention in certain vitally sensitive areas. Chiefest 
of these was the religious, and hence much of the social life and 
laws of the people. This meant the stringent observance of "the 
compact of the British Government with the people of India to secure 
to them the full observance of their religion and laws";"1* upon
this depended "not only ... the lives and fortunes of every European
   2
m  the country ... but the very existence of our Government".
Also vital was 'the faith of treaties' made with a welter of Native
Princes, the result of the varied, piecemeal manner in which the
A
empire had been acquired. To that view, to which the Benthamite 
Examiner of Indian correspondence at the India House gave such elo­
quent expression, that the happiness of the greater number of Indians
^E./2/l2, 226, Court of Directors to the President of the Board
of Control, 13 June 1833.
^H.H.George Tucker, Memorials of-Indian Government, ed..- JvW.Kaye, 
P.355.
lay "frankly and simply" with the extension of British administration 
to the Native States,'1' they could oppose the view that unwarranted 
intervention in the affairs of these states could not fail to shake 
the attachment and confidence of every native prince and chieftain 
throughout India, and might at some future period lead to conse­
quences greatly to be deprecated. The conviction that the extension 
of the Empire would be an evil, because addition of territory strained 
its resources and threatened its stability, was an attitude which 
was as .old as the Company's territorial dominion itself, and which 
continued to characterize the position of the Court as a body during 
these years of great activity on and beyond the borders of India.
The course of British politics after 1830 did much to strengthen 
the conservative tendencies within the Direction.^ This was true 
above all of the passage by the reformed Parliament of the Charter 
Act of 1833 which came virtually at the dictate of Parliament and 
the Ministry fundamentally changed the character of the Company, and 
instituted the greatest changes since the days of Cornwallis, in 
its Indian administration.
^P.P. 1831-3^  volJCIV , qq. 36 and 43. Evidence of James Mill.
2
Politically the Court were overwhelmingly Conservative, and were 
regarded as being so by their contemporaries. Of the thirteen 
Directors who sat as Members of Parliament in the years 1834 to 
1833 nine were Conservatives and only four are listed as Liberals, 
see C.R.Dod, Electoral Facts.
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Such basic continuity of attitude among the Directors was 
the more understandable because the ties which were the result 
of common service, frequently as colleagues on board or council in 
India, were carried over by the Directors into their life in Eng­
land, They chose dwellings within easy reach of Leadenhall Street, 
residing for the most part in the agreeable borough of St, Maryle- 
bone. Upper Harley Street, Portman Square and Devonshire Place 
are addresses that occur more than once in the Company*s official 
directory, the East India Register. Within this locale, where a 
retired 1Indian* of substance, though not necessarily of great 
wealth} could afford to reside, the Directors and their families 
carried on a lively social intercourse. Charlotte Maria Tucker, 
the daughter of one Director, gives us a picture of a ball at 
which there were 11 the misses Cotton, two misses Galloway, two misses
Shepherd, the Eastwicks were not there but our friend Colonel Sykes
2was*', a roll call in fact of Directoral names. And there, too, on 
occasion might have been seen the Duke of Wellington, or Charles 
Grant, Lord Glenelg, other examples of the Indian connection. In
^We wish to distinguish here between the estate of John Thornhill, 
formerly of the Bengal Civil Service, valued at £30,000, a repre­
sentative figure for civilians, with that of those merchants or 
bankers in the Direction who were toorth ten or more times as much. 
See Thornhill Papers.
^A. Giberne, A Lady of England, pp. 23 & 36.
close proximity were also to be found the Royal Asiatic Society 
in New Burlington Street and the Oriental Club in Hanover Square.
Of the latter a contemporary writer acidly commented, "It is the 
region of calico shirts, returned writers, and guinea pigs grown 
into bores". "Enter it", he said "and it looks like a hospital 
in which a smell of curry powder pervades the wards".^ Even with­
out the growing number of merchants and others from India there 
was a considerable body of men with Indian experience to support 
such institutions. Itwas estimated by the Secretary to the Com­
pany in 18,52 that there were "in this country upwards of 1600 persons,
including those on furlough, who have been in the service in India
2
ten years or upwards". Not surprisingly intermarriage among 
families with a tradition of service in the East was common, and
A.F.Baillie, The Oriental Club and Hanover Square, p.113. The 
Royal Asiatic Society was founded in 1S23 as the London counterpart 
of the older Asiatic Society of Bengal, and the Oriental Cluh in 
1824. The tone of the comment on the returned 'Indian* is reminiscent 
of earlier attitudes towards the eighteenth century 'Nabobs'. But 
as the sober concept of service in the Indian civil or military ad­
ministration replaced that of the romance of the private fortune, 
the status of the Conpany's servants ^teadil^ rose. A milestone 
in this process occurred in 1818 when the Prince Regent signified 
that officers of the East India Company might be raised to the dig­
nity of Knight Commander of the Bath (K.C.B.). Henceforth the ac­
quisition of Royal Honours became a widely sought after recognition, 
not least among the Directors themselves.
2P.P. 1852-53, vol.XXX,, q. 299
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on the basis of the available pedigrees the Directors were no 
exception. It would be incorrect, however, to view the Direction 
as a group of men connected primarily by blood ties to one another.
It was a common experience in India, and an interest in Indian 
affairs carried over to home, that seems to have been the most 
significant bond between the members of the Directorate.
The constant changes in the composition of the Court, both 
annually by 'rotation* and intermittently by death or resignation, 
as well as the independence of mind and the variety of experience 
of this body of men, might favour fluctuations on policy on parti­
cular issues. The complaint of <me Director, W.H.Sykes, was not 
unique: "If it is derogatory to individuals to vacillate in opinion 
and line of action how much more so must it be to a grave deliber­
ative body charged with the highest and most important functions."’*' 
But if policy over a longer period is considered, continuities of 
approach can clearly be seen, and for this reason it is better to 
think in terms of the attitudes or tendencies of the Court as a 
body when we assess its role in policy formation. That body was an 
elderly and cautious one. The great changes that were enacted in 
the constitution of the Company and the Government of India in l833> 
changes which came in the manner of a dictate riding the crest of
~*~B/2yf, p.236. Dissent of 2b July l84^ f. In a dissent of 10 November 
1838, H. St. Geo. Tucker speaks of the 'fluctuating councils' of 
the Court. B/2*f2, p.560.
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the reform movement, were greatly to strengthen the conservative
tendencies, bom of Indian experience, within the Direction.
The first functionof the Cunrt of Directors was tcnapply their
collective experience of India to the reviewing of administration
and policy. The second was to appoint and train those who would
form the new generation of administrators and soldiers in India.
We have the testimony of the Company secretary, James Cosmo Mel-
vill~, that the latter constituted virtually their own reward as
Directors.^- What the value of this patronage was cannot of course
be readily estimated, for as Peter Auber, MelviH* s predecessor saw,
2
its subjective value differed with the individual who possessed it.
For the bankers, for example, its possession acted as a valuable
3inducement to custom, but it also provided more general satisfaction 
to all Directors. As Lord Ellenborough, an ex-President of the Board 
and ex-Viceroy, observed, since it was of infinite importance to a 
man to get a cadetship or a writership for his son or nephew, which
"^Their salaries, £500 for the Chairman, £300 for tie Directors, would 
scarcely in themselves have attracted able men.
^.P. 1851-32. vol. IX, q.80.
3B.W.Currie, a partner in the banking firm of Glyn, Mills and Co., 
recounts of the Director, Charles Mills, that he "very fairly dis­
tributed the valuable patronage which belonged to that office, though 
as he used to tell me, an application from a good customer of the 
bank was not often refused". Recollections, vol. I, p.9^.
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was an entire provision for life,the power of bestowing such a boon
made the Director lfa man of great social influence11.'*' Indeed the
prestige of possession of the patronage of an empire was a glorious
thing in itself.
Substantially the Directors’ patronage consisted of the
initial appointments to the civil, military, medical and marine
2
services of the Company. The total number of appointments to be 
made in any one year* was divided into twenty eight parts; the Chair­
man, the Deputy Chairman and, by invariable custom, the President 
of the Board too, each received two ’shares’, while each of the 
remaining twenty-two Directors received a single share apiece.
In the years l83*t-35 to 1831-52 inclusive there were on an average 
35 civil appointments or writerships, 286 military cadetships, ¥f 
assistant surgeonships and nine appointments of midshipmen in the
3
Indian navy to be made per annum. That is to say one and a quarter 
writerships, roughly ten cadetships, and some thing ever one and a
1Hansard, 3S, CXXVIII, 5» Lord Ellenborough, House of Lords, 13
June 1833.
2
Appointments to the home establishment were also made by the 
Directors. They also made the ’subsequent* appointments of the 
Superintendent of the Indian Navy, the general officers on the 
staff of the Company’s armies, the masters-attendant in Bengali 
and Madras, the volunteers for the pilot service in Bengal, the 
law officers to the Government for each of the Presidencies,and 
with the previous consent of the Archbishop of Canterbury or the 
Bishop of London, the chaplains to India. P.P. 1852-531 vol.XXX, 
q.197.
3P.P.l852, vol. X ,qq.223 & 225.
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half assistant surgeonships were, on an average, annually in the 
gift of each Iftrector.
What these appointments would have been worth, had it been 
in the ^.rectors' power to sell them, was a matter of some ^ peculation 
among contemporaries. The estimates given in 1853 & single
Directoral share of patronage range between £10,000 and £12,000 a 
year which is appreciably higher than those given earlier in the 
century,^ If we accept an infantry cadetship in the Company's ser­
vice as being the equivalent of an ensigncy in H.M.'s forces, which 
we are told was worth about £h50, and if we also make allowance for 
the cavalryappointments and seminary cadetships, fewer in number 
than the infantry appointments but more valuable individually, then 
the 10 /b cadetships of a Directoral share would yield a figure of 
about £5,000 to £6,000 a year. With 1^/4 writerships each valued 
at from £3 ,0 00 to £h,500, plus an assistant surgeonship of unknown
value, a Director's total for one year would certainly have been
3well over £10 ,000 had he possessed the right of sale.
^Philips, p.15 & n., gives a figure of between £5,000 and £6,000. c.l8l3.
Both the numbers and individual values of the military appointments 
made in our period appear to have risen over the decades. Not so 
much with the civil patronage however. This appears to be a reflection 
of the economies applied to the civil administration in India from 
Lord Bentinck's time, 1828-36 onwards.
The Bengal Hurkaru, 31 Nay and 17 June 1853, PP« 396 and 656 resp.;
The Times, 7 April 1853, P*7, col. b.
^See Bombay Times, 2 May 1853, p.828, col. c.
We have seen that it was public knowledge that the Proprietors
shared to an unspecified extent in the exercise of the Directors1
patronage. From the poll and patronage books of one Director,
W.H.C.Plowden, for the first seven or eight years after his election
in l84l, it is possible to identify upwards of two-thirds of those
upon whose recommendations particular cadetships were awarded as
being Proprietors - and the vast majority of these as having voted
for Plowden at his election.^ Other evidence lends support to the
impression given by the Plowden Papers that the Proprietory body
2was the focus fdr the distribution of the military patronage.
Home Misc., 820, Plowden Papers. From 1848-9 onwards the proportion 
going to the Proprietors shows a decline, presumably because a 
large part of Plowden's electoral obligations had been paid off by 
this time. It seems probably that after 1833 a greater part than 
before of the Directors' military patronage went to the Proprietors 
because of the cessation of the Company's trade deprived the Directors 
of boons other than appointments with which to satisfy their obli­
gations. The papers of Kichard, father of W.H.C.Plowden, a Director 
in the second and third decades of the century, accord with this sur­
mise.
p
A Proprietor writing to The Times in 1833 gives a revealingjicture 
of how the cadetships were distributed. In two cases where he 
applied for a cadetship he was frankly told by the Directors con­
cerned that 'the contest from which they had just emerged success­
fully had utterly absorbed their patronage for some years to come'.
He went on to show how those who pooled their votes were more success­
fully obtiaining their desires. The Times, 8 April 1853, p. 3y col.a. 
When the Bombay Times, 2 May 1853, p.829, col. b speaks of flthe ten 
thousand families looking out for Indian appdntments11 they are ob­
viously using a round figure but it is not impossible that the con­
nections of the approximately two thousand Proprietors with the vote 
might have accounted for the greater part of this number.
With the civil patronage no such correlation is posable, the
Directors appear to have exercised more freedom of choice. A
recent study by B S.Cohn provides us with an estimate, based upon
the oppositions of the Directors themselves, that of the civil
appointments made between l809 and I83O just less than a quarter
were given to kinsmen while just over half were bestowedon the
1
grounds of friendship. The beneficiaries of the Directors' 
patronage can thus be seen to have been a specific, fairly limited 
group characterised by ties, either of family, friendship or 
electoral obligation, with the Directors and hence with the Company.
Those nominated to the Company's service came mainly from 
the middle classes of British society. The largest group were sons 
of Company servants, but there were sizeable contingents from among 
the banking and mercantile community, from British military and ser­
vice families, from the gentry and the clergy, with smaller numbers 
from professional families and a mere sprinkling from the nobility. 
The system produced both a certain continuity and homogeneity 
throughout the Company. But despite its evident success in apply­
ing the needs of the Company's services, and its role in providing
B.S.Coh} lfThe Recruitment and Training of British Civil Servants 
in India, l600-l860n inR. Braibanti (ed.), Asian Bureaucratic 
Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, p.103, 
table 3 *
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the main reward of the Directors, ±hd patronage system came in­
creasingly to be seen as an eighteenth century anachronism in 
nineteenth century Britain. In 1783 and again in 1833 the Com­
pany’s patronage was threatened by the proposals of Whig states­
men,^ but with every decade after the Reform Act of 1832 it was 
public opinion in general to which the spectacle of private patron^ 
age on such a vast scale was to prove increasingly tolerable. How-* 
ever, the inevitable substitution of a system of entry by open 
competitive examination, effected by the Charter Act of 1833, did 
not result in any great change in the class of entrant into the Indian 
civil service.^ Any change in the character of the military cadets 
chosen after 1833 was, of course, overtaken by the events of 1837 
and the merging of the Company armies with the Queen's forces 
after the Mutiny, though even here the generalization that the
Charles James Fox in his India Bill of 1783 proposed to place the 
appointment of Company servants in the hands of seven Crown Com­
missioners. Under the Charter Act of 1833* ss 103-07, four can­
didates for each vacancy were to be nominated and allowed to sit 
a competitive examination. This fourfold system never came into 
operation, being first postponed and then suspended by act of 
Parliament.
^For the advance towards open competition see R.J.Moore, Sir 
Charles Wood's Indian Policy, l8§3-.&6* PP-83-93*
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effect was slight holds too. What occurred in both the services
of the Company was a "change in the type rather than in the class 
1
of entrantr the unique characteristic of the services depended not 
upon the class from which th^members came but rather upon the largely 
personal nature of the ties which existed between the Company and its 
servants.
Those ties were reinforced by the training which the Company
gave to its servants. The Company supplied the European officers
2for its Sepoy and European regiments either by direct appointment 
to the forces in India or, in the case of a selected one in three 
or thereabouts, after giving them a two year training at the Com~
3
panyfs military seminary at Addiscombe in Surrey. Some seventy 
to seventy-five officers a year passed out from Addiscombe, the
f
best qualified of these ’gentlemen cadets’ having been trained in 
the scientific branches of the service, the engineers or the artil­
lery, in that order, with the remainder going into the infantry.
J.R.Compton, *0pen Competition and the Indian Civil Service, 1834— 
1876", English Historical Review, LXXXIII (1968), p.283.
2
The Company also provided the European troops for its Indian armies - 
some 13,000 of them in 183 ,^ rising to 30 ,00 0 in 1831, using an 
establishment of recruiting agents throughout the British Isles.
In 183^ there were four recruiting offices, in London, Liverpool, 
Dublin and Cork. In 1839 one was added at Edinburgh and in 184-3 
one at Bristol and one at Newiy in Ulster. The Company’s depot at 
Chatham received the recruits and gave them a basic training before 
they were sent out to India. L/A.G. Range 26 (2), vol. 110, List 
of Establishments 1824-38, pp. 730-31. In 184-3 the depot was moved to 
Warley in Kent.
^There were 4-,04-8 European officers in the Company’s service in 1834- 
and 3,lte in 1831, P.P. 1832-53, vol. XXXI, q.93
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That one third of the military cadets received a professional 
training before their first posting was in itself something of a 
break with the British amateur tradition, but the careful training 
of all the civil servants of the Company was totally at odds with 
normal practice. All those nominated to the ’covenanted1^  civil 
service were required to spend two years at the Company's civil 
service college where they underwent a general course of study, in­
cluding Oriental languages, prior to proceeding to India.^ The 
minimum age for admission to the college at Haileybury in Hertford­
shire was seventeen and the maximum age for going out to India was 
twenty-three. The number of students in residence fluctuated between
seventy and ninety~five, with an average of forty students passing
■2
out annually in the years 183^ to 1833• This small contingent of
From the covenant which they signed before going out to India.
The usage, like the term writer, derives from the original com­
mercial character of the Company.
^The subjects studied incouded mathematics, classical languages, 
history and political economy. Sanskrit was begun in the first 
term, Persian in the second, and Hindustani in the third, with 
Telegu available for those who had been nominated to the Madras 
civil service. Arabic was taught in association with Persian, 
but Bengali was dropped from the curriculum on the grounds of its 
limited applicability. Haileybury was the first institution in 
England to establish a chair in political economy; this study and 
that of law amounted to a discussion of general principles.
3P.P. 1852-53, vol. XXXI, qq. 4833, 4890 and 4905
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men was sufficient to provide for the entire higher civil service 
of India, numbering between eight and nine hundred men. The two 
years which these men spent in common, the prestige of the covenanted 
service to which they, as the recipients of the most valuable patron­
age in the Directors1 gift, were destined, and the connection which 
so many of them enjoyed with the Company and with India, account 
for that 'esprit de corps' by which Sir George Otto Trevelyan differ­
entiated them from their successors, the 'competition wallahs'.
When the service was opened to public competition after 1853 the 
college, not inappropriately, soon came to be abolished; Haileybury 
and the patronage system 'passed out' from Indian administration 
together.
The effect of this system of patronage and training upqn 
the government of India was profound. It gave an organic character 
to the various elements of the Company, binding together the Pro­
prietors, the Directors and the Company's servants in India. By 
the social ties and family traditions it embodied, by the intellectual 
traditions which it inculcated, the patronage system imparted a con­
tinuity, in the broadest sense of the term, with in Indian admini- 
stratinn - notwithstanding the very great diversity of opinion 
among the men sent out under it, men as unlike in temperament and 
views as Sir Charles Trevelyan and Sir Alfred Lyall. In his memoirs 
Sir Henry Cotton, a member of a family whose name was always to be 
found in the lists of Proprietors and more than once in that of the
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*
Directors, expressed something of the assured, almost patrician 
manner the system could generate: "It is my pride, that I am, as
it were, an hereditary member of the Indian administration. " 1 The 
system also ensured thaljother than the official channels of in­
formation and communication to India would be open to the Directors - 
often to the discomfort of the appointees of the Ministry. "We 
can no more help their writing to their friends than we can avoid 
their recording their dissents at the India House", one Minister
p
for India was obliged to point out to a disgruntled Governor-General.
For the Directors, then the power of patronage was the unique 
ingredient in their position within the government of India. The 
historian Sir John William Kaye, who succeeded J.S.Mill as conductor 
of the political correspondence at the India House, looking back 
at the years before the 18^3 Charter, saw this very clearly. "When 
the patronage went to Her Majesty the Queen, or to the Queen*s 
Minister, or was thrown into a common store to be raffled or 'com­
peted* for by the outside world," he wrote, "all the power passed 
away from the managers of the great concern; and the kinder patriarchal
Sir H.C.Cotton, Indian and Home Memories, p.15. The author had 
received his appointment through his uncle, the Director John 
Cotton.
2
E.P.42, W.Vesey Fitzgerald to Lord Ellenborougn, 31 January l#+3.
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interest which they took in their servants passed away with it."'*'
Before proceeding to describe the working of the various
organs on the Company side of the home government, something may
be said about the role of correspondence within the whole system
of Indian government - a government which was aptly described as
one of record. John Stuart Mill put it thus in 1852: f!The whole
Government of India is carried on in writing. All the orders given
and all the acts of the executive officers, are reported in writing,
and the whole of the original correspondence is sent to the Home
Government; so that there is not a single act done in India, the
2
whole of the reasons for which are not placed on record.11 Mill's 
statement emphasises the extensiveness of the review - and makes 
plain the fact that correspondence was the very stuff of government 
as far as the home authorities, and this study, are concerned. Of 
the reviewing function Sir Charles Wood asserted in 1853 > speaking 
in the Commons, "Perhaps I should not be far wrong in saying that
J.W.Kaye, "The House that Scott Built", Comhilll Magazine, vol. 
16, 1867, pp. 361-2. The power of appdntment was no less import­
ant to the Governor-General. Lord Hardinge argued that without 
it the head of the government of India "would become like a pri­
vate gentleman, a mere cyphenf? P.P. 1852, vol. X, q.2365.
2P.P. 1852-53, vol. XXX, q.2916
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nine-tenths of the Indian business is to revise and to see whether
the administration of India is carried out consistently with the
1
principles laid down." The other tenth of the business of the 
home authorities is what this thesis is really concerned with, 
the process of decision making. But review of such extent and in­
tensity as Mill described becomes almost inseparable from direction, 
a limiting factor upon the Indian government, and a part of the 
circumstances under which all policy decisions were taken.
A complete record of all the departmental letters and the 
related minutes and resolutions of the members of Council at Cal­
cutta, Madras and Bombay, recorded as they were disposed of, were 
sent home annually as their proceedings. The more current business 
of the three governments was dealt with in quarterly general letters, 
bulky assemblages covering all the variety of topics handled by 
a particular department. Matters of more importance and urgency, 
intended for the special notice of the home authorities at the earli­
est possible date were discussed in separate letters, usually accom­
panied by collections, copies of all the papers relating to the 
matter at issue. Ellenborough, by a despatch of February 1830,
1Hansard 3S, CXXVII, UAO, 3 June 1853
instituted a reform of the correspondence system aimed at bringing 
nthe Local Governments more closely under the control of the home 
government, more particularly of the Board.”1 The enclosure of 
collection in the general letters was made mandatory,thus increas­
ing the intensity of the home government's review, and the Indian 
authorities were also urged as far as possible to treat of subjects 
in separate letters rather than in general ones. The effect of
these changes was to increase the number of seperate letters and
2
the speed with which business could be transacted at home. The
increase of territory and the use of steam communications by way
3
of the Red Sea also contributed to the double process. Individual
communications from India increased from 602 in 1830 to 2,*j43 in
1832, while outward despatches to the three Presidencies rose
Zi.
from 617 in 1830 to 909 by 18^9. It remains to see how the India
Philips, p.267.
^The use of separate letters didv however, mean considerably more 
work had to be performed in India. See P.P. 1832< vol. X, qq. 
833-4, testimony of H.T.Prineep.
■^ In the late l820s the voyage to or from India round the Cape by 
sailing ship took from four to five months - see Philips, p.26*f - 
but with the establishment of a regular steam communication by 
the Red Sea important despatches could travel between London and 
Calcutta in thirty-five days. P.P. 1832, vol. X, q.2^4l-2.
4
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House was organised to cope with this growing flow of correspondence 
and the task of review.
At their first meeting after the *general election1 in 
April the Court chose by ballot^ from among their number the Chair­
man and Deputy Chairman for the coming year. As it was customary 
to choose as Chairman the person who had been Deputy Chairman the 
previous year, the election was in practice for a new Deputy. Such 
was the burden of the work involved that Directors not infrequently 
declined to accept the responsibility from their fellows1,' notwith­
standing the double share of patronage which attached to the office. 
The Chairs1 were required to attend daily at the India House, 
and once a week they met with the President of the Board to discuss 
the main lines of policy and any pressing business. On the part of 
the other Directors daily attendance was not required. On Court 
days, Wednesdays that is, attendance averaged more than twenty,
while on other days upwards of eight Directors were generally to be
2found at the India House looking over the correspondence. The
■^ The secret ballot was first dropped in favour of the open vote, 
and then was subsequently reinstated in our period. See P.P.1852, 
vol. X, qq. 1830 and 1832.
2Ibid., qq. 17-19, and L/A.G. Range 26 (l), vol. 20.
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amount of work put in by individual Directors was to a large ex­
tent optional and this explains in part the varying weight enjoyed 
by the various members of the Court.
One reason why the office of the Chairman was so onerous 
and important was that it was he who initiated action on the in­
coming correspondence. It is most important to realise that the 
ordinary correspondence with Asia and elsewhere did not originate 
with the Directors as a body. It was the Chairman who gave the 
instructions, generally verbal, to the appropriate officer of the 
India House staff for the preparation of a draft despatch.'*' The 
prepared despatch, together with the often very voluminous back 
ground material of the Collections, was then sent to the Board as 
a Previous Communication, or P-C, and was only submitted to one 
of the Committees of the Court upon its return, altered or un­
altered, from the Board. The Chairman was in the position therefore 
of being able to form his opinions and line of action upon a know­
ledge both of the general feeling of the Court and the views pre­
vailing at the Board of Control. The influence of the Court upon
^The misleading statement that the Court originated the correspond­
ence is frequently made by officers of the Company*s home establish­
ment and is quoted in the Report of 1832, see P.P. 18^2, vol. X, 
qq. aO-Hl, 106; P.P. 1852-55. vol. XXX, q.191 and P.P.l831-3a, 
vol. VIII, p.12 of the Report. It is possible to view these state­
ments as 'persuasive definitions' of the Court's role, part of the 
continuing debate on the constitution of the Government of India.
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polcy was hence indirect in the first instance, dependent upon the 
discretion enjoyed by the Chairman and his inclination to frame 
despatches in consonance with the known views of his fellow Directors. 
The Court’s powers of initiation ought therefore to be seen as large­
ly passive and residual, operating through the Chairman upnn those 
issues, admittedly a majority, in which the Board did not wish to 
press a particular line of policy.
Upon the Chairman’s sense of timing, with respect to the 
climate of opinion in the Court, depended very greatly the success­
ful introduction of potentially controversial despatches. Likewise 
in the avoidance of unnecessary friction between the Board and the 
Court, the Chairman's role was crucial. It was thus stated of the 
Chairs that they would not lightly "send up a despatch which they 
know is contrary to the President's opinion" - unless some great 
principle was at stake and they were "anxious to have a contest
with the Board in order to place on record an important difference 
1of opinion." In the view of Hobhouse, President of the Board,
V j
the Chairmen were ideally the managers of the Court, and in this 
vein he wrote complainingly to Carnac, an ex-Chairman, "I regret 
the loss of Sir James Lushington very much. You and he used to
1P.P.1852-53. vol. XXX, 3. 3038.
keep the Court in decent o r d e r . V e s e y  Fitzgerald, another
President, a little later would write equally despondently to his
chief that he might not find the next Chairman "so disposed to
2
assist in all our views."
As the originators of action upon incoming letters and as 
the personal links between the Court and the Minister, the Chair­
men had a central place in themacbinery of the home government. The 
whole body of the Court of Directors was involved, however, in the
■5
general task of reviewing all incoming and outgoing correspondence, 
for which purpose the Court formed itself into a series of committees 
Prior to 183 ,^ when there were commercial as well as administrative 
matters to be dealt with, the committees were ranked in order of 
importance and staffed on the basis of directoral seniority. The 
most senior of these committees, that of Correspondence, was re­
sponsible for the bulk of the correspondence with India and was 
consequently much overburdened. With the reorganisation of the 
committee system consequent upon the cessation of the Company’s 
commercial activities, a more balanced and efficient distribution 
of work achieved, one which "rendered the personal participation 
of the whole of the 2*f Directors in the general business of India
^Home Misc. 839» p.150, Hobhouse to Sir J.R.Carnac, 15 June 1839*
^Add.Mss. f^0*f62, ff. 177-8, Fitzgerald to Sir Robert Peel, 30 
March l&f2.
^Other than that handled by the Secret Committee. See p. kef©
Despatches came home in duplicate. One copy was sent to the Board,
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much more complete than it was before.1' Three committees, the
Finance and Home, the Revenue, Judicial and Legislative, and the
2Political and Military were constituted to review the correspond-
3ence in their respective departments, both that with India and
with individuals and authorities in Britain. The directors were
Zf
assigned to the Committees m  what amounted to a random order,
' but a rule providing for mutual exchange between members meant
that those conversant with particular types of business, normally 
I found their way to the appropriate committee. Thus Neil Benjamin
Edmonstone, who had been Political Secretary to the Government of
India, was always to be found on the P & M Committee, while John
i ...
| Petty Muspratt, a banker, was invariably a member of the F & H
i
Committee. The Chairmen were ex-officio members of all three com-
!
I mittees.
and the other was laid on the Court's table, abstracts of the 
contents of the despatches were sent Id the Chairman and to the 
Committee having the superintendance of the department correspond­
ence to which the despatch related.
^P.P.1832-33i vol. XXX, q.3008. Testimony of J.S.Mill.
2
The committees' function was review not origination. The Director 
H. St. George Tucker, was one of the strongest advocates of the 
Court's autonomy, memorialised the Court in 1833 that each committee 
should "prepare and sign its own despatches to India", but his plan 
was rejected. See J.W.Kaye (ed.), Memorials of Indian Governments . 27.
3
Rt J 8c L Committee also handled the Public or Miscellaneous, the 
Ecclesiastical and the Marine correspondence. After 1837 the Marine 
correspondence was transferred to the F & H Committee, which from 
l8Zf9 handled all railway questions. List of Establishments, pp. 83- 
3 , 89 and 223.
L
P,P. 1832-33, vol. XXX, q. 2*f2.
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The reorganisation of the committee sjistem in 183^ had 
not been accompanied by any corresponding change in the elaborate 
process by which the letters to India were sifted prior to their 
despatch.^ As before, the process began with the preparation of 
draft replies to incoming Indian correspondence on the Chairmans 
instruction. When this original draft or P-C furnished by the 
Chairman had returned from the Board it was submitted to the appro­
priate committee. It then lay upon the table for about a wedc, 
during which time individual members perused it at their leisure. 
Thereafter the draft was brought before the whole committee to be 
altered or amended as it saw fit. The draft was then submitted to 
the full Court and was dealt with the next Court dayy that is on 
the next Wednesday. The Court as a body might still alter, reject 
or accept the draft, every Director hav ing a right to express 
his opinion on it and to record his dissent from the decision of 
the majority. After running this gauntlet the draft was sent again 
to the Board. If approved, the draft was returned, whereupon it 
was signed by at least thirteen of the Directors and despatched 
at once to India. If the Board had not accepted the Court's draft 
in toto it was once again submitted to the Committee upon whose 
report the full Court would decide to sign and despatch it, or to 
remonstrate with the Board. If they chose the latter course the 
draft went back to Cannon Row where the Board made a final decision 
on the issue.
Behind the Court of Directors and their Committees stood
the permanent staff of the India House. They were in fact, if not
in name, civil servants, being known in that administratively less
formal period which preceded the Northcote - Trevelyan Report as
the home establishment. In 1839 over two hundred clerical and
other staff were employed at the India House, at an annual cost in
salaries of over £75»OO0.^ The clerical staff was a markedly
professional body, nominated with care and well paid. Indeed, the
Company deservedly had the reputation of looking after its employees
well, and an established clerk, as of 1831, could expect to earn
some £400 a year at a time when his counterpart in commerce or
government service would have been happy to have achieved half 
2
that salary. The rewards offered to the highest officials at the 
India House - £2,410 for the Secretary, £2,000 a year for the Ex­
aminer, and £1,810 a year for the Military Secretary^ - more than 
put them on a par with the most senior civil servants at Whitehall.
^P.P.1839* vol. XXXIX, paper 342, no. 4. This number included messen­
gers plying the corridors of the India House and the roads to White­
hall, doormen, charladies and a housekeeper. With the other estab­
lishments at Haileybury, Addiscombe and the recruiting depots and 
other individuals such as the standing counsel and the Company phy­
sician the total number of employees of the Company in Britain in 
1839 amounted to 482 at a charge of £104,343. These salaries were 
entirely paid from the Indian revenues after 1833.
2
Bee W.J.Reader, Professional Men, p.92.
3
See List of Establishments, Index to Personnel, James Cosmo Melvill, 
Secretary from 1837 onwards, received an additional £200 a year for 
services rendered during the Charter renewal.
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Even the Company*s critics acknowledged the general excellence 
of the staff, "extremely intelligent and able advisors of the 
Court11, Ellenborough called them in 1852 ,^  and their quality was 
eloquently testified to when, upon their merger with the staff at 
the Board in 1858, practically all the senior secretarial posts 
were assigned to Company men. The experience of these men was one 
of the unique contributions made by the Company to the home govern­
ment and was a source of authority to the Court of Directors in 
their dialogue with the Board of Control.
The reduction of staff and the consolidation of departments
2
consequent on the cessation of trade and Ellenborough*s reform
of the correspondence system left the conduct of the secretarial work
at the India House substantially in the hands of three officers:
those of the Secretary, the Examiner of Indian Correspondence and
the Military Secretary, who between them handled the correspondence
vith India.^ In l846 a fourth office, that of the Statistical Re-
4
porter, was constituted under Edward Thornton who had formerly 
1P.P. 185a. vol. X, q.Zjkb.
^The reduction on the commercial side was estimated to save £51,163  
per annum and a further £4*f,277 was reduced in related, mainly 
Secretarial, offices. List of Establishments, pp. 4 & 6.
^There was also a separate department. under the Inspector of Mili­
tary Stores concerned with the provision and examination of sup­
plies sent to India.
4
Thornton succeeded Peter Auber as the Company*s own historian. His 
six volumes History of the British Empire in India, published l84l- 
44, which was undertaken with the encouragement of the Secretary, 
J.C.Melvill, sets out in its last two volumes what may be called the 
India House view of events in the period, up to 1844.
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carried on the work in the Secretary's office. The growing volume
of statistical work which led to this change was largely due to
the same cause which had occasioned, in 1833, the setting up of
a separate statistical office at the Board of Trade under G.R.
Porter; as Woodward notes, after the reform of 1832 "parliament
set about collecting information on a scale hitherto unknown".^
In 1853 the Director, James Weir Hogg, was able to tell the Commons
that under the current Charter the Company had submitted material
2
to Parliament which filled fifty-three folio volumes.
The Secretary's office as it emerged from the reorganisations 
was the largest of the three offices. In 1839 it employed eighty- 
five persons inclusive of extra clerks, writers and messengers, and 
it incurred a charge for salaries of £40,323 while the Examiners 
office had some forty-three persons employed at a charge of £18,407 
and the Military Secretary's twenty-two at £9,324. The Secretary's 
office consisted of six departments each headed by an assistant: 
minuting and correspondence; accounts; pay; audit; will and admini­
stration; and from 1837, marine. In addition to digesting the 
enormous amount of financial material from India the office carried 
into effect the Company's financial operations at home including 
transactions with the Bank of England. As the complement to the
^L. Woodward, The Age of Reform, p.93.
^Hansard. 3S, CXXVII, IZkk, 6 June 1853.
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Finance and Home Committee the office conducted the financial 
correspondence with India and subsequently the marine and railway 
correspondence as well. Moreover all incoming correspondence from 
India and elsewhere came first to the Secretaryfs office where it 
was copied for distribution to the appropriate department of 
correspondence and committee of the Court.
In 1836 the offices of the Financial Secretary and the 
Secretary were consolidated in the interests of ’economy and 
efficiency1, the administrative watchwords of the day. James Cosmo 
Melvill who until this time had been Financial Secretary assumed 
the post of Secretary in the combined offices upon Peter Auber's 
signifying that he wished to retire. It was the Secretaries, Auber 
and Melvill, who being possessed of an unrivalled knowledge of the 
Company’s internal affairs, represented it before the Select Com­
mittees of 1832 and 1832.^  As the representative officer of the 
Company the Secretaryvas a man of great importance to a variety 
of persons interested in India: abolitionists of slavery, those
interested in cotton, in railways for India, or shipbuilders such 
as R. Napier, to whom Melvill introduced Samuel Cunard in the 1830s.
1In 1832 Melvill also gave testimony on the Indian Navy and defended 
the financial system of India against the criticisms of a former 
Company servant, Sir Charles Trevelyan, by then Permanent Secretary 
to the Treasury.
2
See J.H.Bell, British Folks and British India Fifty Years Ago, 
ch. XV, "The Melvill Dynasty", and J. Shields, Clyde Built, p.^3*
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Melvill's services were given recognition in 18^3 when he was 
knighted, in 1838 he was made Government Director of the Indian 
railways.
In contrast with the Secretary, who was a regular Pooh-Bah,
the Examiner of Indian correspondence was primarily responsible
for only a single function. In his office the greater part of the
correspondence with India was drafted. This included not only that
reviewed by the Revenue, Judicial and Legislative Committee but the
correspondence from the Political Committee also. The duties of
the Examiner himself were, of course, mainly supervisory and the
actual conduct of the correspondence lay with one of his assistants
1
or a correspondence clerk. However, as the list of despatches
2prepared by J.S.Mill as head of the Political department shows, the
P.P. 1832, vol. X, q.33* Melvill states that there were three 
assistants and two correspondence clerks employed in each separate 
department of correspondence . The three most important of these 
were the b venue, the judicial and legislative, and the political.
The conduct of the public correspondence, a rather miscellaneous 
heading, was decidedly a post of less prestige, and the ecclesiastical 
correspondence was more of a sub-division of the public than a separ­
ate entity. Throughout the nineteenth century, however, the frame­
work was constantly undergoing change. From 1833 onwards, owing to 
changes effected in the process of law-making by the Charter Act, 
the legislative correspondence hitherto sent out in the judicial 
department, was placed under a separate heading, although it con­
tinued to be conducted in the same department of correspondence 
within the Examiner's office.
^See Home Misc. 832(a).
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permanent officials, the Examiner included, might at any time be 
called upon to draft a despatch in any department of correspondence.
/In the earlier years of the century, when the old Committee 
of Correspondence was very seriously overladen with work, much of 
the wo2kof preparing the despatches setting out the home governments 
orders and policy decisions hdd had to be delegated to the Examiner 
and his assistants,who thus came to exercise a great deal of in­
fluence. Such was the demand in this office for men of real intel­
lectual and literary ability that the Court of 1819 took the unpre­
cedented step of selecting men from outside the India House to fill 
the highest posts under the Examiner. The men appointed were the 
historian and philosopher James Mill, the novelist Thomas Love Pea­
cock, and Edward Strachey, a retired Indian judge of an already 
distinguished family. As is well known Mill, placed in charge of 
the revenue correspondence, and Strachey, who conducted the judicial 
correspondence, found in their respective departments singular scope, 
Mill especially, for the application of their Utilitarian views 
during a particularly formative period of Indian administration.^
It so happened, however, that the influence of these men 
came to an end almost at the same time as the post-Charter reform 
of the Company administration was effected. Strachey died in 1832
■^ See E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, p.^7, et seq.
/»
and Mill in 1836, and neither David Hill, late chief secretary <bf 
the Government of Madras, who was brought in to fill Strachey*s 
post, nor Peacock, who succeeded to the Examinership left vacant 
by Mill*s death, shared his predecessor*s set of beliefs. When 
Hill came before the Select Committee of 1832, vhere he was de­
scribed as a witness of great weight, he spoke quite critically 
of those efforts to codify the law which owed so much to Benthamfs 
inspiration.'*' As for Peacock, any reading of the dinner conver­
sations in his Crotchet Castle suffices to illustrate his sanguine, 
undoctrinaire approach. Moreover, it is clear that the new men 
did not enjoy the freedom and scope of their predecessors. Pea­
cock* s main interests lay in the relatively circumscribed fields 
of steam navigation and a related opposition to Russian expansion, 
but even here, once the Court had become firmly decided upon the
issuesif "Mr. Peacock, whose advice is /usually taken on steam ar-
2rangements*1, could originate nothing. With JohnS&uarfc Mill who 
had had the conduct of the Political correspondence since shortly
1See P.P. 1852-55, vol. XXXI, qq. 2168-90.
Home Mise.. 838,p.300, J.C.Hobhouse to Auckland, 9 May 1838 and 
see C. Vein Doren, The Life of Thomas Love Peacock, p.221.
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after his appointment in 1823* there was an apparent lack of dis­
position, as well as of freedom, to exercise that practical in­
fluence upon his department which his father had wielded. Ncr is 
there any evidence that either E.W. Prideaux, who from 184-3 on­
ward conducted the Revenue correspondence, or the succession of 
men who had charge of the Public department after J.J.Harcourt*s 
death in 1836, played any dominant role in the formation of policy.
This dwindling of the autonomous influence of the Examiner and his 
assistants after 1833 must be set against the background of the 
increased effectiveness of the Court as a body in the review and 
hence in the formulation of correspondence, and of the increased 
exercise of the Board of Controlfs powers. The net result was to 
approximate the permanent officials to the status and function of 
extremely able advisors to the Court. The memorandum prepared by 
J.S.Mill in I83S on the improvement in the Administration of India 
During the Last Thirty Years may be seen as a retrospect of the 
effectiveness of the refashioned structure and of the consensus of 
opinions at the India House which embraced both the permanent staff 
and the Court of Directors.
The office of the Military Secretary handled onl^ f one branch 
of the correspondence and the degree of supervision exercised by 
this officer was accordingly great; on virtually every draft despatch 
prepared in this office we find the initials of the Secretary himself. 
Because of the specific nature of this correspondence, which contrasted
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with the general review more often found in the other departments, 
and because of its urgency, we find answers to despatches from 
India going out with "marvellous promptitude", frequently by return 
of post.'1' Colonel Salmond, the brother-in-law of David Scott, one 
of the foremost Directors of the earlier part of the century, headed 
this department until his retirement in 1837. He was succeeded by 
Philip Melvill, a brother of James Cosmo. When called upon to give 
an opinion on the existent complex arrangements for the management 
of the Company’s military forces in India - their division into 
three commands, the Presidency armies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, 
and the presence of both King’s and Company’s troops in India - 
both Military Secretaries showed themselves thoroughly conservative. 
Colonel Salmond told the Select Committee of 1832 that the proposal
to transfer the Company’s armies to the Crown "appears to be an
 2 ............
experiment at once hazardous and gratuitous," while in 1832, despite
the radical transformation in other branches of the administration,
notably the judicial, Melvill was able to tell the Select Committee
of that year that the constitution of the service had remained in
3
essential unchanged despite numerous improvements of detail.
•'•p.p. 1852, vol. X, qq. 160 and 162.
2
P.P.l831~32, vol. XIII, p.xxxvi of the Report.
3P.P. 1852-53. vol. XXXI, q.126.
After this survey of the Company’s share in the home 
administration it is necessary now to consider that of Government 
and its instrument, the Board of Control. The Board of Control 
was housed in a handsome if modest brick and stone Georgian struc­
ture on Cannon Row just off Parliament Street, Whitehall. Despite 
the very great changes that were occurring in Indian administration 
at this time neither the Board's statutory authority nor its organi­
sation were much changed by the Charter Act of 1833* Its powers of 
superintendance, direction, and control, plenary from their in­
ception under Pitt's India Act of 178*t» needed little alteration.'1' 
The sum allotted from the revenues of India to meet the Board’s 
expenses remained at £26,000 per annum and its establishment was 
likewise unaltered. The salary of the President of the Board having 
been reduced in 1831 from £3 ,0 0 0 a year to £3 ,3 0 0 had already paid 
its due to Parliamentary demands for retrenchment. A second Par­
liamentary Secretary was however added, enjoying a salary of £1,300
2
a year, and the two puisne commissionerships were abolished. This 
change was a response to the greater involvement of Parliament in
^See 2k Geo. Ill c.23, ss. 1-17.
23 & b William IV c 85. s.23.
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Indian affairs and to the greater role of party in Parliament;1 the
Secretaries were frequently called upon to support the President
in defence of policy. ”With George Thompson and Hume in the House”
Lord John Russell observed to Hobhouse ”we shall require ability in
2
the Secretaries”. This new arrangement had the added virtue of under­
lining the fact that the statutory term ”Board of Commissioners” was 
in fact a misnomer. Almost from its foundation the Board had been a 
Ministry, the president of the Board the Cabinet Minister for India.
The President and his two Parliamentary Secretaries were 
served by a permanent staff,but because its functions were essentially 
subsequent and corrective the numbers at Cannon Row were only a
fraction of those employed at the India House - still only thirty-four
■2
all told in 1§5>2. Fewer in number, the Board's staff was also 
slighter in reputation, for though it achieved a high level of com­
petence, it lacked literary worthies comparable in stature to those 
found in Leadenhall Street. The general business of the Board was 
divided among six departments, each under its senior clerk with 
his assistant and one or more junior clerks, thus mirroring the divi­
sion of correspondence at the India House. When a P-C with its col­
lection arrived at the Board it was therefore referred at once to
1
The Commissioners had not always retired upon a change of Ministry.
See P.P. 1851-321 IXpp.284-6.
^Home Misc., 8^1  P -3 1 0 , l 6 August l8 * f7 .
^P.P. 1832, vol. X, Appendix, p.3^.
Zf
Namely the Finance and Accounts; the Revenue; the Judicial and 
Legislative; the Public, Ecclesiastical and Maxine; the Political; 
the Military.
the appropriate clerk who made himself familiar with its contents, 
offered his comments on the draft in the form of marginal notes or 
a memorandum, and then passed them on to the Parliamentary Secret­
ary who supervised the department. After the latter had offered 
his observations or alterations to the draft it went up to the Pre­
sident, with whom the final sanctioning, or rejection, of the draft 
lay. The Minister was thus at the top of a pyramid of control whose 
foundations extended beyond Cannon Row to Leadenhall. This was a 
fact which Hobhouse was at pains to impress upon an irate appointee 
in India, 111 may as well add that you ought to be aware that when 
you say hard things about the Court's despatches you make in fact 
an attack on your humble servant at the India Board for all the 
letters to India are carefully looked over, and I believe fairly 
reviewed by myself, nor can a line go to your Goverrxnent without 
my full sanction and approved. 1,1
Even a numerical inspection shows that the Board, in this 
period, was intensifying its control over the formulation of corres­
pondence. Thus though the number of despatches to India was growing, 
the number of previous communications between the Chairmen and the 
President of the Board about these despatches was growing still more
^Home Misd. 859, p.9^, J.C.Hobhouse to J.E.D Bethune, Law Member 
of the Governor General's Council.
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rapidly.^- Moreover, whereas in the years l8l4-l831 only about
one despatch in twelve was altered by the Board, in twenty years
2
time the figure had risen to nearly one in four. Admittedly 
many alterations were of detail rather than of substance, so that 
an unqualified comparison might be misleading. But the increase 
does support the picture, which a reading of the general correspond­
ence between the Board and the Court also indicates, of a great in­
crease in the amount and depth of the Board’s intervention. More­
over, the President enjoyed much more than a mere pdwer of review.
Through his weekly conversation with the Chairs the President was 
a party to the initiation of those despatches which he regarded as 
being of particular importance, alterations bythe Board to the 
P-Cfs could then amount to a virtual rewriting of a despatch, while 
in the event of these powers proving inadequate the President could 
simply order the Court to frame a despatch on any subject whatso­
ever, and if the Court failed to do so within fourteen days, he 
could have it composed at the Board.^ The Minister was therefore 
perfectly justified in assuring the Commons that he was fully re- 
sponsible ”to this House for any acts in the administration of India.1’
1P.P. 1852. vol. X, q.520.
^P.P. 1831-32. vol. IX, q.1257; P.P. 1852, vol. X, q.520; P.P. 1852- 
2,, vol. XXX, q.269.
William IV c 85, S.31.
Hansard, 3S, CXXVI, 1138. Sir Charles Wood, 3 June 1853.
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Of one department at the Board the President could offer
that assurance without qualification: the Secret department. This
ms always under the immediate direction of the President alone and
its business was not necessarily shared by him with the Parliamentary
Secretaries.-^ For the most part the despatches that went out via
the Secret Committee were drafted by the Minister himself and it was
the senior clerk upon whom the President leaned most heavily for
their preparation. Indeed, the duties of this office became so oneiw
ous during the first Afghan war that the President had to ask for a
reorganisation to relieve the senior clerk of some of the burden.
As Hobhouse explained, "Mr. Cabel has had to read eveiy Cabinet
despatch from India, from Persia, from Turkish Arabia anril from Egypt
and a great many from Constantinople ... and this he has had to do
without the check of the parliamentary secretaries, who in general
2
do not even see the secret despatches. 11
The business handled by the Secret department came to it from 
the Secret Committee of the Court, defined by Pitt*s India Act as 
the channel through which should be transmitted to Asia that cor­
respondence "concerning the levying of wax or making of peace, or
^P.P. 1852» vol. X, qq. 587-8, Waterfield*s testimony. Hobhouse 
did not regularly reveal the Secret Correspondence to the Parlia­
mentary Secretaries, whilst his Conservative opposite numbers did.
On occasion despatches went without even the customary meeting 
of the Secret Committee.
^Home Misc. 839» P*76, Hobhouse to Chancellor of the Exchequer.
treating or negotiating with any of the native princes or states
in India11 which in the opinion of the Board should require secrecy,'*'
The Committee, which was composed of the two Chairmen and the senior
Director, was not empowered under the Act to refuse to send or to
delay despatches, even when they disagreed with their contents. No
provision was made even for the recording of any dissent. The one
power which the Committee possessed was to refuse to send a despatch
2
which did not rightly come under section fifteen of the Act, De-
■v
spite their clearly subordinate position the Committee had from 173^ 
been taken into the confidence of successive Ministers and had exerw 
cised considerable influence over the determination of Indian foreign 
policy, even to the originating of a number of despatches, right 
down to 1828 when Lord Ellenborough became President of the Board*
By adhering strictly to the letter of the law Ellenborough became
11 the first President to succeed in denying the Directors^a voice
3
in the determination of external policy, 11 Lord Ellenboroughfs 
masterful approach to whatever post he occupied is well known. But 
the assumption of absolute authority by the President of the Board
12b George III, c.25, s 15. The Charter Act of 1833, section 3 6, 
added the words "or with any other Princes or States", thus giving 
statutory cognizance to the established practice.
2See P.P. 1852, vol. X, q. 135.
C.H.Philips, The East India Company. l?8^-l83*f. p.275> et passim.
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was not wholly a matter of personality. With the rise of the
Russian threat in the late 1820s the external policy of the Govern­
ment of India had become increasingly the concern of the Ministry 
as a whole. As the Duke of Wellington pointed out over the affairs
of Sind in 18^3: "Some twenty years ago such a subject as this
would have been merely local. The government would have had no 
occasion to take cognizance of it... But at this moment in parti­
cular everything that occurs in that part of the world is of im­
portance and becomes an Imperial question,"J" From the advent of 
Lord Auckland every Governor General was to be involved in wars on 
India’s frontiers or beyond, and against that background neither 
the Court of Directors as a whole nor even the Secret Committee 
could be allov;ed an independent voice on India's foreign policy. Both 
Whigs and Conservatives regularly resorted to the Secret Committee 
to ensure Ministerial control. The extent of the divorce of the 
Court of Directors from the formulation and conduct of external 
policies and an assessment of its results-is recorded in the dissent 
of H. Willock in l8*f7 from a despatch on Sind. I!lt is a remarkable 
fact," he wrote, "that three great occurrences in recent times, all 
most injuriously affecting the character and resources of the Indian 
Empire, vizt. the seizure of Aden, the expedition into Afghanistan,
^Add. Mss. ^0^63, f.28l, Wellington to Ellenborough, 4 February 18^3-
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the annexation of Scinde were projected and undertaken without 
the concurrence of the East India Company."'1'
The trend towards reserving foreign policy issues to the 
Ministry did not, however, deny all influence to the Secret Committeei 
it scarcely could while personal contact with the President continued. 
It is possible to detect in the private correspondence of various 
Presidents the effect which the Committee's opinions had on them.^
A Committee in which the President leposed particular confidence might 
even share in the elaboration of policy. This was particularly the 
case with steam navigation which formed such a vital part of the 
policy pursued in the Middle East from 1835 to l84l, where the Com­
mittee in fact originated many of the despatches on a subject which 
was not strictly within its purview. When the Committee was in agree­
ment with the Board that a subject should be handled by its agency
...................................................3 ............
the wording of the Act appears to have been no obstacle. The 
Committee could contribute to policy, too, through the Reports it 
furnished on a multitude of subjects at the request of the Board or
, p.535» Dissent of 9 June l8*f? from draft despatch respecting
Sind.
2
Regular minutes of the Committee's meetings were not kept. The 
most illuminating evidence of what passed is in the President's 
private correspondence with the Chairmen, occasional letters to 
the Secret Committee, and with other Ministers.
^See 1892, vol. X, q.523, T.N.Waterfield, senior clerk of the
Secret Department at the Board.
the Foreign Office. Yet, notwithstanding the variety of ways in 
which the members of the Committee and the staff at the India 
House might make their contribution, it is not possible to refute 
John Cam Hobhouse*s characteristically assertive note in his diary:
*’ The Secret Committee c'est moi”.’*'
The same pressure to assert Ministerial authority which was 
evident from the eighteen-thirties onward in the Presidents hand­
ling of the Secret Committee may be observed also in the pattern 
of appointments in India. The Directors through the mechanism of 
the patronage system supplied the great feody of the Indian admini­
stration with their nominees. But notwithstanding the statutory 
formula which laid down th&t the posts of Governor and Governor 
General ,:shall be filled up by the Court of Directors subject to 
the approbation of His Majesty, to be signified under his royal 
sign manual, counter-signed by the said President of the Board of 
Commissioners,it was His Majesty*s Government which in practice
^Add. Mss. 53* 753 * f. 70, HI December l$+8. In his Memorandum on 
the Secret Department dated 15 December 1870 Sir John William Kaye 
made the same point: '’the President of the Board was in reality
the Secret Committee”. Quoted in M.I.Moir's exhaustive Study of 
the History and Organisation of the Political and Secret Departments 
of the East India Company, the Board of Control, and the India Office
1784-1919,
^3 & 4 William IV c. 8 5, ss. 58 and 42
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was primarily responsible for making these appointments. Those 
who directed the government in India were overwhelmingly the 
appointees of the Ministry of the day. Though the Company's old 
Secretary Peter Auber was still prepared to claim a more extensive 
role for the Company in 1832,'1' the function of the Directors be­
came essentially that of a check upon the Ministry's field of 
choice.
After the Melbourne Government in 1835 had revoked Lord 
Heytesbury's appointment to the Governor-Generalcy made by the pre­
vious Ministry, Lord John Russell thought it a sufficient defence 
of the Whigs' action to ask, "Was it not notorious that, for years
past, the Governors General had always been chosen on account of
2
his political sentiments?" By the 1850s this was clearly understood,
and the Director John Shepherd speaking before the Select Committee
of 1852 expressed the Court's understanding of their limited role
in the appointment process by saying, "Our desire generally is,
in the case of the Governor General or Governor, that we should get
the best man of the particular party who may be in power, we are
not so unreasonable as to propose as Governor General or Governor
3
a man in opposition." The limitations imposed upon the Court's
1p.p. 1831-32, vol. IX, qq. 7^ -8 and 1276.
^Hansard, 3S, XXIX, p.65, House of Commons, 29 June 1835.
3P.P. 1832, vol. X, q.733.
initiative by party politics could not have been more clearly 
recognised.
That was not the end of the matter, however, for what was 
notable was the extent to which those who governed India were 
identified with the Ministries of their day. Auckland, Ellenborough 
and Hardinge had each been a member of the Cabinet which appointed 
him, Heytesbury would subsequently serve in Peel's second Ministry, 
after the split in the Conservative party in 1846, was as accurate 
a reflection of the state of British party politics as the other 
four had been. This intimate connection between the Governor 
General and the Ministry of the day grew with the growing sensiti­
vity of the home government to events in India and their possible 
political repercussions. The formal channels of correspondence with 
the Government of India were no longer adequate for the purpose; 
they were too slow, too formal, too public.’*' It was through private 
correspondence between the President and other Ministers that the 
essential political issues would be discussed and resolved. From 
this exchange of private letters emerge the major concerns of the 
Ministry with India and theirreconciliation with the realities of
1Even the Secret Correspon dence, almost wholly written by the 
President, might prove inappropriate because it had to go through 
departmental channels: instead he might "propose that I should
write ... a secret and confidential letter from myself." See 
Add. Mss. ^ 6 5 , f.29^, Lord Ripon to Sir R. Peel, 30 April l8Vf.
Indian administration. For the Governor General the correspondence 
sets out the political bounds within which he must conduct his 
Indian administration or risk losing the support of the Ministry 
which appointed him. How important this private correspondence 
was, how much it formed a departure from the practice of the previous 
twenty years, can almost be measured quantitatively, for the volume 
of letters passing between the Ministry and Auckland, Ellenborough, 
Hardinge or Dalhousie seems immense alongside the comparative trickle 
in the days of Amherst and Bentinck.'1' Thus while the official 
correspondence formed the basis for the superintendence and control 
which the Home Government exercised over the Indian government, the 
clearest account of the background to the decisions on Indian policy 
taken in India and England, the ntenth of the Indian business11 with 
which this study is concerned, is provided by the private letters 
of the President of the Board, of his Cabinet colleagues, of the 
Governor General and also of the Chairmen of the Court.
Bentinck, Governor General 1828 to 1835» exchanged 17 and 18 letters 
respectively with the Presidents Ellenborough and Charles Grant. 
Amherst*s correspondence was similarly modest. Auckland’s letters 
to the President of the Board alone cover 1,0^0 folio pages:, and in 
relation to their period of office his successors wrote even more 
copiously. Significantly Bentinck*s correspondence with the Direct­
ors and certain of the India House officials, whom he knew person­
ally, was much more voluminous than that with the Ministers. This 
type of correspondence in our period amounts to little more than a 
courtesy towards the Court of Directors, negligble in its effect on 
policy.
The new emphasis upon links with the Ministry is perhaps 
even more marked in the appointment of Governors to the Presidencies 
of Madras and Bombay. The second and third decades of the nineteenth 
century had seen men of outstanding ability and experience appointed 
from among the Company’s servants to fill these posts; in our period 
Ministerial appointees, sent out from England, nearly always occupy 
them. Admittedly the pioneering period in the development of the 
Indian empire which had thrown up - and required - men like Munro, 
Elphinstone or Malcolm had passed, but the essential factor behind 
the change seems to have been the Ministry's new emphasis upon hav­
ing its own nominees at these strategic posts.^ The only curb upon 
this tendency was the weakness of an administration. A precariously 
placed Ministry might feel compelled to defer to the Coutt's wishes 
and appoint a Company Servant: "It was very much my wish to have
brought you forward for the Government of Bombay, as you know," 
Hobhouse told his friend E.S.Stanley, "but it was considered in­
expedient at head quarters, that any such move should be made while 
the elections were going on. When they were over, and we were so
completely beaten, it would have been quite out of the question to
2
attempt to procure the place for a decided political friend."
"^It is significant that when an outstanding servant of the Congpany, 
Charles Metcalfe, did receive a governorship in the post-1833 period, 
it was the new Presidency of Agra.
^Home Misc. 8*f0, 183, Hobhouse to Stanley, 29 July 18^1.
The growing- involvement of the Ministry in Indian admini­
stration is apparent in the legislative sphere too, in the pro­
vision under the Charter Act of 1833 for the appointment of a Law
Member to the Governor General's Council and of a Law Commission,
The appointment of the Law Member, who came invariably to head the 
Law Commission, was in practice decided principally by the Prime 
Minister and the President of the Board, Over appointments to the 
Supreme Court also the Ministry exercised a dominant influence and 
the selection of the head of the military forces in India in the 
first instance a matter of discussion between the Prime Minister
and the Commander in Chief in England. Changes of Ministry in Britain 
*
would of course frequently leave the appointees of the previous 
Ministry in oflSlce yet there was nevertheless a strong relationship 
between the occupants of the highest administrative, legislative, 
judicial and military posts in India and the Ministry at home.
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the Court
of Directors, and the Company itself, did act as a check upon the 
Minister's exercise of his powers within the system of Indian govern­
ment. The Court participated in, numerically at least, the greater 
part of the decisions made by the Home Government and the very struct­
ure of the Company had its effect on the nature of the decisions made . 
It is equally apparent however that the President of the Board possessed
overwhelming power to enforce his views when he chose to use it. 
Moreover the power of initiating Indian policy, in the real as 
distinguished from the formal sense, lay with the Minister. The 
sense of the position emerges from the remark of one Director, made 
in 1838, "although the late Charter-Act, has stripped the Court of 
Directors of substantial power, we are still left in a position 
to exert some moral influence with effect ... Our vis'inertiae is 
sometimes sufficient to arrest their proceedings” a somewhat 
pessimistic view provoked by proceedings connected with the Afghan 
War. A final assessment of the Court's role as a check within the 
system of Indian government must now await the completion of this 
study. Something more, however, remains to be said of the ex­
tension of the use of the Board's powers and of how this was re­
lated to the increasing impact British politics were having on 
Indian affairs.
After 1832 the eighteenth century tradition of an administra­
tion, the King's Government, largely independent of Parliament, 
finally succumbed to the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility en­
forced by a reformed House of Commons seeking to establish a control 
over the Executive. Increasingly administrative structures were 
judged by the degree of their amenability to the control of the
Kaye, Tucker, p.484.
1
House, It became one of the great criticisms of the "dual" 
form of tie Home Government of India, therefore, that it obscured
2
responsibility for policy and hence limited Parliament's control. 
Indeed the graat extension of the Board's activity from the l820s 
onward was intimately connected with the Ministry's need to take 
account of the actual or threatened intervention of Parliament in 
an ever widening range of Indian subjects. The increasing number 
of Accounts and Papers, of Select Committee Reports, submitted to 
Parliament on Indian finances, on her Judicial system and Law 
Reform, on her foreign policy, on railways, steamships, cotton 
cultivation are in themselves an index of this increasing inter­
vention in Indian affairs. Indeed one of the points in favour of the
dual system in Ministerial thinking was precisely that it did act
3
as a check upon a too forceful intervention by Parliament.
^ee F.M.G.Willson, "Ministries and Boards, Some Aspects of Ad­
ministrative Development Since 183^", Public Administration, 331 
Spring 1933, p.^9 et seq. The author traces the way in which this 
new orthodoxy came by the 1830s to undermine the old pattern of 
Boards "in favour of Ministries which were more amenable to the 
control of the House of Commons".
2
See esp. John Bright's speech in the House of Commons, 3 April 
1831.’ Hansard, 3S, CXV, 1851.
3
See Moore, pp. 27-30.
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The apprehension than that an Indian subject might be made 
an issue of in Parliament was always present in ministerial minds 
and the greatest practitioner of the Parliamentary art at the time,
A
Sir Robert Peel, was forced to make this point to a wayward Governor 
General in 18^3, as a consequence of the operations in Sind: lfThe
rapid communication between India and this country is making, and 
will continue to make, a most important political change in the 
treatment of Indian questions in Parliament, It will provoke con­
stant discussion by the press and that discussion will increase the 
tendencies in Parliament to make India and Indian subjects the arena 
for political debate Whether it be for good or for evil we must
look forward to the gradual establishment of a system which will sub­
ject every act of the Indian government to Parliamentary scrutiny."'1’ 
The increasing force which Parliamentary intervention could 
exert upon the determination of Indian policy, a factor which lay 
behind the decrease in the Court's independence, forms a constantly 
occuring theme in the correspondence between the Court and the Board,' 
between the President and the Chairmen, the Governor General or other 
Ministers, "The notice given in the House of Commons for the 
appointment of a Select Committee to 'consider the state of the Salt 
Monopoly in India' will not be opposed by this Board", a Parliamentary
^Add.Mss. 40^71, 1.318, Peel to Ellenborough, 6 June 18^3
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Secretary wrote to the Company's Secretary, Even upon questions 
where the Court and the Board, and the Governor General as well, 
were agreed that intervention was undesirable, Parliament could 
decide the issue. Over a question involving the connection of 
the Government of India with the religious practices of Indians
s
the Chairman might well protest to the President that he did "not 
see how it would be possible to the Court to issue any such in­
structions as that you have now suggested".^ Nevertheless^ as 
Parliament insisted, they at length were issued, for as the Presi­
dent explained to the Governor General, "the course taken at home
3
was quite unavoidable ... We could not help ourselves."
The qualities and the defects of the Directors and the 
permanent staff at the India House had little to do with the Board's 
increasing tempo of activity and control, fundamental^ this was 
a consequence of a change in the structure of British politics.
The Court, of course, was by no means ready immediately to acknow­
ledge the full implications of this change. As late as 1849 the 
Court could be found remonstrating with the Board that in the nego­
tiations with the Indian railway companies "The responsibility was
^Home Misc., 779, p.l, R* Gordon to J.C.Melvill, 22 February 1836. 
^Home Misc., 836, pp. 13, 20 April 1838.
Home Misc., 838, p.k93, President to the Governor General, 1 November
1838.
joint”, to which the President replied, crushingly, this was 
not so because any action of the Court's "involved no real punish­
ment or penalty such as addresses from the Houses of Parliament 
might at any time inflict upon the President of the India Board11.1 
Not only was the Court's independence limited by Parliament, 
however, but so too was the President's. "I cannot hel|3 letting
my colleaguesknow something about a matter which may probably
2
cause a squabble in Parliament", wrote a President in 1830 to the 
Governor General. Ultimately Parliament formed the check on all 
action within the system of Indian Government. Describing the system 
of checks which existed upon executive action in India J.S.Mill 
pointed out that over the deposition of the Baja of Satara by the 
Bombay Government, the consent of the Government at Calcutta was 
first necessary. Next, the act might be disallowed by the joint 
action of the Home authorities, and that finally "it was open to 
any member of either House of Parliament to bring forth a motion, 
which if it had been effectual might have led to a Parliamentary 
inquiry, or eventually a reversal of the act".^
Examples of Parliamentary intervention in Indian affairs and 
the response of the Minister and of the Court to them will occur
1Home__Misc., 8^1, p.^8, Hobhouse to the Chairmen, 29 October l8*f9
p
Home Misc., 839, P-2^3, 23 January 1850.
3P.P.1852-53, XXX, q.2920.
throughout this study but the question presents itself now of 
whether British politics had not a more profound influence bn the 
formation of Indian policy than the sporadic, thohgh increasingly 
important, intervention of the Commons.
The word period has been defined as a span of time with its
own inner structure which holds together and determines the re-
1
lation of the parts to the whole. That which gives unity to the 
political events in Britain, and to our interpretation of the events 
with which this thesis concerns itself, lies in the redefinition of 
the party system, which had its origin in the occurences centering 
around the reform of Parliament in 1832. Following this "Great Re­
form" two strongly organized, v/ell disciplined parties all but 
divided the House of Commons between them for over a decade. When 
in l8*f6 one of these, the Conservatives, split over the issue of 
the C o m  Laws the parties for a time became weaker and more numer­
ous but there v/as little sign of a return to the "non-Party Member". 
Statistical study of voting in the House of Commons during this time 
has established that on by far the larger number of issues, "which 
includes questions as various as Free Trade and most financial matters 
religious matters, flogging in the army, education and sanitary reform
^See Wilhelm Dilthey, Meaning in History, edited by H.P.Rickman, p.155
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'party affiliation was closely related to votes'".
The reform of Parliament in 1832 had made it "inevitable that 
party should replace the Crown as the centre of working Government", 
that the possession of an organized majority in the Commons v/ould 
become the prerequisite for the formation and maintenance of a 
Ministry. Party government in the sense of alternating Whig and 
Conservative Ministries became a feature of British politics after 
a period of almost fifty years, during which time one party had mono­
polized power. Because party affiliation and voting represented such 
great differences of principle and approach to the problems of govern­
ment it followed that these alternations would provide great contrasts 
in the administration of Great Britain, and as this study will show, 
in that of the Indian empire.
The Whigs during whose administration this study opens, with 
whose Act for the better government of India the second chapter con­
cerns itself, took office in 1830 as the Government of remedial 
reform. They, and their Radical and Irish allies, were the grouping 
expressive of deep discontent with the existing constitution of 
the British Parliament, and of the local governments, of the church 
and of the army, of the laws and the administration of j*ustice, in
^See D.E.D. Beales, "Parliamentary Parties and the Independant Member, 
1810-1860" in Ideas and Institutions of Victorian England, p.7.
Beals makes the point that W.O.Aydelotte's statistical studies of 
voting patterns in the House of Commons at this time have forced 
N. Gash to revise his earlier assessment of the role of party 
during this period.
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short, of much or most of the constitution of contemporary Britain.
The strength of the Whigs lay in their ability to place themselves 
at the head of the movement for reform, a capacity which stemmed 
in part from their long tradition of opposition to the power of 
the King, the Church and the Lords. This capacity was fundamentally 
a political rather than an administrative one. As the movement for 
constitutional reform weakened in the 1830s so too did the position 
of the Whigs in the Commons, while at the same time their very 
serious shortcomings in the field of administration, particularly 
over finance, became increasingly evident.
The Conservatives on the other hand, the party of Tories 
and others who reorganized themselves around Sir Robert Peel in 
the 1830s, were most closely associated with the established in­
stitutions of church and monarchy. While under Peel's leadership 
they came to accept the great reforms that their opponents had 
passed, they presented themselves as a party of a different kind of 
reform from that of the Whigs and their Radical allies. By seeking 
"to remove every abuse that can impair the efficiency" of these 
establishments Peel sought to "extend the sphere" of their usefulness, 
that is to conserve them. By providing strong government, rather 
than by skillful manoeuvering to meet the changing moqd of Parlia­
ment, Peel sought to provide an alternative to the Whig-Radical 
alliance. The object of his government was to be the "maintenance 
of peace ... the support of public credit - the enforcement of strict
economy - and the just and impartial consideration of what is 
due to all interests."^" Above all, this meant the competent manage­
ment of the nation's finances and a policy of peace abroad which was 
its necessary corollary.
The degree to which these differing approaches to government 
on the part of successive Whig and Conservative Ministeries were 
reflected in the administration of India is for this study the major 
way of assessing the impact of British politics on Indian admini­
stration; even the activities of individual interestsin Parliament 
are related to it. The increasing association of the Ministry with 
Indian affairs has been referred to over the operation of the Secret 
Committee, the appointments to the highest posts in the ^Indian ad­
ministration, and over the subsequent Ministerial correspondence with 
these appointees. The importance of the President of the Board's 
ever-increasing exercise of his powers in this connection has also 
been raised. What then was the extent of the intervention by successive 
Ministries in the foreign and financial affairs of the Government of 
India? Were Whig and Conservative approaches to law reform in 
Britain reflected in Indian administration? Did, for example, the 
political association of the Whigs with Benthamite Radicals have 
any effect on the progress of law reform'in India? In general, how
^See N. Gash, The Age of Peel, p.78, "The Tamworth Manifesto".
much did the conduct of Whig or Conservative Presidents of the 
Board, and the Ministry's appointees in India, incorporate the 
principles of their respective parties into Indian administration? 
On the other hand what was the role of the individual as such 
during these years? In attempting to answer these and related 
questions this thesis will be making an assessment of the role of 
British politics in Indian affairs.
Chapter Two
THE CHARTER ACT OF 1833 
AS A PARTY POLITICAL ACT
Chapter Two
This chapter deals with the formulation and passage 
of the Charter Act of 1833* the most comprehensive piece of 
legislation on India effected by the British Parliament in 
the nineteenth century, involving as it did both commercial 
and constitutional questions of the first magnitude. By its 
nature a discussion of how the act emerged entails more than 
a description of its content and it will be the major object 
of this chapter to give some idea of the respective contri­
butions of the Government of India, of the British Parliament, 
of the Court, the Board, the Ministry and the Opposition to 
this great act of Indian policy.
For many years prior to 1833 the trade of the East India 
had been
Company /tarried on largely in response to the financial needs 
of the Indian administration. Under the terms of the Charter 
Act of 1813 it had been statutorily provided that the sum is­
sued annually by the government in India for commercial in­
vestment should be equal in size to the payments made at home 
on behalf of the territorial administration ;^* the magnitude
*^33 Geo. Ill c,133« s.36. The home payments at this time were 
principally on account of the home establishments, of military 
charges for Company's troops including retiring pay, pensions
of the Company's commercial operations was thus deter­
mined by the size of these "home payments". Indeed, in the 
case of the Indian, as opposed to the lucrative Canton trade, 
the Company's operations which finally became unprofitable 
in the face of private competition were carried on only to 
provide remittances, other than bullion, to meet these 
charges. The Act of 1813 had also provided that the profit 
which remained after the Proprietors' dividend had been met,
the "surplus commercial profit", should be applied to the
IIndian and Home Bond Debts. At the same time the Indian 
Government enjoyed a rate of exchange considerably above 
that of the open market for its rupees in the settlement 
of the account between the commercial and territorial branches 
of the Company's administration. In all, the Company calcu­
lated, the public debt of Indian administration would have
been some seventeen millions more without the assistance it
2received from commerce.
Trade carried on under such terms frequently deranged
etc., as well as pay office demands for King's troops serving 
in India, for civil service pensions, for supplies sent out 
and for miscellaneous expenses: Penang, Singapore, St. Helena
and the Tanjore Commisssion... See P.P. 1851-32« VIII, 37-38 
of the Report.
153 Geo. Ill c.155. s.57.
2
Negotiation Papers, p.6, Minute of the Secret Committee of 
Correspondence, 28 December 1832.
the markets; the disastrous failure of the agency houses 
at Calcutta in the early 1830s was due in part to the Com­
pany^ operations,^ Its Indian operations no less than 
its monopoly of the tea trade at Canton then were the cause 
of continuing antagonism between the Company and the private 
traders. Opinion in the out-ports and the manufacturing cities 
of Britain had taken on the tone of conviction by the time 
the issue of the renewal of the Charter was raised, ,fThere 
can need no proof at this day", dogmatized the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce, that when Governments act as traders 
their operations "will of necessity" be detrimental to
trade. The Glasgow Chamber was willing "on general prin-
2
ciples" to subscribe to this view. The large scale agita­
tion organized by these interests against the Company*s China
3
monopoly was really a matter of leaving "nothing to chance*1. 
It was generally conceded by all parties that the Com­
pany would lose its exclusive rights at Canton and 
had begun modifying its shipping arrangements prior even to
^P.P.1831-32« X, 335 of the Appendix. This involved the Com­
pany's sudden withdrawal from purchasing indigo, a commodity 
in which the houses were heavily involved.
2Ibid., 520.
3
See Philips, pp. 288-9 for the efforts of the outports especially, 
and D. IJyles, The Abolition of the Bast India Company's Monopoly, 
1833 * Edin. PhTD., 1956» PP • 1 W-5*f.
the commencement of the Charter negotiations.
Discussion of the Charter had commenced under the
Wellington administration, 1827-30* Though Wellington had
originally favoured the idea of continuing the monopoly to
the Company on administrative grounds the majority of his
2
Cabinet were increasingly opposed. Thus, before his 
Ministry left office, Wellington and Lord Ellenborough, the 
President of the Board of Control, had broached the subject
of the monopoly*s termination with the chairmen of the East
3
India Company. Having seen that the condition for aban­
doning the monopoly was the achievement of a surplus in the 
Indian revenues Ellenborough had taken measures to this end 
and felt that had the Tories continued in office Mby 183^ 
we should have been financially independent".
The great change that was to be effected with respect 
to the Company*s commerce was to be accompanied by reforms 
in the administration hardly less sweeping. Extensive dis­
cussions were taking place in India on the reform of the
1L/F/I/53< Keport of the Home and Finance Committee, 7 May 
183V, No. 36.
2
Wellington felt the Company required "the million they get 
by the China trade to enable them to carry on the Govern­
ment of India", see Ellenborough, Political Diary, I, 184—3» 
II, &f.
3
Negotiation Papers (N.P.), p.iii, Minute of a Conference at 
Apsley House, 12 October I83O.
E.P.21/2, Ellenborough to Lord Clare, Governor of Bombay,
26 November 1830.
subordinate administration ultimately involving recommendations
for the reconstruction of the Supreme Government itself.
In 1827 the government had been instructed to reduce
expenditure to the level of l823-2*f, the fiscal year prior to
Amherst's Burmese war."'- Bentinck, assuming office in July 1828
accordingly set up a Civil Finance Committee to review the
whole governmental structure and to suggest "such alterations
as may appear calculated to secure to the utmost practicable
extent, unity, efficiency and economy in the general manage-
2
ment of public affairs". The recommendations of the Committee 
consistently directed towards a high degree of centralization, 
formed the focus for subsequent discussion by the governor- 
general and his council. Such reforms as lay within Ben- 
tinck's competence were carried rapidly forward. And on the 
major constitutional issues - the redefinition of the powers 
and constitution of the supreme government at Calcutta and 
of its relationship with the subordinate governments and with 
the royal courts, and the unification of the military commands
~4c/VV20, p.966, Bengal Territorial Finance Department, 12 
December 1827.
2P.P.1831-32. VIII, App. Ill, 113, Govt, of Bengal to Madras 
and Bombay, 10 October 1828.
the recommendations of the Indian authorities formed the
basis for the governments plan of reform.'*' This the
President of the Board of Control recognised, writing to
Bentinck, ’’The papers written by the members of the Civil
Finance Committee and the Judges of the Supreme Court and
the members of your Council, and your own Minutes, have
furnished invaluable materials of which we have availed our- 
2
selves”. There was, however, no direct intervention by 
the Indian authorities in the preparation of the new Charter 
and the only extended discussion upon it between the Presi­
dent and the Governor-General took place after the passage 
3
of the Act. Thus both in administration as well as in 
commerce large changes were anticipated when Wellington's 
Ministry fell and Lord Grey assumed the Government in Nov­
ember 1830. The Charter Act of 1833 was to be one of a
^See P.P.1833* XXV, paper 67, Correspondence on the Con­
stitution of the Indian Governments.
2
Bentinck Papers« Charles Grant to Bentinck, 25 Bee. 1833> p*2.
■^Grant's letter wan to a considerable extent an apologia for 
the degree to which the Act differed from what Grant knew to be 
the Governor-General's wishes. Bentinck, a Canningite, was 
cordial in his relations with the ministers, but not close.
P. Spear's characterization of Bentinck as ”an advanced Whig” - 
O.H.I., 586 - anticipates matters.
series of the great Whig measures passed during the period 
of the most intense reforming activity in Britain during 
the nineteenth century. The changes effected in the con­
ditions of Indian government were to be the most extensive 
since the days of Pitt and Cornwallis. Half a century after 
an India Bill had occasioned the fall of Fox and the triumph 
of PittfeIndian administration was once more the subject of 
a major piece of legislation. Both the Acts of 178^ - and 
1833 came at critical junctures in British politics. The 
interrelationship between Britain's development and that of 
empire in India during these fifty years lies beyond the 
scope of our story but the Great Reform of 1832 which gave 
political recognition to the economic and social consequences 
of the Industrial revolution had an immediate and profound 
effect on the Charter Act of l833i brought forth as it was 
by a Reform Ministry and passed by a Reformed Parliament.
Ellenborough had hoped that Auckland, a Whig of long 
standing, would succeed him at the Board - "he would have 
carried on my plans firmly and cautiously". Instead Charles 
Grant, whom he regarded as "a man of theory" rather than a 
man of business>became President,with Sir James Macintosh, 
the radical champion of law reform, Sir James Macdonald 
and Charles's brother Robert as Commissioners. Sensing 
the radical shift their appointment implied, Ellenborough
commented MI dread the dangerous follies they will commit”.
Ellenborough*s apprehensions were not without foundation. 
Grant*s accession to the Whig side was not the first indication 
of his sensitivity to the contemporary currents of reform.
Vice President of the Board of Trade in Lord Liverpool*s 
government, and President during Canning*s brief premiership,
A
Charles Grant took a stand upon the Corn Laws in Wellington's 
cabinet, threatening resignation if they were not reformed, 
and finally went out, with the rest of the Canningites, over 
the issue of electoral reform. His inclination towards free 
trade and electoral reform was supplemented by a strong evan­
gelical interest in India. As Princess Lieven observed,
Grant was the only 'saint* in Grey's cabinet. Like his father, 
the distinguished Company servant and Director and member of 
the Clapham sect, Charles junior was to use his official 
position to further the cause of bringing Christianity to
“^Ellenborough Papers (E.P.) 21/2, Ellenborough to Clare, 26 
November I83O. Sir James Macintosh, 1763-1832, Onetime re­
corder to the Supreme Court at Bombay and later Professor 
of Law at Haileybury. Another member of the opposition 
for many years, his appointment now to the Board did not 
entirely fulfill his expectations. Sir James Macdonald,
M.P. for Caine in Wiltshire, like Macintosh * died in 
1832.
the people of India. In the three Charter debates in which
Grant took part he was always conspicuous for the warm
humanity with which he spoke on India. In the last of these,
that of 1853, after he had retired from public life, Grant,
now Lord Glenelg, told the Upper House that nit was not
only the duty but the mission of this country to India to
communicate to the natives of India the best education which
2it was in their power to give them. 11
The composition of the Board which supported Grant was 
remarkable even for such a time. In order to cope with the 
task in hand - a complete review of the Company’s affairs 
prior to legislation - an unusual number of Commissioners 
were attached to the Board. Besides Macintosh and Macdonald, 
both of whom died in 1832, Charles* beloved brother Robert 
was also immediately appointed. Like Charles, Robert had 
been called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn after coming down 
from Cambridge, but he had subsequently held positions of
^The influential pamphlet by Charles Grant senior, *’Observa­
tions on the State of Society among the Asiatic Subjects of 
Great Britain, particularly with respect to morals; and of 
the means of improving itM, an evangelical prescription for 
India was included, undoubtedly at his son*s wish, as an 
appendix to the authoritative Report of the Select Committee 
of 1832 (qv), see P.P.1831-32. VIII, App. I.
Hansard. 3S, CXXV, 11 March 1853
a legal nature, and it was this experience which parti­
cularly marked his contributions to the framing of the 
Charter.^ Another appointment of great consequence was 
that of Holt Mackenzie, for many years Secretary in the 
Territorial Departmentto the Government at Calcutta. Re-
2
commended to Grant by Bentinck as ,fmost humane and liberal11, 
his was a mind particularly "sensitive to the reforming 
current of Utilitarianism11. In Stokes* words Mackenzie’s 
memorandum on the land revenue system of the Conquered and 
Ceded Provinces was "the seed plot of the revenue systems 
adopted throughout northern and central India". His role
in the Civil Finance Committee, of which he proved to be
3the most radical member, was no less fertile. Two of the 
most drastic changes suggested by that body, the abolition 
of the councils of the subordinate governments and the in­
troduction of competition in the selection of civil servants
^Bentinck MSS, Grant to Bentinck, 25 Dec. 1833, p.8. Charles 
was to relate to Bentinck how "Having been with me the main 
concocter of the new Act, having thus with me created the 
place", Robert had declined the Law Membership. Robert 
Grant was conspicuouglin Parliament as the champion of the 
movement to end Jewish civil disabilities. He is remembered 
elsewhere as the author of two hymns in the English hymnal.
2
Howick MSS. Grant to Grey, 29 June 1832.
■^ Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India,pp. 9^ ancl 162-3, 
and see I. Husain, Land Revenue Policy in North India, pp. 
122-32 for a view of Mackenzie's work as essential prag­
matic.
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through the "four fold system", are attributed to him.^ 
Generously acknowledging the contribution made by his 
brother and by Holt Mackenzie, Charles Grant declared to
2
Bentinck, "Without these two men I could have done nothing."
Also prominent among this inner circle of Ministerial 
appointees was Thomas Hyde Villiers, brother of the future 
Lord Clarendon, who received the Secretaryship in May 1831. 
Villiers had already achieved some prominence in the free 
trade movement and from the moment he assumed his duties 
at the Board he diowed an indefatigable interest in the pro­
gress of British trade in the East. When, in January of 
1832, a Select Committee was appointed to inquire into the 
Company's affairs and into "the state of trade between Great 
Britain, the East Indies and China" Villiers was placed at
its head. The organization and management of this committee,
3
"whose labours formed the basis for subsequent legislation" 
it was claimed, remains a monument to this man whose untimely
Hobhouse told Auckland, "The four fold system is a child 
of Holt Mackenzie's", Home Misc., 837* 120. Hobhouse also 
made the marginal comment, "The Councils should have been 
abolished according to Mr. Holt Mackenzie's plan". Add MSS,
36468, f.446v. The fact that Macaulay's biographer, his 
nephew G.O.Trevelyan, could.credit him with "imparting into 
the Act" the competitive principle underlines the tenuous 
nature of such attributions.
^Bentinck MSS, Grant to Bentinck, 23 Dec. 1833* P« V*
■^ Sir Denis Le Marchant, Memoir of Viscount A1 thorp, p.467,
There is also evidence for the direct participation of another member 
of the Cabinet, Lord Brougham,in the framing of the Charter. The 
Calcutta Review, XXX, 1847, VII, 433 credits him with the author­
ship of the Law Commission.
death in December 1832 robbed his party of a promising
young politician. After the successful issue of the
struggle for the Reform Bill had released him, Thomas Bab-
bington Macaulay became a Commissioner and upon Villiers1
death he was appointed Secretary.
In Villiers, Holt Mackenzie, Macaulay and Robert Grant,
the President was supported by men of outstanding ability.
In their selection, with the exception of Macaulay, a Mini-
1stenal favourite, Grant had a major voice. All men of 
"enlightened and liberal views" by their own admission there 
was, not surprisingly, a large measure of mutual sympathy 
between them. While it is true that Grant lacked the domin­
ating personality that Ellenborough, for one, possessed,
it does not follow that the Charter was primarily the work
 2 ...........................
of his assistants. Certain of its provisions have been
attributed to one or the other of these men, sometimes the
same provision to two individuals, but such attributions
"the Committees on Indian affairs ... were organized by Mr. 
Hyde Villiers, with the assistance of Lord A1thorp".
See Howick MSS, Grant to Lord Grey, 29 June 1832 and passim.
Philips, p.294, speaks of the dominant part played by 
Macaulay in moulding the Bill and more recently Eric Stokes, 
pp. 179-80, has said of the Charter, "Officially its author 
was Charles Grant., but undoubtedly his assistants, at the 
Board had a more powerful influence in its moulding".
do not constitute the basis for a general assumption.
Leaving aside Grant's claim of his and his brother's author­
ship it is apparent that even before Holt Mackenzie and 
Macaulay came to the Board in 1832 the preliminary moves, 
particularly the Committee's investigations, were indicative 
of the lines along which the Charter would finally emerge.
Though the views of the Ministry on the continuance 
of the Company's commercial privileges should hardly have been 
in doubt Grant nevertheless refrained from declaring them 
to the Chairmen.^ An explicit statement on the shape of the 
arrangements was to await the completion of the largest in-
2vestigation yet undertaken by Parliament into Indian affairs.
The Select Committee at whose head Hyde Villiers was placed
in January 1832 was divided into six subcommittees.which,en-
3
quired into every aspect of the Company's affairs. Their 
Report was to form the authoritative reference for the Cabinet
1
N.P., ix-x, Memorandum of a Conversation between Charles 
Grant and the Chairmen of the East India Company, 7 July
1831.
2
Select Committees of both Houses had been appointed as early 
as February I83O but the fall of the Wellington Ministry had 
cut short their work. The Select Committee of the Commons 
appointed in February 1831 was likewise disrupted by the 
dissolution of Parliament in July 1831.
3
The Public, Finance and Trade, Revenue, Judicial, Military 
and the Political found in P.P. 1831-32, . IX to XIV.
with respect to the Charter.'1' The very volume of the in­
vestigations, "81^9 pages of close print, which, with the 
matter already given to Parliament, made an aggregate of be­
tween thirteen and fourteen thousand closely printed pages of 
2
large quarto” and thesize and the composition of the Com-
3
mittee seemed to give substance to the Ministry's claim 
that the Charter had been framed in response to the voice of 
the nation.
If the Committee was to express the voice of the nation 
pains were taken to see that that voice was a well modulated 
one. The sittings were held at the Board and members of that 
body generally sat in charge of the six sub-committees into 
which the Select Committee was divided, Hyde Villiers con­
ducting the one on Trade and Finance. The witnesses called 
and the topics on which they were examined exhibited a strongly 
predetermined character, an attribute not uncommon to Select
The Report is found in P.P. 1831-32, VIII, 9-8^. See the 
Cabinet Minute,6t 7 & 8 esp. In the House of Lords Ripon 
claimed on 3 July 1833 that "there was no part of the plan 
which had not received the deliberate- sanction of a committee, 
and that not a single principle had been adopted that had not 
the support of some adequate authority". Hansard, 3S, XIX, 193*
2
P. Auber, The Rise of British Power in India, II, p. 679•
^See P.P. 1831-32, VIII, 2. There were forty eight members 
originally and twenty four more were subsequently added.
Hardly a quarter of the members could be associated with the 
Opposition and even less with support for the Company's privi­
leges. The industrial and commercial interests were strongly 
represented.
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Committees.^ Of particular significance for the future 
shape of the Indian administration was the fact that the 
two witnesses most extensively examined, James Mill, the
2
Benthamite Exaniner of Correspondence at the India House, 
and Holt Meckenzie, who was soon to assume his Coramissioner- 
ship at the Board, were the strongest advocates of compre­
hensive reform.
The Report,though it appears to give both the pro and 
the con of the great questions of Indian policy which it ex­
amines, emerges as a powerful advocate of change, a compen­
dium of the improving ideas of administrators and statesmen, 
of evangelicals, merchants and industrialists, an exemplifi­
cation of the extent to which their views could be repre­
sented as running together at this time. It expresses force­
fully the extent of the impetus to change, not only in the
Lucy Brown's remarks on the Select Committee on Import Duties: 
"The membership of the Committee bore every mark of its pro-
• pagandist origin" and on the Select Committee on Rates of 
Postage: "witnesses were not so much examined as invited to
give prepared propaganda lectures", are not inapplicable to 
this Committee. The Board of Trade and the Free Trade Move­
ment 1830-^2i pp. 71 and 73- Lord Ellenborough, for one, did 
not regard its findings as infallible. Hansard, 3S, XIX,
186-7, House of Lords, 3 July 1833-
2
It appears that James Mill attempted to exert a private initi­
ative too. In 1831 he addressed the Lord Chancellor, writing 
"India, its judiciary or rather its government altogether, is 
a subject about which I should wish to talk to you for a month.
| Then I am sure I can talk with advantage because I can save you
an infinite amount of trouble in getting at the evidence on
! which you should build". Brougham Papers, Mill to Lord Brougham,




commercial but in the territorial administration, which came 
from Britain. Throughout the Report two great themes, in 
theory perhaps contradictory but complementary in practice, 
are constantly recurring: that of a free trade in goods and
ideas and that of the intervention of a strong centralized 
government. Thus on the one hand we have, at the conclusion 
of the section on land revenue: "Nothing can be better cal­
culated to give an impulse to the improvement of the Land, 
when cultivation is backward and the means of improvement 
scanty, than the opening of foreign markets to its produce" 
and a related stress on the need to abolish or modify the 
salt, opium and tobacco monopolies and such burdens on in­
ternal commerce as transit and town duties, the wheel tax, 
sayer and abkari. On religious matters "perfect toleration, 
on the part of the Government, to the labours of the mission­
aries, is not less strongly recommended". Exclusion of the 
natives from the civil service is not warranted, "while it is 
contended that their admission into the higher offices would 
have a beneficial effect". " And it is implied that the re­
strictions on the press will be removed.^ On the other hand 
"It has been said, that one of the most important considerations
1P.P. 1831-3 2. VIII, 68, 22, 21 & 26
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for Parliament is the improvement of the Government of 
India in India itself: with this in view... has been pro­
posed..* the establishment of one Supreme Government for all 
of India without the charge of any local administration".
The chief obstacle to the settlement of Europeans and the 
accompanying benefits of increased intercourse "appears to 
be considered to arise out of the defective state of the 
Judicial establishments, civil and criminal". And on relations 
with the native states, if the subsidiary system of alliances 
was not to be abandoned "it is clearly our duty to render it 
as beneficial, or rather as little detrimental as possible, 
to the interests of the inhabitants of the Allied States".^
The complete reorganization of the fiscal system apart
2
from land revenue is contemplated by the Report, the reform 
of the constitution of the Indian governments and much of the 
administration as well, as redefinition of the relationship 
with the native states and much else. Not all the aspirations 
voiced in the Report would find expression in the Charter,
"*Ibid., 19, 26 & 83. Upon the admittance of Europeans it might 
be observed that the one Indian who testified, Ram Mohun Roy, 
who of course partook of the current reforming spirit and who 
contrived to appear in England at this time, was in favour of 
permitting the entrance, under suitable restraints, of "edu­
cated persons of character and capital" as a stimulus to In­
dian development. Ibid., Appendix, 3^1 seq.
2
It was pointedly observed however that "the Permanent Settlement 
of Lord Cornwallis has failed in its professed object", ibid., 64.
nor indeed would they all find realization in the succeeding 
twenty years of Indian administration. But the fact that the 
Act did fit comfortably into the context of the Report is 
something of a tribute to the Reform Ministry’s skill in 
tailoring administrative reform to the political realities of 
the hour.
On 10 December 1832 Charles Grant,, in the presence of 
Lord Grey, read to the Chairmen of the Company a "Paper of 
Hints",^ an outline of the proposed changes in the Company's 
commerce and in the constitution of the home government.
The Ministry's plan bore the major characteristics of the 
other Whig reforms of the period. The proposals were un­
doubtedly of "such a scope and description as to satisfy all
reasonable demands and to remove at once, and for ever, all
2rational grounds for complaint" on the part of the Reform 
' Parliament. They promised a spee$# settlement of outstanding 
issues and hence their removal from the Parliamentary arena 
at the earliest possible date. Any powers independently exer­
cised by the Court of Directors were to be removed so as to
~*~N.P. t 3-4» Memorandum of Paper of Hints read to J.G.Ravenshaw 
and C. Marjoribanks, 10 December 1832.
2Grey upon the requisite characteristics of the Reform Bill,, 
see N. Gash, Politics in the Age of Peel, p.10.
strengthen the Minister's hand in the face of a Commons bent 
on asserting its own control over the executive.
The Company was to be maintained as the administrative 
organ. Its commercial monopoly was of course to cease while 
the thorny question of the future of the Company's trade was 
solved at a stroke by abolishing it. To avoid a lengthy ad­
judication between the claims of the territorial and commercial 
branches of the administration upon the Company's assets these 
were to be transferred in their entirety to the Crown for the 
service of the Government of India. The Proprietor's dividend 
was in return to be charged upon the Indian revenues for a 
fixed number of years.
In the Cabinet's view "This plan appears fair to all 
parties - With respect to England it involves no expense. With 
respect to India it is more than negative. It removes the 
pressure of a burthen which it might be difficult to find an­
other opportunity of so conveniently discharging, by obtaining 
for India all the Company's commercial property in India and 
in England... It secures to the Proprietors a dividend, which
under no circumstances could they expect to increase... It
1identifies their interests with those of India". Questions of
~*~MSS Eur.l, Report of the Committee of Cabinet on the 
Charter, pp. 14-13* The political expediency was borne out 
by the fact that the only question ajsked in Commons by the 
leader of the Opposition, whose authority on financial questions
fairness apart, if we accept as given that the Grey Ministry 
needed to find a swift solution to the problem of the Com­
pany's trade in order to avoid prolonged political contro­
versy then the form the solution took, with its interlocking 
provisions, and this includes the maintaining of the Company 
in an administrative capacity, follows logically.
The"Paper of Hints" made it quite clear that with the 
cessation of the Company's trading activities the Board would 
thenceforth enjoy a complete control over "establishment and 
expenditure". It also proposed to give the Board the power 
of veto over the Court's right to recall Governors and Mili­
tary Commanders, and potentially most revolutionary, had the
change been instituted, it provided that the Board should
\
have the power to frame a despatch themselves, should the 
Court refuse to do so, and this without any power of appeal 
to a court of law. It was apparent that while the Ministry 
was unwilling to assume the government of India outright 
they wished to leave no independent powers in the Court's 
hands. No less threateningly, the chairmen must have felt, 
the future number of Directors was left open and included 
in the proposals was a plan for introducing the competitive 
principal into the selection of civil servants by providing
was already being deferred to by the Government, was about 
the security for the Proprietors' dividend - "Is this country 
to be answerable for the payment?". Hansard, 3S> XVIII, 722, 
Sir R.Peel, House of Commons, 13 June' lb33»
that there should always be more candidates than service
appointments to fill.
Despite its tentative title the provisions of the Paper
were to be embodied in the Bill with relatively little change
of substance,,The Company was ill placed to defend itself
from such attacks upon its privileges, and the Directors’
morale was low.^ In the new Parliament there were fewer
2
members associated with its interests than ever before. The
Company had been labelled a monopoly, and as the Tory
3
Quarterly Review observed, that was a ’’bad name”. Though
it was fully entitled to continue as a trading body after
surrendering its commercial privileges such a course was
never seriously entertained. Even that most outspoken defender
of the Company’s autonomy, Henry St. George Tucker conceded
that against the private traders it could not ’’venture to
k
engage in a race of competition”, while J.G.Ravenshaw, one 
of the Chairmen, writing to his friend Bentinck, showed him­
self even more alarmed by the free trade lobby: ”In fact the
J.G.Ravenshaw wrote to Bentinck, 16 Oct. 1832, ’’Another son
for Bengal early next year He is the last I shall ever
send to India. Comparatively speaking the service is as good 
as over.” Bentinck Mss.
^Philips , pp. 277 and 28f>-6. In 1806 there had been 106 
M.P.s with Indian interests, in 1832 there were 22.
3Vol. 50, p.233.
L
N.P., 126, Dissent of 30 March 1833.
Government is not strong enough to do what is right against
popular clamour”. ”As Proprietors and Directors give us
our capital which we have”, he added resignedly, ”and we
1
shall have no reason to complain.”
Responsibility to the Proprietors for the security of
their capital meant that any course other than acceptance
of the Ministers' proposals was at best a manoeuvre and Grant
took an early opportunity of pointing out that if a prompt
acceptance was not forthcoming he would propose an alternative
2
plan for the future government of India. The centralquestion 
of the negotiations was therefore the size of the fund for the 
guarantee of the dividend and eventual redemption of the stock. 
When Grant expressed a willingness to recommend to Parlia­
ment a dividend of 10 and a half per cent; and that the fund 
should be increased to £2 ,000,000 from the £1 ,200,000 originally 
stipuhted the great majority of the Directors expressed their 
willingness to recommend the Ministerial plan to the Proprietors.
^Bentinck Mss., 10 Dec. 184-3 • He seems to have misconceived 
the Ministry's attitude as between Company and free traders.
2
N.P., 33i Grant to Chairmen, 12 Feb. 1833-
3N.P.. 191-2 , Chairmen to Grant, 29 May 1833 and 202-03, 
Committee of the whole Court, Minute and Resolution of 7 June, 
1833* Grant had also assented to the Court's request that 
sufficient funds should be set aside to compensate their ser­
vants in the commercial line, N.P., 187-9» Grant to Chairmen,
27 May 1833.
Despite its weak bargaining position the Court never­
theless attempted to extract certain conditions under which 
they might continue "efficiently to administer the Government."^- 
Firstly they asked for and received Grant's assurance that he
would recommend to Parliament that the Charter should be re-
2
viewed for a defined period. Then they requested that mea­
sures affecting expenditure should continue to originate 
with the Court. The Directors were deeply anxious about the 
viability of the Indian finances, deprived under the new ar­
rangements of support from commercial profits. Their defense 
of the Company's China monopoly had turned mainly upon its 
importance to their finances."^ Unfortunately, as with the
Court's claim that to open the China trade might jeopardize
if
"our amicable intercourse with China", such arguments were 
more appropriate to the mercantilist thinking of the previous
~^N.P., 183-^, Chairmen to Charles Grant, 3 May 1^33- 
^N.P., 187, Grant to Chairmen, 27 May 1833*
~z
N.P., 6, Secret Committee of Correspondence, 2 Jan. 1833*
See also ii and iv.
^N.P., 7 , Secret Committee of Correspondence, 2 Jan. 1833-
Grant replied that recent events in Canton left "some room to
distrust the sufficiency of the Company's guardianship".
Some officer or officers would have to be stationed at Canton 
"by appointment of the Crown" to supervise British subjects 
there. Three were so appointed - but war broke out nonethe­
less in 1839. Ibid., 2^-3, Grant to Chairmen, 12 Feb. 1833.
century than to the laissez faire doctrines to which the
Whigs in the 1830s were increasingly subscribing. Grant
answered the Court in the coin of contemporarypolitical
economy: "Once cut off the resource of the surplus profit,"
he said, "and the administrators of the Indian revenues will
.find themselves compelled to confine their expenditure within
the limits of their proper income."'*' The Court, however, did
not place much faith in the infallibility of this tenet; in
their view the chief cause of the financial embarrassment of
the Indian Government had been "the expensive wars in which
2we have at different times been involved." Grant "conceded"
the point by observing that expenditure would continue "as
3
at present" to be subject to the Board's sanction. Re­
trenchment was one of the main planks in the Whig platform 
and it was a central concept of the Charter that Indian ex­
penditure should be met entirely from Indian revenues, "that 
India shall not be a permanent burden on the finances of 
England." Grant chose completely to ignore the Court's ob­
jection, though its validity was to be fully demonstrated in
~*~N.P. 31» Grant to Chairmen, 12 Feb. 1833- 
^N.P. 66, Chairmen to Grant, 27 Feb. 1833. 
N.P. 188, Grant to Chairmen, 27 May 1833-
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the next twenty years.'1' As with other Whig measures Grant
was more concerned to cope with political pressures than
with financial realities.
The Court had one other major request to make. Now
that the Company had been divested of that commerce from
which the Court had derived so large a part of its character
"as a body independent of the Government", the Directors
greatly feared that they might become "merely an instrument
2
for giving effect to the views of the Indian Minister." To 
maintain a degree of independence the Court now appealed for 
a rule of publicity to both houses of Parliament in cases where 
the acts of the Board might appear to them "to be unconsti­
tutional to militate against the principals of good govern­
ment, to interfere with substantial justice to our allies."^
The Court's request touched upon a crucial issue for 
the Ministry: how to conduct the administration in face of
a Reformed Parliament bent on asserting its control over the 
executive. It spelled danger for any ministry with a small 
majority, or with a heterogeneous one such as that of l8j?2.
^P.P.1832-33* XXVIII, q.8l92. In the next twenty years some 
£3 0,000,000 in increased military expenditure was to be charged 
to the revenues of India. In only five of those years was there 
a surplus of revenue over expenditure. This was duer over­
whelmingly to the almost continuous round of wars commencing 
in 1838.
2
N.P. 63, the Chairman to Chailes Grant, 27 February 1833-
•3
^The current struggle between Court and Board over the pecuniary 
claims of British subjects upon Native princes gave particular 
edge to this request, the Court opposing the Board's wish to 
throw the government of India's influence behind the creditors.
110
Accordingly, to the Court's repeated requests an adamant refusal 
was returned. H.M.'s Ministers could not but object, Grant 
told the Chairman, to a principle which could not fail to 
operate "very prejudicially to the purposes of good govern­
ment."'1' Nor did subsequent petitions to both houses of Par-
2
liament bear any immediate fruit. Parliamentary publicity 
of issues within the home government had therefore to await 
the Government of India Act of 1838 brought in by a Conser-
'Z
vative Ministry. The Whigs in 1833 were not prepared to 
concede what would have been the most effective guarantee of 
the Court's independence at the price of increasing Parlia-
kment's scope for intervention.
Grant had produced his "Paper of Hints", which settled 
the structure and powers of the Company in England in December
1832. It was not until 2k June, however, just four days be­
fore he introduced the Charter Bill in the Commons, that he 
sent to the Court a summary of the proposals with respect to
^N.P. 198, Grant to the Chairman, k June 1833*
2H.P. 404 and 448.
^21 and 22 Viet, c 106, S.26. 
if
This unwillingness on the part of Whi& statesmen to allow to 
the co-ordinate body a substantial measure of independence 
was a continuing factor in legislation on India. Over the 
Act of 1838 Palmerstone and Sir Chafes Wood were strongly of 
the opinion that the Secretary of State's Council should be 
a clearly subordinate body. See S.N.Singh, The Council of 
India, l838-1919i London Ph.D., 1955, pp. 8 and 26>.
India which with the relatively few amendments allowed to 
the Court or won by the opposition form the substance of this 
part of the Charter. They were then seen to be hardly less radi­
cal than the Hints: "An entire change in the frame and constitu-
2
tion of the Indian Government11, one Director termed them.
The main feature of the new proposals was the provision 
for the effective centralisation of the administration in the 
hands of the Supreme Government, whereby !,the whole civil and 
military government of India11 was to be vested in the Governor- 
General in Council.^ The legislation of the Supreme Govern­
ment was to apply to ,fall persons, British or Native, Foreigners 
or others, and to all Courts of Justice** - which meant among 
other things that the Governor-General would be empowered
N.P. 259 seq. Summary of the Provisions of the proposed 
Bill, contained in C. Grant's letter to the Chairman* 2k June
1833. Ellenborough was informed of this fact by the Company's 
Financial Secretary, E.P.28A  f.91» His Diary entry for 18 
June 1833 runs nI learn from Melvill that these changes with 
respect to the Government of India have not been the subject 
of discussion with the Court of Directors".
^N.P. 3^1* Tucker's Dissent of 2 July 1833*
^The Council was to be of five members, the fifth being in 
effect an appointee of the Ministry. This last appointment, 
and the intended enlargement of the ecclesiastical establish­
ment in India was not referred to in the summary.
Mto issue laws binding, to a certain extent, upon the Sup­
reme Courts, especially as to jurisdiction." A "more defined 
and efficient control" over the subordinate .Governments was 
to be given to the Supreme Government, which henceforth 
would have a "precedent and preventive" authority in place 
of its former "subsequent and corrective" powers. No laws 
were to be passed, nor any expenses incurred, without the 
previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council. At 
the same time the Councils in Bombay and Madras were to be 
dispensed with, the clear intention being that the Supreme 
Council should contain a member from each of the Presidencies 
of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, and also from the Presidency 
of Agra newly to be created from the upper provinces of the 
old Bengal Presidency. The Governor-General himself was to 
remain Governor of Bengal, that is Governor of what were 
formeify- the lower provinces, and heads of the Bengal civil 
and military services which, undivided, would continue to 
serve both the upper and lower provinces.
The ticklish question of placing the Army in India 
under a single Commander in Chief was left for future con­
sideration. A Commission was to be set up, however, to en­
quire into the "nature administration, etc. of the existing 
laws, into the courts of justice, modes of judicature,and
police throughout British India" and it was to submit such 
alterations and propositions as would tend to establish as 
uniform a system of laws as was consistent with the diverse 
character of British India.
Meanwhile, as British subjects were now to be allowed 
to proceed to India without licence, to enjoy greater access 
to the interior, and to hold land, though limited for the 
present to terms of years, the interests of the natives were 
to be protected by subjecting Europeans to the same laws and 
jurisdiction, with certain exceptions, as Indians. Slavery 
after a specified period was to be abolished. Finally, np 
Native or British subject was henceforth to be excluded from 
holding any office within the administration merely by reason 
of his religion, birthplace, descent or colour. These 'pro­
posals1 then would form the major provisions of the Charter 
with respect to India. The few amendments won by the Court 
and the few more by the Opposition in Parliament will be dis­
cussed in the course of the remainder of the chapter.
When these sweeping proposals were submitted to the 
Court, Sir Richard Jenkins raised the objection that they 
were being called to deliberate upon the Ministers' plan in a
^N.P. 353* Dissent of Richard Jenkins, 5 July 1833. Jenkins 
was later Tory M.P. for Shrewsbury. He was one of four new 
Directors with Indian experience elected between June 1832
1
virtually Mex post facto mode”* Nevertheless, the Court did
proceed to obtain one truly major concession to their views on
the constitution of the Indian governments. Grant agreed that
the existence of the Councils at Madras and Bombay should be
decided Mby the future and deliberate decisionnof both the
Court and Board. He also made it clear that the provision
relating to the Crown* s approbation of appointments to the
Supreme Council applied to the fifth or law member . only -
the first written mention he had made of this new post. In
the same letter Grant finally laid to rest the threat of a
2
reduction m  the number of Directors.'
The modifications which the Court were able to obtain 
were limited and Tucker held that the Directors' objections 
had not gone far enough. Nevertheless their views were
and June 1833• The others were Cotton, Vans Agnew and W.B. 
Bayley, who had been a member of Bentinck1s Council. Bay- 
ley in India had discussed reform plans, and while agree­
ing with the principle of a truly supreme Government, and 
of creating a fourth Presidency, he had objected to the 
more radical ideas of Holt Mackenzie. (See N.P. 2Vf, Minute 
by Bayley, 9 Nov. 1830.
Ellenborough was told by the Company's Financial Secretary 
how little notice the Court had received - E.P. 2.8/k f.91 - 
and he recorded in his diary, on 18 June, MI learn from 
Melvill that these changes with respect to the Government of 
India have not been the subject of discussion with the Court 
of Directors.
^N.P., 263, Grant to Chairman, 27 June 1833.
f^fee, N.P-., v 353» Dissent of 3 July 1833* James Rivett Carnac
important as a statement, admittedly a cautious one, of 
what their future attitude towards the proposed changes 
was likely to be.
The Court of course concurred in the necessity of 
placing Europeans under suitable restraints now they were 
to be allowed an increased facility of access into the in­
terior,^- of subjecting them to the Company’s rather than 
the Supreme Courts. They expressed a guarded approval 
of the proposed abolition of slavery provided it could be 
effected "without doing violence to feelings of caste, or 
rights of property". They argued that the more extensive 
employment of Indians as "servants of the local governments 
is in accordance with the views which the Court have for many 
years expressed and acted upon", but as would appear later 
this interpretation was something very different from the 
eligibility of natives to the covenanted service which the
was ready to express his belief that under the new system 
the Directors would still have the power to play their part 
"with benefit to India". He was alone in that belief, 
but then he was a Whig, related to both the Palmerston 
and Russell families. See N.P.,402.
1The actual state of the apprehension existing in the Court 
is perhaps better reflected in Tucker’s letter to William 
Blunt, Member of the Supreme Council, written in May 183 :^ 
"What I most dread, is the unchecked resort of Europeans to 
India, and their location on the land. This may lead to much 
injustice and oppression to the natives, and to a fearful 
struggle at some future period; hut I used my utmost efforts, 
to no purpose, to prevent the measure. I succeeded better with 
the slavery question and it will be the fault of the legis­
lative Government if any imprudent step be taken." Kaye, 
Tucker, pp. 4-7 0-71.
87th clause of the Charter implied. On the addition of 
two bishops to the establishment in India the Chairmen were 
willing to express themselves more forcefully, urging that 
the charge to the revenues of India ’’should be limited to
what is essential for the use of the Servants of the State
1who are members of that Church”. The project for codifying 
the laws of a land as vast and varied as India was premature, 
the Court felt, they ’’must be permitted to doubt whether 
the British empire in India ... has yet reached the point 
at which it may be possible for its foreign rulers to ac­
complish that desideratum of uniformity of laws which has 
not yet been found attainable in our own long settled and 
highly civilized country.”
The degree to which centralization of power in the hands 
of the Governor-General had been carried, the Court observed, 
must materially ’’interfere with the control now exercised by 
the Home Government?! Henceforth the Governors of the Presi­
dencies would be subordinate to him rather than to the authori­
ties at home. Moreover the Court doubted whether it would 
always be possible to select a person fit to be entrusted 
with authority of such magnitude. They noted that by en­
trusting the details of Bengal administration to the Governor-
N.P., 329, Letter of 10 gilly 1833.
General, as an addition to his general duties of control, 
labour had been consolidated rather than divided. On the 
} other hand the division of Bengal seemed likely to be pro­
ductive of confusion and dissatisfaction.'*' Nor had Grant's 
compromise on the future of the subordinate Presidency 
Councils fully reassured them: they stressed that Governors
appointed from England would continue to need the advice of 
men conversant with the workings of Indian government, and 
they also made the point that Councillorships formed a 
legitimate goal and reward for outstanding service.
The Court could not have felt otherwise, than alarmed 
about the threat posed to long established policies by the 
Bill that was now being submitted to the reformed Parliament. 
The exclusion of Europeans and non-intervention in the social, 
religious and even certain facets of the political life of 
Indians had been cardinal principles of policy even before 
the Company's assumption of empire. Similarly administrative 
centralization, even in the largely pragmatic manner in which 
it had been incorporated into the Bill was opposed to the 
principles of check and balance inherent in the Cornwallis 
system, to which in its broad outline the majority of the
^The Directors were doubtless conscious that the division of 
Bengal might limit the prospects of men in what had hitherto 
been the premier service; they feared the expense of the 
Agra Presidency in any case.
Court still adhered, V/ith respect to the Home Government 
they clearly felt that unitary government in India implied 
the same at home rather than the existant 1 double govern­
ment*. The Chairmen could scarcely bring themselves to 
accept the Ministry*s plan. It would have been better, 
they felt, ’’that His Majesty’s Government should have openly 
and avowedly assumed the direct administration of India.
If the Court had to, it would only be because they felt 
with Tucker, Mif we throw up and withdraw, what will be the 
result? It is to be apprehended that the administration 
of our Eastern possessions will fall into less experienced 
hands.... "^
In the Commons the Bill, presented on 28 June as a
measure agreed between the Board and Court, experienced
little opposition. MThe very cause of the negligence of the
reporters, and the thinness of the House, is that we framed
our measure so carefully as to give little occasion for
debate1’ observed Macaulay, the spokesman for the Bill at
3its second reading on 10 July. Macaulay himself contributed 
^N.P., 46^-3, Dissent of 12 August 1833-
p
N.P.f ^77, paper by Tucker, 12 August 1833*
^G.O.Trevelyan, The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay, p.226.
a speech brilliant in its rhetoric - ”by general agreement ... 
the best speech that I ever made in my lifeM, as he recorded - 
or in the words of one old M.P. a consolation to the young 
Mfor never having heard Mr. Burke”.^  Indeed Macaulay, like 
Burke at an earlier juncture, did rise to the occasion, and 
venture to speak of the ultimate purposes of British rule in 
India, of ”the destinies of our Indian empire”. A towering 
vindication of the purposes of the Bill and of the liberal 
spirit in which it had been framed, the speech was unequi­
vocally a partisan one directed in no small measure against
2
Lord Ellenborough1s attack in the Lords five days earlier.
The eas& with which the Bill passed through the 
Commons must also be attributed to Grant’s skilful manage­
ment which averted any major collision on the questions 
which were still outstanding. At his persuading Wm. Ewart, 
member for Liverpool, postponed his motion on the equaliza­
tion of duties on East and West Indian produce and George
Wilbraham his on the abolition of the Government of India's
3salt monopoly. The efforts of Joseph Hume and of the Director
1Ibid.. p.225.
2See p- II'l S-ecp-
^Hansard, 3$, XIX, 6l6-l8 and 1075, 12 and 22 July 1833.
Robert Cutlar Fergusson on behalf of the legal community 
at Calcutta to avert the subordination of the Supreme Courts 
to the Governor-General and Council were skilfully thwarted.'1' 
He also ensured that neither Hume's objections on the ground 
c£ economy, nor O'Connell's on those of partiality to a parti­
cular sect, the established Church, gained sufficient sup­
port to have the clauses dealing with increases in the
2
ecclesiastical establishment amended. On slavery Grant 
was able to push through an amendment removing the deadline 
for its abolition in India, mainly because Thomas Powell 
Buxton, inheritor of Wilberforce's mantle, was ready to
leave the timing to Grant, in the knowledge that he and his
3
associates "were averse from slavery".
If the voice of the Opposition was scarcely audible in 
the Commons this was not the case in the Lords where they 
were in the majority and where Ellenborough and Wellington
H^ansard, 3&, XIX, 66A, 13 July 1833• Fergusson was an ex­
barrister of the Supreme Court at Calcutta. Though in the 
nature of the Company's advocate on other parts of the Bill, 
he here spoke contrary to the views of the Court as a whole.
2Ibid., 1033-4, 19 July 1833.
3
Ibid., 799> 17 July 1833- As a Minister, however, Grant 
seemed rather to share the Court's view, for writing to 
Bentinck he declared the clause in its amended form "harmless" 
Bentinck Mss., 23 December 1833-
121
! possessed the respect of the House when they spoke on In­
dian questions. "Some very important -amendments v/ere made
i
there, most of them being due to the efforts of Ellenborough 
and Wellington. They included the specific provision that 
the subordinate Councils should consist of three members - a move 
which; had Lord Wellesley’s support - and that the Supreme 
I Council should consist of four and not five ordinary members.
The provision that the "whole" civil and military government 
should reside in the Governor-General in Council was altered 
to read that he should have "the superintendence, direction 
and control of the whole". Lord Lansdowne carried an amend-
i
| ment to the effect that the Law Member should take part
only in purely legislative deliberations, a provision which
I
i 2contributed much fuel for later controversy. Provision was
i
also made for the annual submission of Indian accounts to 
Parliament. These were by no means minor changes, but even 
so it may be argued that even more significant for the future 
conduct of Indian affairs was Ellenborough’s comprehensive
2,
See Printed Copy of the Bill with Amendments, 9 August 1833* 
House of Lords Record Office.
^See Hansard, 3S, XX, Vf3, House of Lords, 9 August 1833*
criticism of the bill, made in a speech which he considered,
as Macaulay was to consider his in turn, the best of his
career.^" While there is much in Ellenborough1 s speech
which is of an idiosyncratic nature, and none the less
important for that, the basis of his attack is grounded in
the attitude common to his party at this time, namely, that
the Ministry, urged on by the Radicals, were tampering with
the very foundation of government.
"The present" Ellenborough told the Lords, "was a crude,
ill-digested plan, the offspring of unfounded theories, formed
2
by men who knew nothing of India." The abolition of the
Councils at Madras and Bombay would eliminate the principle
of responsibility and would constitute the Government of
India an absolute authority, he objected. (Considering that
Ellenborough had told Lord Clare in November of 1831 "If I
3
had my way there would be no members of Council" his defence 
of them now can only be seen as emanating from a party poli­
tical position rather than from personal conviction.) A new
^E.P.28/3, Diary for 6 July 1833*
^Hansard, 3S, XIX, 192, H. of L. 5 July 1833.
E.P.21/2, Ellenborough to Lord Clare, Governor of Bombay,
2 November 1831. There is a similar discrepancy between 
Ellenborough1s condemnation of the influence of the Court 
of Directors in his speech (Hansard, l8*f-3), and his conduct 
towards them as President of the Board and more especially 
as Governor General.
government was to be established in India and the legis­
lature vested in an unmanageable Council of six, the fifth 
member of which, a "philosopher11, would be at the head of
A
the opposition. Confusion would be carried into every de­
partment of government. Legislation, he claimed, would be 
better carried on by the local than the Supreme Government. 
The extension of this Government’s legislative power, 
the subjection of the Supreme Courts to it, the abolition 
of the licensing requirement for entry of Europeans, the 
plan to place all persons in India under the same law-all 
this meant the sweeping away of every security the natives 
of India possessed against oppression by Europeans, Ellen­
borough thundered.^
The social implications of the Bill were as alarming 
as the constitutional. The proposal to abolish slavery by 
a fixed date, Ellenborough asserted, "would lead most cer­
tainly to bloodshed in every part of India". And though the 
time would come when the natives of India would fill even 
the highest positions there, the attempt to precipitate such 
a state of society was self-defeating and dangerous. No man
Hansard, XIX, 189-90. It is surely to Ellenborough’s 
attack on the subordination of the Supreme Courts that Macaulay 
is replying when he states "I could scarcely, Sir, believe my 
ears when I heard this part of our plan condemned in another 
place." It seems too that Ellenborough is the target, at 
least in part, for Macaulay's invective in defense of the 87th 
clause "At the risk of being cdled by that nickname which is 
regarded as the most opprobrious of all nicknames, by men of 
selfish hearts and contracted minds - at the risk of being 
called a philosopher", ibid., 528 & 53 .^
in his senses would propose to place political and military 
power in the hands of the natives. Ellenborough looked in­
stead to the reduction of taxation, "which was the only way 
to benefit the lower classes in India, to elevate them ulti­
mately in the scale of society".
Ellenborough!s most formidable attack was mounted on 
the financial aspects of the Whig Ministry's plan, and his 
insistence on sound fiscal administration bore the hallmark 
of that administrative approach which Sir Robert Peel was in 
the process of making the cornerstone of Conservative policy. 
It would have formed no part of the previous Ministry's plan, 
he claimed, "all at once to end the trade with China".
Rather, by a gradual cessation, they would have prevented 
loss to India's revenues by otherwise investing the Com­
pany's assets. The other changes wrought by tie present plan - 
with its enlarged Council, Law Commission, additional bishops 
and the like - would also involve the Government of India 
in deficits and loss. In a masterly analysis of the effects 
of the plan on Indian finances he demonstrated that it en­
tailed an additional annual burden of £5^ -0,000 more than what 
had been proposed under the previous Ministry. The day when 
a surplus might be achieved would thereby be postponed for 
four or five years if the present plan to limit Government 
control to general matters, leaving the details to subordinate
officers were followed, "the total ruin of their Indian 
finances would be the r e s u l t . W h a t  Ellenborough was im­
plying in fact was that the Indian Minister must be responsible 
for the condition of the Indian finances, that he rejected 
the convenient fiction espoused by Grant, albeit in good 
faith, that the authorities in India would be compelled by 
some natural law to confine their expenses within their income. 
Here he had seized on the Achilles' heel of Whig reform and 
administration, the financial aspect.
The Edinburgh Review, the intellectual organ of the
Whig party, in whose pages Macaulay's contributions were so
often to be found, hailed the Charter Act finally passed on
2.8 August 1833 as marking "the introduction of a just and
liberal policy in the East, And somewhat magniloquently
it pronounced, "The rights of all our subjects in the East
have been placed upon a new and secure foundation, while
those of our countrymen at home have been established in all
2
that regards either trade or settlement." The Benthamite 
Westminster Review chose to publish a generally critical 
article on the Act, but it, too, could find "redeeming qualities
liansard. 3S, XIX, 177-8 & l8l-3.
2




in the Ministerial measure proposed for the future govern­
ment of India”.^ For the evangelicals and abolitionists,
if
j often the same people, there was likewise cause for satis-
iI
faction in the ecclesiastical and slavery clauses. Indeed 
there is much in the Act, and in the speeches and reports 
associated with it, that reflects economic liberalism,
Utilitarian prescriptions for administrative and legal re-
i
form, or reforming, proselytizing Christianity. Certainly
the final shape of the Indian administration far from being
I a uniform system appeared to the Governor General as ”an
2apparent compromise of conflicting opinions”. Compromise 
there had been, indeed the word was one which Grant frequently 
used during the Charter negotiations and the debates in 
Parliament. But the compromises that were made were, ulti­
mately, effected by the Minister for India and subject to 
the approval of the Ministry. The interest of the Govern­
ment when acting in its own sphere, of necessity, was dominant.
Halevy has pointed out that the Whigs were no longer 
the defenders of the eighteenth century constitution, that
to their critics in the 1830s they appeared to be ushering
3
m  a system of bureaucratic despotism. Enough has been said
^Westminster Review, 1833» ■» 19* 1^.
Bentinck Mss, Bentinck to Tucker, 11 August 183 .^ 
^Halevy, III, p.99.
to show the hollowness of Macaulay!s claim that the Com­
pany would form an effective check against the power of 
the Board and it is not in terms of Whig constitutional 
theory, or any other, that we wish to describe the influence 
of the Ministry upon this Act. Rather for Lord Grey’s Govern­
ment this measure had to serve primarily as a practical solu­
tion to the problem of carrying on the administration of India 
under changed conditions both in India and at home. In this 
connection we are reminded of a quotation used by Norman 
Gash to sum up the Whigs' political approach: "They believed
that Government was a practical thing, and did not exist to
furnish a spectacle of uniformity, nor to comply with logic,
1
arithmetic or the theories of visionary politicians."
The outstanding characteristic of the change effected 
in the government of India was the extent to which the ad­
ministration had been centralized. As an article of faith, 
administrative centralism, in Halevy's phrase, was "a genuine,
perhaps even the most characteristic aspect of the doctrine
2
of the orthodox Radicals, of Bentham and his followers".
Yet the manner in which the Indian administration was further 
centralized was certainly not the result of a disinterested
~Sl. Gash, p.lln.
2Es-levy III, pp. 99-100
Ministerial application of this doctrine. The chief 
difference between the theory and the fact hinges upon the 
distinction between vesting power in the hands of the Sup­
reme Government as a body and centralizing it in the hands 
of the Ministry's representative, the Governor General.
Thus it had been the view of James Mill,'5' "the high priest 
of Benthamism", and the substance of the recommendations 
received from India, that the Supreme Government ought to 
be relieved from the details of local administration so as 
to free it for the more efficient discharge, on an all- 
India basis, of its executive and legislative functions.
But what was in fact done was to vest the local administration 
of the lower provinces of Bengal in the Governor-General 
personally. This, as the Court rightly pointed out, was to
consolidate labour "to a degree quite incompatible with 
2
efficiency". Clearly what had been believed to be of pri­
mary importance was to ensure the personal authority of the 
Governor-General by giving to him the immediate direction
See P.P. 1831-32, IX, 3^2.
^M.P., 308, The Chairmen to Charles Grant, 2 July 1833. 
Bentinck in his minute on the "India Bill" took even stronger 
exception to this arrangement. In his opinion it was "wholly 
impossible for the Governor General in Council to discharge 
the double duties of the Local Government... and of the 
Supreme", see Bengal Secret Consultations, vol. 379•
and the patronage of the Bengal Presidency”."1'
The precedence given to the centralization of power 
over the abstract principle of administrative centralization 
is apparent too in the legislative arrangements. Notwith­
standing the weighty opinion expressed in India and at home
2
in favour of a larger body the membership of the Legislative
Council was confined to that of the Executive Council with
the addition of one Law member. Over legislation itself the
Governor General was given the power of veto should he be
absent from his Council and, owing to the frequency of wars
in our period, this amounted to a great deal of the time,
as well as an extraordinary authority to over-rule his Council
on any measure which he considered affected the safety, tran-
3
quillity or interests T1of the British possessions in India”.
Because the services of the old Bengal Presidency had remained 
undivided the Governor General maintained control of a large 
but ill-defined portinn of the new Presidency of Agra, a fact 
which gave rise to a controversy in which the Governor, Sir 
Charles Metcalfe, declared to Bentinck, ”If the Governor <f 
Agra is not to nominate ... how can I reasonably be expected 
to be responsible for the Government of this country.”
Bentinck Mss., Metcalfe to Bentinck, 16 January 1835 see 
P.P. 1852"! JC, 8^9. It was subsequently agreed that the 
Governor General would appoint to the superior posts.
See Stokes, p.176. The author speaks of Mill's "authoritarian 
caste of mind”, his influential argument against numbers on 
the ground that they lessened individual responsibility. Yet 
Mill nevertheless had advocated the inclusion of a native on 
the Supreme Council. See P»P. 1831-32, IX, 3^8 • It was Grant 
who ”did not think they were prepared for these duties”, see 
Grant to Bentinck, 25 December l833j P *15- Grant's decision 
here seems to reflect a primarily Ministerial concern for the 
uncomplicated running of the Supreme Government.
?3 & k William IV c 85 ss. 70 & ^9 .
Similarly with Indian finances we have this same negative
/N.
emphasis on control by the Governor General: the great aim
was that the Government should be enabled to "confine their 
expenditure within their proper income”, no provision was 
made for positive measures such as a separate department of 
finance at Calcutta or for the presentation of an annual bud­
get. It is not surprising that the most important influence 
exercised by the Ministry on the constitutional aspects of 
the Charter should have fallen on the aspect of control for 
Government was entering a new period both in England and in 
India, great changes were affected by the Charter and not 
unnaturally the Ministry had to insist on the greatest de­
gree of caution expressed by the placing of overwhelming 
power in the hands of the Minister at home and the Ministry*s 
nominee in India. Henry St. George Tucker in his dissent 
of 17 August 1833 saw this very clearly when he stated ”1 
perceive only two powerful functionaries, the Governor 
General of India and the President of the Board ... and 
upon these must the fate of India henceforth mainly depend.”'1'
^NuP. ,*f71. It may have been as a belated realization of this 
fact that Holt Mackenzie on the occasion of the Charter re­
newal in 1853 petitioned in the Court of Proprietors against 
the Bill's reduction of the number of Directors and hence 
their independence, see Debates at the India House, l8*f5-58, 
p.206, 29 July 1853.
But what of the more advanced schemes and principles 
embodied in the Act? Certainly their inclusion testifies 
to the inclination of the Board at this time and of the 
receptivity of the Ministry. But the abandonment of the 
project for dispensing with the subordinate councils during 
the Charter debates themselves, the subsequent failure to 
implement the four fold system of nomination to the civil 
service, embodying as it did the competitive principle, the 
fact that the 87th clause remained, as far as the covenanted 
service was concerned, merely a principle, the fate of the 
Law Commissinn, of the whole project of codification and of 
the Fourth Presidency show that the favourable disposition 
of Grey's Ministry to these reforms in 1832-33 was 
guarantee of a future commitment to their implementation. 
Benthamite ideas in particular might commend themselves to 
or impose themselves upon a reforming Ministry and a Reformed 
Parliament but this was no guarantee of their ultimate realiza­
tion. This depended upon a continuing impetus from home and 
so, ultimately, upon the course of British politics and it 
is in this context that the above reforms will subsequently 
be discussed.
The Charter Act of 1833 was the most conqprehensive 
legislation on India enacted by Parliament in the nineteenth 
century. As well as settling a commercial question of the 
first magnitude it substantially comple ted the process of 
the centralization of tie British administration in India 
and thus began that of nation building in the sub-continent.
As well as defining the form of the government in India and 
at home for the next twenty years, it proposed a plan of re­
form which, like the opening of the interior of India, had 
immense social significance.
Like Pitt's India Act, the Charter Act of 1833 bad 
come at a critical juncture in British politics. This fact 
had made possible the constituting of a reforming Board and 
a Select Committee of like disposition. It had ensured that 
Parliament would be willing to pass this reform and was 
chiefly responsible for the virtual exclusion of the Directors 
from a say in the framing of the Charter and for even more so 
the limitation of their power to amend it.
Of even more profound significance to the subsequent 
development of Indian policy at home, the triumph of Reform 
in 1832 led to the reconstruction of British politics, of
Britishpolitical parties. The Charter debates gave dramatic 
proof of the extent to which the views of members of the 
two parties differed on Indian questions at this time.
The Charter bore the stamp of the Whig party. The future 
conduct of the home government of India would bear that of 
which ever party was in power.
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Chapter Three
THE SEQUEL TO THE CHARTER ACT,
WHIGS AND CONSERVATIVES 1833-35
Chapter 3
The immediate post charter period saw the replacement of
the Whig Ministry of Lord Grey by that of Lord Melbourne and
then, what would have seemed impossible only two years earlier,
the formation of a Conservative Ministry under Sir Robert Peel
at the end of 183 .^ Brief as this Conservative interregnum was
to be, it would be pursued with a vigour characteristic of the
greatest administrator of the day, and the activity at the Board
\
would be no exception to that in other departments. But far more 
significant for this study, than the examination of what was ac­
complished under a particular Government, Whig or Conservative, 
is the Nlive1' contrast in the management of Indian affairs between 
the two providing as it does an additional perspective with which 
to judge the impact of British politics upon Indian policy.
Tha passage of the Charter Act saw the end of the temporary 
eclipse of the Court. The air of urgency which had so frequently - 
characterized Grant’s disregard of their representations, dis­
appeared, the discussion of Indian policy returned to the-normal 
channels, and a more cordial relationship between Board and Court 
soon ensued. The resignation in October 1833 of the Chairman,
Campbell Marjoribanks,1 followed by that of his Deputy, William 
Wigram, who almost alone of the Directors had refused to accept 
the terms of the Charter did much to reinforce this latter 
tendency.
The two men chosen to lead the Court during the winding up 
of the Company's commercial operations, through the period of 
transition to administration under the new arrangements,were 
John Loch, a former Captain in the Company's service, elected 
for the remaining six months of the Chairman's term and Henry 
St. George Tucker, one <f the Company's most eminent civil ser­
vants, well versed in Indian finances, who was elected Deputy 
and would therefore be the first Chairman under the new Charter.
Tucker had commenced his service under Cornwallis, whose system
2
in its major premises he adhered to, a nd had risen to become 
Accountant General and member of Council at Calcutta. His family 
motto:, "nil desparandum" serves admirably to characterize a man 
who had been foremost among the Directors in opposition to the
B/187« P#10, Court of Directors, 30 October 1833* He resigned 
ostensibly on grounds of ill health but in fact to avoid serving 
under the circumstances in which the Court had been placed. See 
Asiatic Journal. l8*f0, vol. 32, pt. 2, pp. 166-68.
During the Conservative interlude of 183^-33 when Tucker could 
more freely express his preferences on the matter he told Ellen- 
borough "We must however sooner or later come back to the just 
principles and judicious system of 1793,f- John William Kaye's 
Life of Tucker, the only biography of a Director of our period, 
and Tucker's own "Memorials", which Kaye edited, give a full ac­
count of this outstanding Director's views. See E.P. 29 pt. 2/8 
Tucker to Ellenborough, 7 March 1833*
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Ministry's plan, yet had at length counselled its acceptance 
"with all its defects" so that the Court could with "firmness" 
and prudence" play its part under the new system. For the 
remainder of Grant's term in office Tucker was to pursue a courfiG
of accommodation to the new circunEtances of government leading the
f
Court in opposition to the Board only when he deemedit vital to 
principles of good government. Grant, who during the Charter 
negotiations had found the previous Chairmen "obstinate, narrow­
minded, wrong headed" was soon to observe of his relations with
t
the new Chairmen, "we now proceed most amicably".
A measure of the extent to which the conduct of affairs 
changed with the passage of the act was the resignation of Holt 
Mackenzie upon his return from the continent where he had gone 
for reasons of health: "he had no confidence in Ministers who
he. admits may mean very well but who he says have not the courage 
to carry good intentions into execution".1 Whether over a parti­
cular point or general considerations the most radical member of 
the Board had departed.
Filling the places created by the Charter was one of the 
most pressing questions to be decided. As the Charter took effect 
from the 22 April 183^ it was desirable that the Government of 
India should be notified prior to that date. Far more significant
bentinck Mss., Ravenshaw to Bentinck, 26 June 183 .^
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however was the fact that the realization of the Charter1 s 
prospective provisions, particularly those connected with 
law making, depended to a great extent upon who should be 
placed on the Supreme Council and the Law Commission* For 
"the first movement of the great machine which is now to begin 
its operations" to employ Grant's own phrase, who better than 
those who had been so intimately connected with the creation 
of that structure? With the President's proposals Tucker was 
to cooperate while reserving the claims of the Company's ser­
vants for what he considered the appropriate appointments.
In the position of Fourth or Law Member of the Council, the 
man who was to be the 'interpreter of the Act* to the Government 
of India,'*' Grant had hoped to place his brother, who he felt 
was "by universal consent the fittest". Robert however scrupled 
at accepting a place which he had done so much to create and thus 
this key post went to Macaulay whose formal appointment, Grant 
told Bentinck, required a good deal of "skill and prudence" to
obtain from the Directors, though in the end "the philosopher"
2
was elected by a great majority. The man who had been the 
spokesman for the Charter would thus carry into Indian administration
~*~Bentinck Mss., Bentinck to Charles Metcalfe, 12 May l83*f.
Bentinck recognized the need for an authoritative exposition 
"I am glad delay is unavoidable, because it will give us the 
benefit of Mr. Macaulay's notes and commentaries upon the 
context which by no means exhibits the intentions of the pro~ 
pounder of this great measure".
2
Bentinck Mss., Grant to Bentinck, 25 December 1833$ p*12.
his unique knowledge of the principles underlying the great act 
and employ, for their realization, his matchless powers of per­
suasion in spoken word and legislative minute. The Chairman 
had also "entered cordially" into Grant's proposal for putting 
Holt Mackenzie on the Supreme Council, despite the fact that 
the former had been critical of many of Mackenzie's opinions.
It was only Mackenzie's absence on the continent for reasons of 
health which prevented this Grant assured Bentinck.
In the appointment of the Law Commission, "the most important 
provision of the Act",Grant had observed to Bentinck,'*' great care 
was likewise taken for from their labours a subsantially uniform 
system of policy, judicial procedures and laws was expected 
eventually to result. One member each from Bengal, Madras and
Bombay were chosen- all by the home authorities - G.H.Macnaghten,
2J.R.Maclepd and G.W,Anderson, a disciple of Bentham's, partner 
of W.M.G.Colebrooke in the great reforming Commission of Inquiry
^Bentinck Mss., Grant to Bentinck,.25 December 1833$ P«13*
2
Macleod, Macnaghten and Cameron were among "our particular set". 
In a letter to one of his sisters: "There is a little circle
of people whose friendship I value, and in whose conversation I 
take some pleasure - the Chief Justice, Sir Edward Ityan, my 
old friend Malkin, Cameron and Macloed, the law Commissioner 
Macnaghten among the older servants of the Company, Mangles, 
Colvin and Grant among the younger." Macaulay Papers. 0ul5-12D 
1 January 1836. Sir Charles Trevelyan soon to become Macaulay's 
brother-in-law should be added to this band of like-minded men.
in Ceylon,**" was indicative of the sense of purpose £ the Board 
at this time.
For the post of Governor of the newly created Presidency
of Agra feeling in the Court and opinion !,among the public in
general” rendered the appointment of yet another ”friend of the
government” out of the question despite Lord Grey's desire to
2
place Auckland there. The choice was therefore to fall upon 
the Company's most distinguished servant, Sir Charles Metcalfe 
who enjoyed both Bentinck's support and the Court's full con­
fidence at this time. However a Governorship became open when 
Lord Clare's decision to resign the Government of Bombay became
known in 183^ and it was agreed between the President and the
3
Chairmen that the place should be filled by Robert Grant.
G.C.Mendis, The Colebrooke-Cameron Papers, introduction p.ix 
speaks of the Commission upon whose labours ”the series of 
remarkable reforms which transformed the administrative, judicial 
and financial system of Ceylon between 1832 and 183^” were based. 
Both in India and later at home Cameron's devotion to what he saw 
as the purposes of the Act makes a study in tenacity.
2
See Howick Mss., Memorandum on the Government of Agra, by Charles 
Grant, 27 August 1833 and also Grant to Colonel Morrison, 26 
October 1833*
•^ Tucker and his deputy, W.S.Clarke, were criticized in the Court 
for proposing the nomination. In particular it was felt that 
with one brother at the head of the Board and the other as 
Governor of Bombay the official channels of communication would 
be by~ passed by the private, such a situation did develop to a 
considerable extent but because of Ministerial ties rather than 
family ones, B/2^2, pp. 28-30, Dissents of
C. Mills, Wm. Astell, and R. Ellice, June 183 .^
Later in l83*f Charles Grant attempted to consummate these 
series of appointments by obtaining the Governor Generalship 
for himself. However the latter part of 183^ was not favourable 
for such an attempt. Tucker with the support of most of the 
Directors was determined to put forth the claims of the Company 
to the highest office in its service. Mountstuart Elphinstone 
having maintained his refusal to accept office on grounds of 
health, a resolution was passed, by overwhelming majority, on 
September 26, in favour of appointing Sir Charles Metcalfe.**
In the event neither Grant's ambitions nor the Court's claims 
Was"1 successful. Lord Grey's Government, in which Grant's re­
commendations were generally received with sympathy had been re­
placed by Melbourne's first Ministry. Melbourne, who favoured 
the claims of Lord Auckland, was unwilling to support Grant 
against the Court although as he told the latter he was quite
2
determined that the Court's resolution should not be acceded to. 
Lord Melbourne's preference lay with a man of closer political 
outlook to his own than Grant. Whatever his reasons for this 
preference it is evident that the implementation of the prospective 
program of reforms contained in the Charter was not the decisive
V 2/ &  p.l2*f. The Chairmen to Grant, 27 Sept. 183^.
E/2/38,p. ^7. Grant to the Chairmen, 1 October 183 .^
2
Add. Mss. k€h91, p.22?. Melbourne to Lord Auckland, 17 September 
I8j4. "This is a scheme in fact for omitting the Government of 
any share in the nomination and must be firmly and decisively re­
sisted”. This letter contains the first offer of the Governor 
Generalship made to Lord Auckland.
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consideration for had it been there was none better suited for 
Governor Generalship than Charles Grant.'*'
Whatever his natural sympathies with the Governor General 
might have been Grant as the Indian Minister insisted upon inter­
preting the Charter from home. Bentinck though he welcomed the 
'India Bill1 in its major principles took serious objection to 
the burdens thrust upon the Governor General under the new 
constitution. The location of the Supreme Government at Calcutta 
rather thanin the Upper Provinces was not what he had wished.
Even more serious the Governor General alone had been burdened
with the Government of Bengal, an "augmentation of his labours
2
already excessive". The only relief Bentinck saw was a Governor 
and a Council for Fort William. But notwithstanding Bentinck's 
repeated requests that the whole should be placed on one uni­
form system, and the Court's efforts to comply, the constitution
•2
of the Governments as set down in the Charter was maintained.^
^"Macaulay's comment on Auckland's appointment "I should, on 
private grounds, have preferred Lord Glenelg, for whom I feel ... 
a strong attachment" was possibly motivated by this view for with 
him in particular private and public considerations are inex­
tricably combined. See Add. Mss. **72?7 ff* 186-7, Macaulay to 
Hobhuuse, 16 January 183&I
2
Bengal Secret Consultations, vol. 379> Minute of 29 January 183 *^
■Z
Bentinck Mss., Tucker to Bentinck, 7 November 1833> Bentinck to 
Tucker, 11 August 183 .^
Grant proved equally obdurate with the Court of Directors 
on the fundamentals of the constitution and aims of the new 
system as they were discussed in the commentary despatch on the 
Charter which was on the anvil for the greater part of 183 .^
*t)ur proposed despatch on the constitution of the Indian govern­
ments, the exercise of legislative functions etc. etc. is still
before the Board but I hope we shall be able to launch it off with-
2
out much further delay” Tucker wrote to Bentinck in July of that 
year. He was mistaken, the draft despatch with its red pencilling, 
amendments and deletions did not receive final sanction until 
December when the Melbourne Ministry was on the way out. By 
then it had become the resultant of the combined, often conflict-
in© views of the Court and the Board, though predominantly those
3of the latter.
The predominant view was to express itself most firmly 
over the clauses dealing with the work of the Law Commission.
Despatch to India and Bengal in the Public Department, 10 December 
(No. ¥f) 183 .^ Laid before the RJL Committee 21 May 183 ,^ 
sanctioned by the Board, 3 December 183^, signed by the Court of 
Directors 10 December 183 .^ See E/W4-2, pp. 327-7^9*
p
Bentinck Mss.., Tucker to Bentinck, 19 July
3
The often repeated statement - as with Stokes, p. 193 & n. - that 
James Mill was the author of the despatch was, from our p&int of 
view, misleading. The original authority, Kaye in his The Admini­
stration of the East India Company, p. 173 n. states !,Mr. Tucker 
was chairman at this time, and his is, therefore, the first name 
appended to the letter. It breathes much of Us spirit. I be­
lieve that the original draft was written by Mr. James Mill ... 
and that Mr. Robert Grant was concerned in its revision.*1 The 
original draft, Mill's contribution notwithstanding, is seen by 
us as an effort to circumscribe the provisions of the Charter with 
CQUntfsfown interpretations.
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The Act had contemplated two periods of change, one immediate, 
the other prospective, at the end of which ”a general system of 
justice and police and a code of laws common (as fax as may he) to 
the whole people of India” would have been achieved. The draft of 
the Court, who had shown themselves skeptical of the appropriate­
ness of such a goal, sought to guide the Commissioners along the 
more proven paths of legislative procedure. Their long dis­
quisition was swept aside. With the brusque comment that the 
clauses proposed by the Court ’’would seem in great measure to 
supercede the labours of the Commissioners”^ the Board simply 
ran the red pencil through paragraphs twenty-six to seventy of 
the original draft. The Board made it clear that the labours of 
the Commission would 'fill up' the whole of the prospective period 
and that one of the principal duties of the Supreme Government 
would be "to guide the course and promote the efficiency of those 
labours”.^
The attendance of the Law Member of Council had been limited, 
by Lansdowne's amendment in the Lords, to legislative meetings 
of the Supreme Council only. Grant now sought to return to the
~*~E/2/38, p. 12, Board to Court, 19 August l83*K This cancellation 
of what was par excellance James Mill's particular field of in­
terest is a further comment on the primacy of the Ministerial 
viewpoint in forming the Charter. We can see in the Board's 
additions, see E / W & 2- pp. & W f - 3 , an emphasis on the 
consultation of native opinion in the process of law making 
which is more reflective of a liberal regard for public opinion 
than that more authoritarian stress on official opinion, British 
or Native, of the original draft which can be taken to echibit 
the Court's as well as Utilitarian preferences.
2 ibid., *fl8.
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original conception of the Fourth Member* s functions by in­
forming the Government of India that it could avail itself of 
his presence on any occasion on which it might seem desirable 
to do so, the words f,without his vote"^ being inserted to stress 
the fact that the Fourth Member's presence was not to infringe 
on the Executive power.
Grant's wording of the 87th clause of ttie Charter had been 
a negative statement removing factors of birth as a bar to the 
eligibility of Indians for Government service and in his letter 
to Bentinck the President had sought to explain its short­
comings by stressing that there was nothing in the act to prevent 
the Governor General from interpreting the clause in the most 
liberal fashion. The Board now sought to give a more positive 
character to the clause with the observation that "the great 
principle which the legislature has for the first time recog­
nised" was expected to yield "visibly important and indefinitely
2
expanding results". The Chairman and most of the Court were 
opposed to any effort to give what they conceived as an artifi­
cial stimulus to the admission of Indians ultimately into the 
covenanted service. But not until after Melbourne's resignation 
when it became apparent that Grant must retire from office did
XEA/742, p.339.
ibid., p.380, alteration of 19 August 1834
the Board consent to delete their stated expectations of re­
sults from the clause.'*'
Lastly Grant also sought, in the privacy of official 
correspondence, to do something more for the progress of
Christianity in India than he had thought advisable to attempt
2
xn the Charter Bill submitted to Parliament. Four paragraphs 
were inserted in the despatch dealing with the help the Govern­
ment of India might extend to all sects of Christians,most 
significantly to native Christians. The Court protested that 
a wider opportunity "for unlimited demands upon the Government 
of India than the Board seem to be aware ^ i c 7 would thereby 
be opened. As with their opposition to giving the 87th clause 
a more positive interpretation their opposition to the attempt 
over the Ecclesiastical clauses met with success only after 
Grant's retirement from office had become imminent. In agree­
ing to the deletion of their amendment the Board made it clear
^ibid., deletion of 3 December 183 .^
2
Grant had also by the despatch of the 22 February l833i which he 
had virtually re-written himself over the loud protests^of the 
Court, sought to put an end to the association of the Government 
of India with the religious practices of the natives of India 
by counselling an end to the collection of the pilgrimtax and 
the administration of endowments of temples and mosques by the 
Government of India, both traditional duties of the ruling power. 
See Philips, pp. 276-7.
^E/2/131 p.136, Court to Board, 23 October 183^
that "they consider themselves at liberty to act at any future 
time upon those opinions as freely as if they had not made 
the present concessions."***
Grant had attempted in the commentary despatch to give a 
wider interpretation on some provisions <f the Charter than the 
act itself seemed to call for, on some perhaps a narrower.
But while he had not been particularly successful in the former 
endeavour and while the imminent fall of the Whig Ministry had 
forced concessions from the departing Board there had been no 
abandonment of the major premises of the Charter during Grantfs 
terra of office.
The Charter had separated the finances of India from extra- 
Indian sources of revenue and in so doing had, in the eyes of 
H.M.*s Ministers and the Home Government, magnified the import­
ance of ensuring that Indian resources alone should answer for
all the calls upon them, indeed that they should provide a sur-
2plus to meet the new charge once the Company's assets had been
3
fully transferred. Financial centralization, It..hascbeen ob­
served, can be looked upon partially as a means to this end.
*~E/2/38, p.86, Board to Court, 3 December 183 .^
p
The net new charge, after the full benefit from the application 
of the Commercial assets had been received, was calculated as 
some forty five lacs of rupees or £^33*323. See E / W 4 4 , p.9^3» 
India Financial Despatch, 12 August (No. 10) 1833-
3
P.J.Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finance in India, p.39» gives
But to infer from this that the direction of Indian financial
administration lay wholly with the Governor General in Council
would not he correct. In the view of Sir Charles Trevelyan, 
high positions
\ho held/both in India and in England, as permanent secretary 
to the Treasury after his return,’’the financial administration is 
the only branch of the Indian administration which is attempted 
to be carried on from home".’1' The size of the Government of 
India's remittances, the rate of exchange of rupee for shilling, 
the amount of the reduction of Indian debt and a number of other 
decisions were taken at home in which not only the Board and 
Court were concerned but frequently Government Ministers, parti­
cularly the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Moreover there was a 
constant generalsupervision of the financial administration of 
the Government of India, "That the Government is kept in a state 
of tutelage on this subject will be apparent to anybody who 
reads the general letters which the Company occasionally send 
to the Government in India on finance. In those letters the
Company take a general review and point out what ought to be
2
done in each respect." Thus in addition to the great change
a vivid picture of the change: "The financial control of the 
Governor General in Council over the whole of British India 
became legally complete in 1833- The revenues were henceforth 
dealt with as a whole. They were paid into the treasuries all 
over the country to the credit of the Governor General in Council.. 
Except for some small local cesses ... provincial governments be­
came entirely dependant on the sums annually allotted for their 
expenditure by the Supreme Goverfcment."
3-P.P. 1832-33, XXVIII, q.8066.
^ibid.
in the composition of Indian finances and the constitution 
of Indian financial administration effected by the British 
Government of 1833 there was a permanent and major involvement 
from home.
The close involvement of the home government in the 
general aims and management in the administration of Indian 
Finance as well as in the non routine decisions on extraordinary 
expenditure ensured it a preponderant voice. Not only because 
H.M.'s Ministers were not infrequently concerned in decisions 
affecting Indian finances, but because the President and the 
Governor General subscribed to those views on financial questions 
generally which their colleagues in the Cabinet held, the im­
print of the Ministry of the day is clearly evident. Financial 
administration, it has been noted, was the Achilles heel of the 
Whig Governments of the 1830s, budgetary inexpertise, their 
increasing deficits and their inability to effect the fiscal 
reforms to which they were pledged being a major cause of their
i
downfall in l8*fl. With themfinance never enjoyed the primacy 
of place which it did under Peel who during his first Ministry took 
the Exchequer and closely coordinated the work of other depart­
ments with his own. Grant's conduct of Indian financial policy was 
not in great contrast with that of the series of indifferent 
Whig Chancellors of the Exchequer at the timei"1*
Giving a sketch of Sir Charles Wood the Daily'News, 18 January 
1873* p.5* remarks that his management, during Russell's First 
Ministry "marked the lowest point to which the notorious in­
capacity of the Whigs for practical finance ever fell."
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In the realization of the Companyfs assets, which were now 
being transferred to the service of the Government of India,
Grant exhibited something less than a single minded desire to 
obtain the maximum for them. The Court, who considered them­
selves the guardians of India’s finances, had appealed for a 
gradual cessation of trade, which would minimize dislocation of 
the market and entail a minimum of loss. Grant however informed 
the Chairmen that Mit appears to the Government desirable to 
bring the Company’s commercial transactions to a close with 
all practicable expedition. With this view, I beg to recommend 
that the Company should not send any more ships to India or China, 
nor proceed with any more contracts in this country”. An exception 
was to be made in the case of silk filatures, but here Grant made 
it clear that the care that was to be taken in the disposal of 
the Company's silk factories in India applied ”less to the 
pecuniary gain or loss of the Company, than to the interests
of the producers and the wants of the manufacturers in this 
1
country”. Similarly with the disposal of the large stocks of 
tea which the Company had been required by law to maintain Grant 
gave evidence of the Ministry's responsiveness to the appeals 
of tea importers who had rushed into the market and an agreement 
was therefore arranged with the Company whereby it should limit
^N.P., p.371i Grant to Chairmen, 13 July 1833
its sales of tea to *+,000,000 lbs. a quarter if a greater
quantity should be seen to depress the market.^ On the matter
of the compensation of the Company’s maritime servants Grant
was prepared to go further than,even the Court wished. Indeed
the latter had frankly desired to make the awards "as small as
2possible” within reason. Grant on the other hand was more 
disposed to listen to the forceful entreaties of the ex-maritime 
servants of the Company and when they managed to reject the 
Directors' plan for compensation by the large vote of 3^5 to 
137 in the Court of Proprietors he accepted their proposed
scale, though making a gesture towards economy by reducing it
3
twenty five per cent. The scathing criticism of Whig financial
conduct in general: their "Budgets appear to have been designed
primarily to offer concessions to those who asked for them the 
Zf
most loudly" would appear to apply with equal force to the
conduct of the Whig Minister for India at this time.
Nor did Grant's handling of general financial policy ex­
hibit a greater mastery of the subject than his conduct of 
detail. He emphasized the need for continued economy in his 
letter of December 23 to Bentinck "It is certain that nothing
^E/2/371 p.371, Grant to Chairmen, l*f February 183*+.
^See Asiatic Journal, 183*+, vol. XIV, pt. 2, p.307*
^E/2/38, pp. 69-70, Grant to the Chairs, 12 November 183*+.
„ Brown, p.*+6.
but the strictest economy can succeed in answering all the
demands upon the Indian treasury” but no detailed review or
plan such as was to be sent out under Ellenborough was provided.
The Governor General was simply to continue to retrench along
the lines already worked out "Your continuance in the measures
2
requisite to produce that result we confidently rely upon.”
The sale of the Company's assets gave a temporary surplus
of funds which provided a means of reducing the charge by
paying off some of the Indian public debt. A despatch was sent
out instructing the Goveirment of India to remit £1,200,000 only
and to apply the remainder of the funds thus made available to
3
the reduction of debt. "The paramount object is reduction of 
charge by reduction of debt” Grant had told Bentinck but even 
here he had not pursued his own conviction that no remittances 
at all should be made. Rather he had compromised with the 
Directors who feared,mistakenly as it turned out, that private 
trade would not be able to effect a large enough remittance 
for the needs of the Home Treasury.
____________, Bentinck, 23 Dec. 1833, PP. 18-19.
^EA/739. pp. 713-17, Financial Despatch to Bengal, 27 December 
(No. 29) 1833.
4
Bentinck Mss, Grant to Bentinck, 23 Dec. 1833, p. 19.
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From finance we turn to another branch of the admini­
stration, not unrelated to it, that of relations with the 
native states. The case both for and against intervention 
in the affairs of the states had been forcefully argued be­
fore the Select Committee of 1832 and the bias, here as else­
where, was in favour of intervention on the part of the Govern­
ment though the value of caution had been generally conceded 
"all the evidence ... tends to show that any sudden change would 
be attended with difficulty and danger" . 1 The problem of the 
native states was intimately bound up with the growth and de­
velopment of British dominion in India which had radically altered 
their external and also the internal situation. In particular 
the system of subsidiary alliance , it was argued, by intro­
ducing a British force, paid for by the native state, provided
a check against the traditional remedies for misrule - conspiracy 
2
or insurrection. The most radical prescription for solving the 
problem of the native states was advanced by James Mill, namely,
that they all be incorporated into British India and pensions
3
be granted to their rulers. The justification for this in Mill's 
view was sinply the greater happiness of the people under a
1P.P. 1831-32, VIII, p . 83 of the Report.
ibid., p.8l. The allied states either paid a pecuniary smbsidy 
for the maintenance of the British force or, in some cases, 
ceded territory in lieu of a subsidy.
3P.P. 1831-32, XIV, q.65.
superior administration but the Report did not ignore the 
financial gain that would accrue to the Government "if the 
direct sway of the Company should hereafter be extended over 
the Territories of the Princes". It was observed that "in 
such :a case a smaller aggregate force" would be possible, 
involving considerable financial saving. 1
If Mill's views were conspicuous they differed in degree 
rather than kind from the general tendency of the Report. The 
inclusion, in an appendix, of a paper of great length submitted 
by the chief clerk in the secret department at the Board is 
a fair indication of what was considered by Grant and his sub­
ordinates to be the correct course of action for the future.
At the conclusion of his paper B.S. Jones observed "The mere 
consciousness of our ability to govern better than our allies 
cannot for a moment be urged as a reason for setting them aside.
We must, therefore, necessarily wait until by some overt act 
they forfeit their right and title to our protection and support. 
The case, moreover, should be such as to render it evident to
the people of India that the assumption of the power of the
2
offending state was absolute^ forced upon us."
^.P. 1831-32, VIII, p . 83 of the Report. The financial case for 
the annexation of the native states, implicit in this whole 
section, was given quite explicitly by Charles Trevelyan before 
a Committee of Parliament in l8*f0 "If the whole of India were 
under our direct administration, the expenses of government would 
be very little increased, while the revenue would be very much 
increased." P.P. l&tO. VIII, q. 1895.
P.P. 1831-32, XIV, p.293 of the Appendix
The Court were fully aware that the development of the 
British empire in India was constantly changing the actual 
conditions of the relationship between the Government and the 
Native States. However, they were, as a body, strongly opposed 
to abandoning the principle underlying the formal agreements 
v/ith the Native rulers to a course of action which aimed ulti­
mately at incorporating the states within British India.
The case of the Kingdom of Oudh was to illustrate most 
dramatically the extent of the difference between the Court and 
the Board on this principle. But it would do more than this.
It was to be the first example of that difference of opinion on 
policy towards the native states between Whig and Tory statesman 
which was to determine the course of that policy during our 
period. In the light of what emerges we find that we have some­
thing to add to Piofessor Phillips's observation that during 
Grant's Presidency of the Board "the revolution in the home 
government's attitude towards the Company's subordinate allies 
was complete" .1
The mood in Parliament at the time of the Great Reform Bill 
was extremely receptive to petitions of all kinds and those from 
creditors of native princes were no exception. Some of the claims 
made related to transactions which had taken place in the previous
1Phili£s, p.280.
century but Grant nonetheless showed himself responsive to
the creditors' pleas, or those of their agents or heirs. In
two notable cases1 Grant intervened to see that the Government
of India should use its authority on behalf of the claimants:
that of the bankrupt firm of Palmer and Co. on the Nizam of
Hyderabad and that of the Calcutta bankers, Munir Doss and
Setal Baboo, on the king of Oude for money lent to him in 179^*
In the former case the Court at length yielded in March 1833
and signed the letter which the Board had itself prepared though
2
they did so with a formidable protest.
Over the Oude claims however though the Court had received 
the Board's draft in December 1832, after failing to prepare one 
themselves, the draft had remained unsigned and there the matter 
rested until the Charter negotiations had been dealt with. The 
Board then reopened the case, quoting its statutory authority 
to compel the Court to sign the draft;,; and when the Court still 
failed to respond positively the Attorney General, on the 31st 
of January 183 ,^ made the preliminary motion in the Court of
^rant also sponsored the "notorious monetary claims" of one 
Hodges upon the Zamindar of Nozeed and of Hutchinson on the 
Rajah of Travencore. Philips, p.280 n.
2
Ravenshaw told Bentinck "we would not sign until we got a 
mandamus - Sixteen or Seventeen protested against it - only 
l*f have signed it after all and not more than 2 or 3 approve 
of it." Bentinck Mss., 11 April 1833. Thirteen Directors 
was the legal minimum of signatures required.
King's Bench for the issuance of a mandamus to compel the 
Directors to do so.
The Court had viewed the succession of claims as a 
"dangerous attack on the revenues of India and the Native 
States" which threatened to precipitate an avalancheof un­
realized claims. In this case the conviction that to sign would 
be to authorize the despoilation of a native ruler, "to sink in 
the estimation of our allies" and to "endanger the stability 
of our own power" was so strong that seven of the
Directors led by Tucker refused to sign even .though this en­
tailed the threat of going to prison. Another seven asserted 
that they would only do so ministerially in order to prevent 
the machinery of the home government from being disrupted and 
only one Director expressed approval of the Board's draft.1
Happily the Court were neverput to the test and this 
appears to have been due largely to the influence of party; 
the Oudh claims it appears were threatening to become an issue 
in Parliament. The Director J. G. Ravenshaw wrote to Bentinck 
"Mr. Grant is coming to his senses at last - for the question 
has been taken up out of doors and I am in hopes we shall hear 
no more of it - for the time to issue the mandamus has been 
allowed to go by and Lord Ellenborough has been induced to
1B/2^f2, p.l. Letter of John Forbes, 26 Feb. 183 .^
postpone his motion on the subject of which he had given notice
in the Lords”.^  Shortly after this Grant told the Chairman
that it was not the intention of the Board to proceed with the
mandamus lately moved for inthe Court of King’s Bench. Another
course would be adopted - as a consequence of the intended
assumption of the administration of Oudh all pecuniary claims on
that state would be adjudicated by a strict investigation under
2
the authority of the Supreme Government. But here again Grant's
expectations were not to be fulfilled.
Both the Court and the Board were agreed that it was im-
possible any longer to tolerate the maladministration of Oudh.
But despite the former's conviction that something had to be
done they were not prepared to go to the length the Board wished
of making the assumption of the administration of that kingdom
mandatory. The despatch as finally agreed to simply placed a
if
discretionary power in the hands of the Governor General.' This
^Bentinck Mss.,Ravenshaw to Bentinck, 23 April 183^ •
^L/P&S/3/ll9* p.8*f, Grant to Tucker, 26 April 183 .^
•^Bentinck Mss., Tucker to Bentinck, 19 July 183 .^
Ss/Vyi+l, pp. ^06-08, Political Despatch 16 July (No.11) of 183 ,^ 
para. *fl. Tucker in a memorandum of October l8*fl speaks of the 
original draft prescribing a mandatory assumption as having been 
quashed with the help of two Commissioners of the Board who shared 
the Chairman's view, See Tucker, Memorials of Indian Government, p.
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was in fact what Lord Bentinck, whose policy it was to attempt 
to induce the native rulers, by advice and persuasion, to adopt 
reforms voluntarily' had requested. The Governor General de­
cided to allow the King an opportunity to reform his admini- 
2stration.
It seems probable that Grant’s modification of his position 
on the assumption of Oudh’s administration had also been affected 
by considerations of British politics. Whatever the case, 
Ellenborough’s speech on the issue in which he examined the 
principles involved left no doubt of the great gulf between the 
position sanctioned by a Whig Ministry and that adopted by the 
Conservatives. For the last fifty years the principle of non­
intervention in the internal affairs of a native power ’’had been 
acted upon by all the Governors General of India11, now that 
principle was to be set aside on the plea of misgovernment. In 
Oudh’s case this would be ’’extremely dangerous”, an army of 
60,000 would prove difficult either to disband or maintain. But 
the general application of such a formula would be more grave still
^See K.N.Pandey, Lord William Bentinck and the Native States,
Ph.D. London, 1959 s ii»
2
B. S. Jones in writing to Lord William, 22 August 1835* Bentinck 
Mss., did not appear toosanguine:”Mr. Cabell... informs me that 
you had determined to afford the King of Oude another chance of 
amending the disgraceful system under which his fine country, was 
hastening to decay. I hope he will profit by your Lordship’s 
clemency”.
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for "when once the principle wqs established that, for mis- 
government, a sovereign might be dethroned, and that of that 
misgovemment the Legislature of this country erected them­
selves as the sole judges, "an alarm would be excited in all 
the provinces of India'1. ^ Ellenborough feared that the new era 
inaugurated by the Charter might prove to be "a return to the 
old system of Indian Government which had been abandoned for 
fifty years", rather than that the ignominy of such a course 
should be attached to the British nation, Ellenborough declared, 
with a nobility of sentiment comparable to that of Macaulay's 
oration the year before, "he would see its power in India fall 
for ever".
3
The fact that Herries and Peel in the Commons in support 
of Ellenborough1s was illustrative of the fact that tie latterfs 
position was more than a personal one, it reflected what we 
might loosely call a party attitude on a great problem of poli­
tical, and indirectly social, change in India. The contrast of 
Ellenborough's position in 183^ with his more interventionist
^Hansard, 3S, XXIII, Wt-6, House of Lords, 5 May 183 .^
2
ibid., W6. "fifty years" previously Pitt's India Act had stated 
that "schemes of conquest and extensiorj6f dominion in India are 
measures repugnant to the wish, the honor and the policy of this 
nation".
■^ Hansard, 3S, XXV, 620 8c 63 ,^ House of Commons, 28 July 183 .^
position when he was President of the Board under Wellington,^ 
strongly suggests that the positions adopted by Ministers or 
shadow ministers in the 1830s had received a large measure of 
redefinition because of the events centering around the Reform 
Act of 1832.
The events of 1830 marked a turning point for British 
foreign policy. The advent of the Whigs to power and the appoint*.
A
ment of Lord Palmerston to the Foreign Ministry ensured that the 
British response to the quickly changing situation in Europe 
and Asia would make any cordial understanding between the Euro­
pean powers impossible. Palmerston’s own reaction upon hearing 
of the July revolution in France expressed an attitude very differ­
ent from that which had characterized the cautious, conciliatory 
if hesitant policy pursued under Wellington; ’’This event is
a
decisive of the ascendency of Liberal principles throughout Europe .
The reign of Metternich is over, and the days cf the Duke’s policy
2
might be measured by Algebra, if not by arithmetic.” Under this 
new convert to Whiggism an aggressive assertion of what Palmerston 
considered to be British interests, apparently inseparable in 
his mind from liberal principles, came to characterize British 
foreign policy. The Peelites regarded this interventionist policy
^For Ellenborough's action over the state of Nagpur see Philips, 
271-2.
^R.W.Seton Watson, Britain in Europe 1789-191^» pp. 133-^.
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as counterproductive of peace or of liberal government.
Gladstone as Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 1830s castigates 
its effect on domestic affairs in his letter to Sir James Graham 
when he says ”1 expect from him, with scarcely a shadow of 
doubt, a foreign policy keeping us in perpetual hot water;' 
large establishments which will undoubtedly be needed to sustain 
it; the utter ruin of the financial policy of 1833? and general 
legislative inefficiency.This verdict is not inapplicable 
to the case in the latter 1830s and as a description of the 
case with the Indian government it also applies to a large de­
gree. In this and following chapters examples of both direct 
and indirect relationship between the Foreign policies of 
Britain and India will be examined, though not in detail, and 
the conduct of the latter under the Whigs will be contrasted with 
that under the Conservatives.
The focus of discord with Russia, the Treaty of Unkiar ^
1
Skelessi concluded between that power and Turkey in 1833* Re- 
garding the Treaty as placing the Porte in a position of vassalage 
to the Tsar, the Foreign Secretary had responded by the issuance 
of a ”discretionary order” authorizing the commander of the Medi­
terranean fleet to comply with any request of the Turkish Government
^C.S.Parker, Sir James Graham, II, p.291-
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addressed to him through the British ambassador at Constantinople, 
at that time the notoriously anti-Russian Lord Ponsonby.^
In the light of the growing Russian presence in the Middle 
East the strategic advantages of a regular line of team communi­
cation with India, running through this area, were obvious. Of 
the two most practicable routes, by the Red Sea or down the great 
rivers of Mesopotamia, the latter was for reasons of diplomacy 
the most advantageous as it would form a natural check to the 
progress of Mehmet Ali of Egypt whose advance towards Baghdad
was regarded by Palmerston as the prelude to Russian interference
2
under the terms of its treaty with Turkey.
The establishment of a system of steam communication with
India had been considered by the sub-committee on trade and finance 
■2
in 1832 as a means of promoting commerce and for some it had 
a connotation as broad as a free trade in goods and ideas which
ij.
would regenerate the East.' On the 3rd of June 183^ Charles 
Grant moved for the appointment of a select committee on steam 
navigation. The personnel of that committee, its Report, and the 
subsequent approval by Parliament of the recommended £20,000 for 
the frail of the Euphrates route rather than that by the Red Sea
^See H. Temperley and L. Penson, Foundations of British Foreign 
Policy, p.119.
^See M.G.I.Khan, British Policy in Iraq, l828-*f3« London Ph.D.,
1967, 110 & 196.
■^ See P.P.1831-32, VIII, p.60 of the Report.
11
^ee P.P.1837 j VI, Select Committee on Steam Navigationwith India, 
q. 193^ for Lord Bentinck’s letter of 183^ to the Madras Steam Committee.
was an example of the manner in which Palmerston and the
Ministry were forced to accommodate their foreign policy to
the realities of the Parliamentary situation, to that body's
powers of financial control. The search for expedients would
become more intense and of greater significance to the revenues
of India during Melbourne's second Ministry. At present the
Company's relationship with the Euphrates expedition was an
auxiliary,” one, that of cooperating in the ostensible object of
the operation - the founding of a line of steam communication
whether by the Euphrates or the Red Sea. Grant's request that
the Company's steamer, the Hugh Lindsay, should be despatched
from Bombay with the mail in time for it to be transferred to
H.M.'s steam packet being sent from Malta to Alexandria was duly
complied with."**
Relations with Persia at this time were under the control
2
of the Government of India. However Ellenborough as early as
1829 had held the opinion that diplomacy in that part of the
world should be brought "into line with that which we adopt else-
3
where with regard to Russia" and this was to be increasingly 
the case. In January of 1833 the Governor General was informed
■^ See PsP.l83*K XIV, Resolution 12 of the Report; Hansard, 38, 
XXV, 932, House of Commons, k August 183 .^
2For a comprehensive account of the alternation between the 
Indian and British governments of the control of the Pecsian 
Mission, see M.E.Yapp's article in the Birmingham Historical 
Journal, vol. VII.
-^ Philips, p. 269.
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that Mthe policy we ought to pursue wdth regard to Persia,
in reference especially to the relations of Russia with that
country has long engaged our attention"^" and by the time Grant
quit office the importance and interconnection of events in
the Middle East and Persia was such that he could leave a
memorandum at the Board which declared "That subject must now
be understood to include all our relations, not only with Persia,
but generally with all the countries that intervene between
2Europe and our East Indian dominions." It is noticeable how­
ever that while Palmerston and the President of the Board were 
takirWan ever greater interest in Persia, while some appointments 
were being made from London rather than Calcutta, no moves were 
made by the British Government to reassume formal control of 
the Persian Mission.
It is apparent from J.W.Kaye's biography of Henry St.
George Tucker that by 1834 the Chairman was already alive to the 
significance which the progress of affairs in the Middle East and 
Central Asia might have for the Government of India and that in 
this area constituted a European question and should be dealt 
with by Great Britain. The subsequent conduct of the Court
^L/P&S/3/346, Secret Despatch of 14 January 1833*
^L/P&S/3/l20, p.6,Memorandum of 9 December 1834.
See Kaye, Tucker, pp. 490-3* At this time Tucker also opposed 
the appointment of Lieutenant Burnes to a commercial agency at 
Cabul "feeling perfectly assured that it might speedily degenerate 
into a political agency", pp. 493-6.
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towards the question of the Persian Mission, the Euphrates 
expedition and related matters should be judged in the light 
of this. It is not impossible that Tucker’s bold attempt to 
obtain the Governor Generalcy for a Company servant was moti­
vated by this same consideration.
The diplomacy adopted in the Middle East and Persia was 
rapidly being "brought into line" with that adopted elsewhere 
towards Russia and the foreign policy of India to the west­
wards, therefore, could not but be affected..A detailed analysis 
of the genesis and progress of Indian foreign.policy and its 
interrelationship with British lies beyond the scope of this 
work. It will be more by the method of contrasting the -conduct 
of Indian foreign policy during the years of Whig administration 
in Britain with that during the periods of Conservative, or 
perhaps by a combination of analysis and contrast, that we hope 
to be able by indicating the differences to say something about 
the nature and scope of the contribution of British politics.
The Charter of 1832 had been a Whig measure and in describ­
ing the conduct of Indian policy at home during the immediate 
post Charter period an attempt has been made to concentrate on 
those aspects which most clearly bear a party political imprint. 
Fortunately this attempt, admittedly of a tentative, exploratory 
nature is supplemented by the contrast provided by the management 
of Indian affairs under the incoming Conservatives.
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Melbourne’s dismissal from office in November of 183^ 
and Sir Robert Peel's acceptance of the King's commission to 
form a Government brought Ellenborough back, as a matter of 
course, to the Board. The immensity of what had been effected 
in Indian affairs under the Whigs prompted the learned Asiatic 
Journal to venture "beyond the circle of topics which belong 
particularly to this Journal" for, it argued, "In the present 
critical juncture of our political affairs ... the change which 
has recently been made in the administration, as it concerns 
every part of the empire and may exercise a material influence 
upon our Indian Government can scarcely be deemed an extraneous 
topic." It proceeded to hail the advent of the Conservatives 
as a blessing both for England and for India and then toi.observe 
on the Charter, "The bold and sweeping nature of the plan, ad­
mitted to be framed in deference to the voice of the nation; 
the imperfect mode in which its outline was filled up; the 
scope which it had already offered to arbitrary interference 
with the machine of Indian government and the prospect of similar 
interference unless barriers are provided by Parliament or by 
the moderation and forbearance of superior authorities render 
it highly expedient that a different ministry from the authors 
of the measure should be entrusted with the superintendance 
of its administration."'*'
^Asiatic Journal, l833j vol. l6, pt. 1, pp. 1 & 4.
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The point that the Conservatives, for so Robert Peel 
now called his party, did indeed hold and embody a profoundly 
different view of the principles and practice of administration 
from those of the Whigs has already been made; it forms an 
underlying assumption of the previous chapter. The conduct 
of policy at the Board during Peel's ’’hundred days” is signi­
ficant therefore not so much in the work accomplished, hyper­
active though Ellenborough was., but rather in the striking 
difference between the policies pursued under a Conservative 
Government and those which a Whig Board of Control had followed. 
This difference of approach, in many cases amounting to a re­
versal of policy, makes all the plainer the profound effect 
that party politics could have on Indian policy in an age of 
vigorous partisanship.
An immediate and pressing question for the home government, 
and one with which the Ministry was directly concerned, was the 
choice of a successor to Bentinck as Governor General. Though 
handled with due deference to the Court's sentiments the selection 
was made from among men closely associated with the Ministry. The 
offer privately made by Ellenborough to Mountstuart Elphinstone 
was, predictably, declined as had been all other offers of pub~ 
lie employment though the gesture greatly pleased the Director 
Richard Jenkins when Ellenborough told him of it at their club, 
the Athenaeum. Tucker, who remained in the Chair throughout
Ellenborough*s brief tenure of office, subsequently informed 
the President that the Court would not insist upon their 
original resolution in favour of Sir Charles Metcalfe and that 
they were willing to concert with H.M.*s Ministers. Apparently 
the Chairman did not think it so important to attempt to have a 
servant as Governor General now that the Conservatives were in 
power. The list of candidates for the post he handed the Presi­
dent actually contained Ellenborough*s name^ and when hem 
Wellington, and Peel finally settled upon Lord Heytesbury, a 
former ambassador to St. Petersburg, their choice was duly 
elected by the Court of Directors.
The presence of a Conservative Governor General would of 
itself have had a profound effect upon the workings of the Indian 
administration under its new constitution but Ellenborough ih- 
tended to go much further than this. He immediately set out, 
upon a broad front, to modify the new arrangements. During the 
Charter debates Ellenborough had defended the subordinate councils 
as a security against the abuse of power, he now addressed a 
powerful discourse to the Chairman on the subject in which
t
he declared: "The Government by Governors in Council is
^E.P.28/5, 88 & 89, Diary for 21 December 13^
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practically the constitution of India”. He felt that
"Even were it possible for man to perform all the business now
cast upon the Governor General, it would be highly inexpedient
that he should administer the executive Government of Bengal
without a Council”. Ellenborough recommended that the Court
should use its power to terminate this state of things by
c 1
appointing members of Counil m  Bengal. Such a course of
A
action suffered from the obvious disadvantage that a despatch 
bearing on the same subject had been sent out under the pre­
vious • administration. The result was that a further indecisive
2
despatch was sent out. An effort by Ellenborough, after the
Peel Ministry had retired from office, to effect the change by
3
legislation at Westminster failed as did the subsequent effort
4
of the Chairmen in 18^0 to prevail upon the President for the 
appointment of a Council to Bengal. The Whig Ministry was to 
maintain the view taken in 1833 of the importance of the Governor 
General having direct control of the administration cf Bengal.
5
With the clarification of the ill defined status of the 
E/2/38, 121, 30 December 1834.
p
See E/^f/7^31 9, Legislative Despatch to India, k March (No. 2) 
1835, Para 5.
3P.P. 1852, X, q. 2286.
See Home Misc., 836, pp. 116-8, Hobouse to the Secret"
Committee, 21 February 18A-O. A
■^Friction had already arisen over the division of powers, parti­
cularly of patronage, between the Governor General and the Governor 
of Agra. See P.P. 1832» X, 8^9.
newly formed Presidency of Agra Ellenborough and the Chairman
were to have more success. The division of the former Bengal
Presidency had remained unpopular with the Court and Tucker
took the opportunity to tell Ellenborough MI think you will
find the Court ready to cooperate in bringing things back to
1
their proper places11. The President however pointed out that 
it was unlikely nthe legislature which so recently constituted
the Government of Agra, would be prepared at once to sanction
2
its abolition11. Instead therefore a Bill was introduced which 
simply enabled the home authorities to suspend the provisions 
of the Act relating to the creation of the Presidency, the 
Governor General already possessing the power to appoint a
lieutenant governor on his own authority. Rather than restoring
3
the Bengal Presidency to its former state Ellenborough1s Bill
more clearly subordinated the head of the government of the 
if
upper provinces to the Governor General.
^E.P. 29, pt.2/8 Tucker to Ellenborough, 20 January 1833*
^E/2/58, 264, Board to Court, 16 March 1833 in response to
Court’s letter of 12 March 1833- See E/2/13, 303.
3
Peel was willing to see the Bill brought forward provided that 
the case for the change should be laid before Parliament, see 
E.P. 29, pt. 2/9, Peel to Ellenborough, 16 March 1833.
Ij.
From 1836 onwards these provinces became known as the Lieutenant 
Governorship of the North Western Provinces.
172
Particular attention was of course given to the functioning
of the Supreme Council. Ellenborough noted in his diary for 31
December 183 ,^ "Mr. Mill came to the Board and I had a long
conversation with him respecting the various misunderstandings
of the Law by the several Members of the Supreme Council, and
letters will be separately written to treat of each."'*' By law
Ellenborough meant the Charter which he was in the process of
reinterpreting in a manner which went beyond what even the Court
thought advisable. The crux of the dispute was of course the
relationship between the new law member - and by extension the
Legislative Council - with the Governor General's Executive
Council. On the 27th of June 183 ,^ the very day he took up
his legislative duties, Macaulay had fired the first shot of
2
what was to be the continuing debate on this question. In his 
minute of that date Macaulay complained of his ill defined powers, 
referring directly to the amendment made in the Lords which limited 
his attendance in Council to Legislative meetings only and he 
desired that this point should be referred to the home authorities
*4)iary, 107, 31 December 183 .^
^P.P. 1832--33« XXVII, Appendix No. 10 gives the course of this 
controversy which continued virtually throughout the term of 
the charter.
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for decision. There was, after all, little doubt that with 
a Board headed by Charles Grant the question would be decided 
in the sense which Macaulay wished. But the Fourth Member 
went much further than the mexe question of his attendance, he 
stated boldly that in his opinion the division of pov/ers be­
tween the Executive and Legislative Councils was "analagous 
to that which exists in the Government of England1'. This 
amounted to a claim that the Charter had given the Legislative
Council M a control over almost all the proceedings of the
2
Executive Government”.
Instead of the Board of which Macaulay had once formed
a part,it was that headed by Lord Ellenborough which now took
3
up the question of the functions of the Law Member. Two des­
patches were sent out. In one Macaulay1 s assertion that the . .
Fourth Member could by his opposition on a legislative matter 
force the Governor General to have recourse to his extraordinary 
pov/ers to overrule the Council was rebutted by the legal ad- 
visors of the Crown and the Company, which amounted to a denial
'’ibid., 521, Minute of 27 June 183 ,^ paras. 1 & 2. The Home
Authorities, as noted, had already made provision for the Fourth 
Member's attendance at non legislative meetings in the Public 
Despatch that had finally gone out on 10 December 183^ •
2 .
ibid., paras. 6 & 7. Bentinck in his Minute of 31 July 183 ,^ para. 3, 
p. 522, while noting that the "legal and constitutional difficulties” 
thus raised "can only be solved by the authorities to whom they have 
been addressed” nevertheless allowed himself the opinion "that the 
new Act has not altered the character of the Council; that it is one 
and the same for executive and legislative purposes!1
E/2/38. 113, Ellenborough to the Chairmen, 29 December 183 .^
bSee P.P.i852-53, XXVII, 519, Legislative Despatch to India, 27
of Macaulay's assertion of the independant position of the 
Legislative Council. In the other despatch notice was taken 
of an opinion expressed in Council, prior to Macaulay's arrival, 
that the Law Member had the power to confer a more formal 
legality upon the proceedings of the Supreme Council. The 
opportunity was taken to stress the fact that the Legislative 
Council would have no right to confer legality upon proceedings 
not in conformity with Acts of Parliament.^
Despite the fact that Bentinck in his minute of 31 July 183^ 
had urged the value of allowing the Fourth Member to be present 
at the executive meetings of the Council Ellenborough was not 
prepared to accept the discretion allowed by Grant to the Governor 
General on the question of the "philosopher’s” attendance. In 
another of his long constitutional discourses to the Chairman 
Ellenborough pointed out that it was "inexpedient that a person 
should be constantly present at the deliberations of the Council, 
tak:e a.'part in them, and perhaps influence the decision by his 
arguments, and yet be wholly without responsibility for the 
advice he may give and he requested that a draft despatch should 
be framed that would limit the fourth member's attendance to
February (No. I) of 1835*
ibid., 519, Legislative Despatch to India, 4 March (No. 2)
of 1835.
to legislative meetings of the Council. The Court’s draft,
however, still left too much discretion to'the Governor General
2
in the Board’s view and it was therefore amended. It was
only the arrival of Melbourne’s second Ministry which prevented
the revised despatch from going out,for the new Board cancelled
3
the instructions as superfluous as the Court knew they would.
The Whig Government was to show itself indisposed to allow to 
Macaulay the same influence he had enjoyed under Bentinck and 
Metcalfe,yet it was with Ellenborough's arrival as Governor 
General in the l8*f0s that a really dramatic stage in this struggle 
would be reached.
Similarly, though the Public Despatch of 10 December had 
delegated the power of framing the new rules of procedure in 
the Legislative Council to the Supreme Government itself Ellen­
borough now insisted that the Court should forthwith frame these
and submit them to the Board in accordance with section k7 of 
2*
the Charter. Tucker and Clarke objected that long experience
^See E/2/38, 193 & 193j Ellenborough to Tucker and W.S.Clarke, 
l8 February 1833*
2B/2/38, 333, 8 April 1835.
3E/2/38, 376, 18 May 1835.
Il
See E/2/38, 100-01 & lO^ f, Ellenborough to the Chairmen, 23
December 183 .^
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had convinced the Court of Directors that under nthe very 
imperfect knowledge which can here be attained of all the 
circumstances connected with and bearing upon public arrangements, 
and operations of the Government of India, there are few cases
1
in which precise and peremptory rules ought to be prescribed”.
The Chairmen adhered to the principle of laying down broad general 
observations for the guidance of the Supreme Government though 
the Board under Grant had not dealt tenderly with what it con­
sidered efforts to circumscribe the activities of its appointees 
in India. Ellenborough insisted on the prerogative of the home 
authorities. The principle of Whig and Conservative view might 
seem opposed, in actuality the end was the same, to determine 
the course of events either through nominees or, for want of 
these, directly, at home. However, as with the attendance of 
the Fourth Member it was the fall of Peel’s Ministry which
determined the matter by preventing the rules from duly being
2
framed and sent out.
1E/2/l3, 215, 5 January 1835.
2
Thus it was Macaulay who framed the rules of procedure. At 
Calcutta the conservative minded Henry Thoby Brinsep took a 
similar view to Ellenborough on the desirability of strictly 
limiting the Legislative Counnil’s powers arguing that all 
laws should initially be considered by the Executive Council 
according to the department to which they pertained and only 
then submitted to the Legislative. See Stokes, p.^97. Had 
Ellenborough remained at the Board and had a Conservative Governor 
General gone out to India it appears probable that Prinsep's views 
would have enjoyed greater weight than they did under Bentinck and 
Metcalfe.
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The Law Commission’s existence was an established fact, 
its present members had been appointed in the latter half of 183 ,^ 
the previous Board had dealt at length with what was expected 
from it. Nevertheless Ellenborough now attempted to accomplish 
what the Directors had failed to do, to circumscribe the Commission’s 
activities. To Cameron who was on the point of leaving for India 
he wrote setting out what he considered to be the scope and pur­
poses of the Commission, laying particular stress on the need to 
avoid uniformity in legislating for a country ’’more various than 
Europe” and to disturb as little as possible the existing customs 
and institutions of the people.'*' Cameron for his part stoutly 
defended the task assigned to the Commission: 11 the main scope
of the Indian Lav; Commission as I understand it is not to alter 
the rights with which the people of British India are now in­
vested but to ascertain what those rights are, to define them,
and to define the means of effectually protecting and enforcing 
2
them.1 Though the manner of thisreply provoked Ellenborough's 
admiration: "Nothing but good can arise to the people of India 
from investigations carried on in the spirit you manifest" it
~*~E.P. 29, pt. 3/8, Ellenborough to Cameron, 23 January l833«
ibid., Cameron to Ellenborough, 26 January 1833.
^ibid., Ellenborough to Cameron, 27 January 1833-
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ignored rather than rebutted the argument for caution for certainly 
the Commission’s activities were to be less passive than the 
Bethamite Commissioner seemed to be admitting to.
The above exchange did not bring to an end Ellenborough's 
efforts to contain the work of the Commissioners. Replying to a 
suggestion from the Chairman that the acts of Parliament relating 
to India should be consolidated in order to ascertain which had 
been superceded by the late Charter Act Ellenborough took the 
opportunity to suggest that the Court itself should undertake the 
consolidation of the regulations of the three Presidencies thus 
leaving the Law Commissioners free to devote themselves to their 
inquiries into the customary laws and rights of the various classes 
of inhabitants of India."*" Such a work would have greatly limited 
the functions of the Commission. However the Chairmen did not
...................... ■ 2 ......................
reply until Apri}. 9th and then in the negative; there was hardly 
time left then to take the matter further.
Though both the Court and the Board had objected to the 
wholesale changes in the system of Indian government, particularly 
those involving legislation, brought about by the Charter the 
former was inclined to come to terms with what had been done, to . 
attempt to modify rather than reverse it. This may well have been 
due to Tucker's appreciation of the realities of the political
^ E /2/ 38, 199, Ellenborough to the Chairmen, 18 February 1833-
2E / g / l3 , 3 5 6 -7 .
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situation in England, namely that Peel’s Government was unlikely 
to last long. Whatever the case it is apparent that the Court 
was not willing to go as far as Ellenborough wished, that 
though there was substantial agreement in criticism of the pro­
visions of the Act there was not an identity of position between 
the parties.
Ellenborough's approach to the problems of Indian financial 
administration, which he felt the "recent measure of the legis­
lature had either occasioned or increased" was no less compre­
hensive than that he took on constitutional questions and if any­
thing was even more consistent with the principles he had put 
forth in the Lords two years earlier. His apprehensive attitude, 
contrasted markedly with the sanguine expectations which Grant 
had entertained and likewise his efforts to direct from home the 
measures by which Indian expenditure should be decreased and her 
revenues increased differed from those of his predecessor not 
only in the energy with which they were pursued but in the assumption 
on which they were based. Just as Grant's handling of financial 
matters reflects the characteristics, as well as, in the case of
the Charter's provisions, the effects of Whig financial administration
1
so Ellenborough*s bears much of Peel's.
^In a letter of 3 Jan. 1833 sent to members of his Cabinet Peel 
hat announced his intention of making the estimates for 1833 
lower than "any preceding Estimate since 1793,r* it was most im­
portant "that the heads of each Department should commence without 
delay a consideration of what retrenchment can be made consistently 
with the time and permanent interests of the public service." By 
this means Peel sought to "increase the stability of our Government". 
See Add. Mss. ^0310 f.l8, Peel to Wellington.
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Ellenborough had preached the need for a minute and force­
ful control of expenditure during the Charter debates and now he 
proved as good as his word: "Nothing but steady perseverance in
attention to the smallest details of Indian expenditure can
bring things about, they seem beyond the reach of a single stroke,
1 • ' 
however bold" he wrote to a correspondent on financial matters.
On the question of compensating the Company's ex maritime
2
servants Ellenborough, with Peel's full support and in the face
of a strongly organized lobby headed by George Eobinson, Director
of Lloyd's, steadfastly refused to consider any claims not conceded
under the former Ministry. Ellenborough also put Indian interests
first when he rejected the petition of the British Chamber of
Commerce at Canton that the Company's financial agency there
should be closed as it deterred the British capitalist from ven-
3 ............
turing into such activities. To cut expenses at the Board 
Ellenborough told Mr. Pennington, the account specially appointed 
under Grant during the Charter investigations, that he "could do 
the business without him" and "so save £1300 a year". With the 
disposal of the Company's assets, ships, warehouses, tea and other
~4s.P. 29 pt. 3/3* Ellenborough to Lord Bexley, 16 January 1833*
2
See Hansard, 3S, XXVI, wh-hG, Sir Robert Peel, House of Commons,
11 March 1835.
3See E.P. 29 pt. 1/16.
E.P. 28/5, 8l, Diary for 19 December 183 .^
commodities no opportunity was lost of obtaining a maximum 
and the Court's request for customs concessions on its remaining 
goods and for permission to dispose of 6,000,000 lbs. of tea 
at the March sales were granted.^ Even with his suggestion 
that a private Company could best handle steam communication 
with India Ellenborough seems to have been guided by a desire 
to relieve the Indian finances of such a charge. Over these 
details of Indian finance the Conservative President had been 
as rigorous as his Whig predecessor had been lax and in terms 
of their respective parties the contrast was appropriate.
Under Ellenborough the first comprehensive review of 
the present condition and prospects of Indian finances "as 
affected by the recent alteration of system" for the direction 
of the Supreme Government was formulated and sent out, it was 
unmistakably a reflection of his thinking. In order "that we 
may be kept regularly informed of the extent to which you have 
succeeded in restricting and reducing your expenditure" the 
Government of India was instructed "to furnish us with Quarterly 
statements of every increase and decrease of charge which you 
may sanction, whether civil or military with the general reasons 
for each". The Government was warned against relaxation of its
^E/2/38, 1^3, Board to Court, 13 January 1833*
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efforts to retrench because of the temporary surplus of 
funds occasioned by the sale of the Company1s assets, and 
this time the "whole of the Funds in excess of what the im­
mediate wants of the Government may require are to be faithfully 
applied to the reduction of Debt".'*' Perhaps as an indication 
of thinking upon foreign policy the Government of India was 
instructed to "keep the military charges of India at the low-
2
est amount consistent with the maintenance of an efficient Army".
The despatch of April 15 is also remarkable for the fact that 
it deals with more than' the receipts and expenditures of the
Indian government, it shows, in however embryonic a form, a
3
concern for the "moral and material" progress of India.
During the Charter debates Ellenborough had shown a more posi­
tive attitude towards Indian finances than the Whig spokesmen.
His correspondence at this time is consistent with his earlier 
views. He did not consider the mere reduction of expenditure 
sufficient in itself to place Indian finances on a satisfactory 
footing "Ultimately I trust we may effect a large saving, but 
at the present moment we cannot materially diminish our charges" 
and to "increase taxation is impossible. It already presses
^E/A/7^5, 519-23, India Finance Department, 15 April (No. 5) 1&35•
^ibid., 516.
^ibid., 260-70 (paras. Ik 8c 15) esp.
but too heavily upon the people". The answer lay "in the
improved condition of the resources of the" country" and in
that alone could be found "the resources that will preserve
us from bankruptcy"."** These observations had been contained
in a letter to the Chairmen of 18 March 1835 which had been
provoked by the reading of Sir Charles Trevelyan's "luminous"
report on the town and transit duties of the Bengal Presidency.
Ellenborough1s letter amounted to a major statement on financial 
2
policy. It was his wish that the abolition of the strictly
internal duties in Bengal, giving "entire liberty to the internal
communications of 60 millions of people", should be "the first
act of Lord Heytesbury’s government". This step "would assist
his Lordship in all his future measures", it would soon be
extended to the other provinces of India and would induce the
neighbouring to follow suit. Ellenborough hoped to complement .
the removal of the internal duties of India with the reduction
of the import duties charged in Britain upon Indian produce to
3
the level of those charged upon West Indian goods. Peel agreed
^E/2/38, 276 & 277, Ellenborough to the Chairmen, 18 March 1835*
^It is contained in the Appendix to P.P. 1852, X, 785-7, pre­
pared under the Tory Derby Ministry.
"^ The financial despatch of April 15 commenting cn the need to 
develop "new springs of wealth" expressed the hope ihat "the 
British Legislature may be induced to adopt a more equitable 
commercial policy towards India". E/A/7^3« 267-8.
with Ellenborough’s proposition on this but the matter had 
to be deferred as the Chancellor was already in the process 
of introducing the budget for the year.'*'
In foreign policy as elsewhere that pursued during Peel's 
first Ministry was the forerunner of what would be realized 
under his second. The brief duration of this government of 
course severely limited what could be done and perhaps obscures 
what we maintain vas a difference in kind from the foreign policy 
pursued under the Whigs, a difference which we hold was of great 
importance to the external policy of the Government of India.
The general characteristics of that policy, as fully manifested 
in the period 184-1-^ 6, were its pacific nature, the manifest 
desire on the part of the Ministry to reach an accommodation 
with other major European powers, particularly France and Russia, 
and the connection between the desire fb‘r peace and Peel’s in­
sistence on bringing expenditure under control, in particular 
reducing military and naval expenditure, a prerequisite for 
the effective reform of the fiscal system of Great Britain. In 
varying degrees these are already present in the earlier period. 
The most apparent was that of Peel’s reduction of the naval
~*~E.P. 29 pt. 2/9, Ellenborough to Peel, 3 March 1835, enclosing 
a petition fromthe Court of Directors for lowering duties on 
E.I. commodities.
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and military estimates in his budget of 1835
Peel’s Ministry had inherited a tense situation in the 
Middle East and Wellington, now Foreign Minister, did not 
underestimate its seriousness. He did, however, act decisively 
to defuse the potentially explosive situation created.by Pal­
merston’s issuance of the 11 discretionary order” to the Mediterranean
2
fleet by cancelling that letter, and by generally discounting 
the reports of Lord Ponsonby who had remained at Constantinople 
only because he believed, rightly as it turned out, that Palmer­
ston would soon be back in office. The contribution made by 
Wellington’s protege, Ellenborough, to policy in this area, the 
Euphrates expedition, and in Persia was in accordance with the 
tenor of British foreign policy at this time, not with that of 
some of his more aggressive ideas of the l820s. We can observe ^
..........................................................................I
the same tendency in those despatches to do with the policy of 
the Government of India beyond its north western frontier.
Thus in answer to a question by William IV about the sig­
nificance to British interests of the struggle for power in 
Afghanistan Ellenborough assured His Majesty that whereas the
^Halevy, III, 335» notes of expenditure on the army and navy in 
the l83Cs, ”It had never been so low as it had been in the 
budget introduced by Peel during his brief tenure of office”.
2
Temperley and Penson, p.120.
x
See Philips, pp. 269-70; see also A. Imlah, Lord Ellenborough, 
p.69n for a conclusion similar to the above.
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independence of that country 1!is matter of much interest to
the British Government in India ... it does not appear to be
of moment whether the dominions of that country be in the hands
of Shah Shuja or Dost Mohomad. It is however very desirable
that Ranjit Singh should not establish his power on the right
bank of the Indus".**" The Government of India was subsequently
told that their acquiescence in the.sale of arms at Delhi to
the pretender, Shah Shuja, was a "virtual breach of that neutrality
which in all such cases the British Government ought and professes 
2
to pursue". The last secret despatch to go out before the Whigs
returned to power dealt with relations to the north west and
simply counselled the Government to maintain the division of
3
power between Sindians, Afghans and Sikhs.
The Euphrates expedition was part of this inheritance from
the previous Ministry,. Wellington and Ellenborough do not appear
If
to have been enthusiastic about it and there is no clear evidence 
of whether they intended to use it as a counter to Russian penetration 
in the area. Wellington simply advised Ellenborough to carry out the
~4c.P. 29 pt. l/l, Ellenborough to William IV, 28 January 1835*
^E/A/7^3* 77, Political Despatch to India, 18 March (No. A) 1835•
.In the debates on the Afghan War, in 1839, Ellenborough was to 
'accuse the Whigs of having acquiesced "in the expedition of Shah 
Shuja to Candahar in 183^". Hansard, 3$, XL, 9&3> House of Lords,
28 February 1839.
^L/P&S/5/5^71 Secret Despatch of 7 March 1835.
A
See E.P. 28/3, 1^3. Ellenborough1s Diary for 13 January 1835 :
Chesney came, "He would not take upon himself the responsibility 
of deciding whether the expedition should be given up or not."
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expedition in the manner laid down by Parliament, descending
the river rather than ascending it.^
Towards Persia H.M. fs Ministers took the important step
of transferring control of the mission to the Crown. The long
anticipated demise of the Shah had finally occured in October
of 183^ and the Cahinet had decided that it was desirable to
make a definite attempt to come to an understanding with Persia
if possible with the cooperation of Russia. Sir H. Ellis, who
as a Commissioner at the Board had been largely responsible
for the conduct of the Persian correspondence was selected to
2head the mission and was instructed along these lines. Accordingly 
Ellenborough wrote to the Chairman explaining "The disorganized 
state of the kingdom, the succession to which cannot be expected 
to take place without internal wars makes it particularly neces­
sary at the present time that the British Representative should 
possess all the influence with the Russian and the Persian authori­
ties which can be given to him". The costs of the mission would 
have to be borne by the Company as Parliament would not consent to 
any such grant "even were H.M.'s Government prepared to ask for it", 
which clearly they were in no position to do. Ellenborough there­
fore requested that the Company should contribute £12,000 annually,
^See ibid., 94-, Diary for 22 December 183 .^
^See M. Yapp, British Policy in Central Asia, 1830-4-3» Ph.D.
London, 1959, pp. 73-^.
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been
the sum which had/previously the limit of annual expenditure 
by the Government of India on the Mission*^
The fact that Tucker and Clarke readily agreed to recommend 
this proposition to the Court despite the strong conviction 
among many directors that the Mission was na perfectly useless 
establishment" was the ]£sult of the former’s wish to disassociate 
Indian finances from the course of foreign policy ii the area as 
much as possible, the Chairmen contended that affairsin Persia
v/ere "much more connected with European politics and negociations
2than with Indian", This was such an important object that they 
were even willing to accede to a supplementary request for the
payment for the cost of these British officers employed in train-
3
ing Persian troops.
The Ellis Mission as conceived by the Conservative Ministry
appears to have been a forthright attempt to reach a stable
arrangement with Persia, if possible with Russian cooperation.
That it received no support from Palmerston and the row President
if
of the Board after the Whigs had returned to power appears to
~4c/2/38, 126-7 & 129, Ellenborough to the Secret Committee,
20 December 183 .^
^E/2/l3, 229, The Chairmen to Ellenborough, 13 January 1833.
E/2/13, 297, Chairmen to Ellenborough, 12 March 1833*
^See Yapp ,pp.^-7 & 80.
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have followed from a profoundly different conception of what 
could be accomplished in Persia and a different approach to 
the problem of Russian influence in this part of the world.
Indeed all the questions of foreign policy dealt with in this 
chapter have relevance to such differences between Whig Ministry 
and the Conservative. Por in those cases where the foreign 
activity of the Government of India was not the direct response 
to an order issued from home it shall be by means of showing 
where such differences existed that, in lieu of a detailed 
study of the genesis and progress of such great matters as the 
Afghan expedition, this thesis can make some contribution.
Ellenborough*s efforts in almost every department of 
Indian administration had been aimed at the reversal or at least 
at the modification of the work of the previous government and 
had he remained in office there is little doubt that his efforts 
would have been substantially carried into execution. It is 
evident in the instances dealt with, and elsewhere, that Ellen­
borough frequently attempted more even than the conservative- 
minded Court, who shared many of his views, were willing to assist 
in. Had another Conservative Minister been at the Board he might 
conceivably have attempted less. Ellenborough’s restless, imperious
personality was in itself a factor in what was done but ulti­
mately that depended on the course of British politics, on the 
accession to power of the Conservatives and the general approach 




INDIAN POLICY DURING THE MELBOURNE MINISTRY l855-/fl. 
THE ABANDONMENT OF RADICAL REFORM AND THE ADOPTION
OF AN INCREASINGLY ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY
Chapter Four
Following the resignation of Peel and his Cabinet the
Whigs-, returned to poWer, under Lord Melbourne, for six years.
' The length of his second Ministry however'was no measure of 
the strength of Melbourne’s Government.; After’the general 
election of 1833 the Whig majority in the Commons was no longer 
overwhelming and after that of 1837 it was downright precarious.^
The Government’s position was made all the more difficult by the
* * t * ' * * •
fact that it restedupon an association between Whigs, Radicals 
and Irish M.P.s. Melbourne, who has been described as in­
tellectually very liberal but politically quite conservative, 
meaning cautious, accepted the alliance as a matter of necessity 
feeling no more enthusiasm for it than he did for the Utilitarian 
doctrine of one section of the radicals. Internally his govern­
ment was hardly stronger than it was externally. Peel referred
to it as a !,mere government of departments without a centre of 
2unity11. The Home Secretary, Lord John Russell, as well as Pal­
merston at the'Foreign Office, all too frequently led where they 
should have followed.
■^ J. A. Thomas, "The House of Commons, 1832-67", Economica, March 
19231 p.30 gives the Whigs a majority of 370 in 1832, one of 112 
in 1835 and a mere eighteen after the general election of 1837.
2
Woodward, p.111.
The years of Melbourne's second administration witnessed 
the virtual disappearance of the reforming style of Lord Grey's 
Government. Legislation on outstanding problems ceased to be 
a matter of quick, radical solutions and became rather one in 
which the agreement of the Opposition, continually gathering 
strength under Peel's leadership, was often as necessary as 
that of Melbourne's own parliamentary allies. On the other hand 
there was nothing stable or static about the condition of British 
finances during these years, they became steadily worse owing to 
increased national expenditure particularly on the army and the 
navy for which Lord Palmerston 's foreign policy was responsible, 
and also owing to decreased revenues caused by a depression in 
trade.^
The course of administration in India during the years 
1836 to 18^1, when the government was under the direction of the 
appointee of the Melbourne Ministzy, closely parallels that in 
England under the Whigs. The vigorous style of legislation which 
pertained before Auckland's arrival is quickly transformed into 
one which takes account of a wider group of authorities in India 
and in England and is consequently less radical. On the other 
hand Indian financial administration which had already been pro­
foundly modified as a consequence of Act of 1833 is overtaken
^See Halevy, III, pp. 198-99 and 333-6
after 1838 by mounting deficits caused by the pursuit of a 
vigorous foreign policy and is by the time the Whigs quit., 
office if anything in a worse state than the British.
The man who obtained the Presidency of the Board in 1835 
contrasted greatly with the man who had held it during the re­
forming years of Lord Grey’s Ministry and considering the 
different character of the Whig Governments before and after 
the Conservative interim this difference was not inappropriate.
John Cam Hothouse, the friend and literary executor of Eyron and 
a member of the Greek Committee, had for many years represented 
the Kadical stronghold of Westminster in Parliament. With his 
acceptance of office under the Whigs and with the passage of 
the reforms to which he had been committed however Hobhouse 
came to accept a more orthodox political stance. Among the 
offices he had held under Lord Grey was that of Secretary at 
War, Palmerston1s old post of Parliament’s financial watchdog 
over the forces. Upon his refusal to accept this post in Mel­
bourne’s second Ministry he had been offered the Presidency of 
the Board.'1’ A man of short stature but imposing appearance, of 
forceful, if inelegant, style as a speaker he was well equipped, when
the need arose, to defend Indian policy in the Commons or to 
impose his will on the Directors and by experience,as well as 
by temperament^Hobhouse was well suited for the close relation­
ship with the Foreign Minister which he was to maintain over 
the next six years.
Virtually Hobhouse's first official act was to write to 
Lord Heytesbury advising him to stay the preparations for his 
departure.^ Taken with the full knowledge that it would be 
strongly resented by the Court of Directors as well as the 
Opposition the vacation of Heytesbury*s appointment is an in­
dication of the importance placed by the Ministry upon having 
their own appointee at Calcutta. Peel was quite right when 
in the Commons debate on the measure, he asserted that it f,must
carry into the Government of India the colours and shades of our
2
political' differences11 in Britain. But had Heytesbury gone 
out under a Conservative Government the same would have been 
equally true though with a very different result.
The Court protested against this "arbitrary Act of Power11 
but they were unable to stop it. Resenting the manner in which
^Home Misc., 833, 1, Hobhouse to Heytesbury, 20 April 1833.
2
Hansard,3S, XXIX, 391 29 June 1833. This case was not unique. 
Heytesbury wrote to Lord Ellenborough that 111 hear that Lord 
Amherst las also been superceded, and that Sir Howard Doujas 
is recalled from the Ionian Islands-war £0 the knife is de­
clared against everything Conservative'1. E.P. 29 1/2, 3 May
1835.
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the incoming Whigs had been forced to act rather than disputing 
their right to make the appointmentf the Court were subsequently- 
willing to cooperate by not proposing a successor to Lord 
William until the Ministry were ready to have the appointment 
made.1 Tucker was out by rotation and the only two Directors 
to dissent from this arrangement were George Iyall and Richard
p
Jenkins both of whom sat as Conservative M.P.s in the 1830s.
George Eden, Lord Auckland, who formally accepted the 
Governor Generalship in July of 1833 was a Whig of long standing 
who had served as President of the Boardof Trade and Master of 
the Mint under Lord Grey and had received the Admiralty under 
Melbourne. Amongst men who were for the most part novices in 
the field of administration he was generally regarded as a good 
man of business though Hemy Thoby Prinsep who served under him,
perhaps influenced by the disasters of the first Afghan War, adds
\
Mbut he was much wanting in promptitude of decision and had an
x
overwhelming dread of responsibility.11 Melbourne, as we have 
seen, had considered Auckland for the Governor Generalcy as early
1E/2/13, ^28, Chairs to Hobhouse, 28 May 1833*
^See B/2*f2, 62, Dissents of 1? June 1833.
In his relations with the Court Hobhouse was particularly fortunate 
in having Sir James Kivett Camac, whom Melbourne made a Baronet, 
first as Deputy, 1833-6, and then as Chairman for the two succeeding 
years, 1836-8. Camac became a Whig M.P. in 1837* Elsewhere, only 
with the aged W.S.Clarke, whom Heytesbury refers to as a political 
friend1, and Sir Richard Jenkins, Chairman 1838-9 , is any friction 
apparent.
3
Prinsep, Three Generations, p.227.
as 183^ and in commenting upon his own style of administration
George Eden shows himself to be a man of similar inclinations
to the Prime Minister: "It had been my object rather to seek
the gradual introduction of administrative reforms, than to aim
at sweeping changes of principle and of system; of which the
necessary effect would be that of unsettling the minds as well
of the population generally as of the servants of the Government".***
The Court of Directors were no less partial to Auckland’s style
of administration than Melbourne and his apniable disposition
and courteous conduct towards them securedtheir good will even at
a time when they profoundly disagreed with the external policy
his government was pursuing. The reaction of Benjamin Malkin,
Judge of the Supreme Court at Calcutta to the news of Auckland's
appointment might well have been what was expected at home from
his appointment "I think that things will go at a more Cautious
pace now that Lord Auckland is here, who I take to be a good man 
2
of business11.
With Auckland's arrival at Calcutta in March of 1833 we 
have the first of three Governors General who came out to India 
from Cahinet office, from "the Councils of the Queen in the full
From Auckland's minute of 4 February 1840 quoted in D.P.Sinha 
British Social and Administrative Policy in India During the 
Administration of Lord Auckland< p.313«
^Macaulay Papers, 0 18 Ml^, Malkin to W.Whewell, 1836.
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knowledge of the views and sentiments of her Government". The 
intimate connection between these men and their colleagues in 
England introduces a new element into the relationship between 
the Home and Indian Governments, one which not infrequently ren­
ders an effort to attribute the origin of a particular policy to 
the one or the other somewhat artificial; the frequent occurence 
of "coincidences" of thought and action between London and Cal­
cutta, or Bombay, is largely attributable to the shared assumptions 
and experience of the Ministry and their appointees.
The maintenance of the special relationship between the 
Minister and the Governor General depended upon a factor which, 
quantitatively speaking was new, the private correspondence be­
tween the two. It is this correspondence, together with the 
President's communications with the Chairmen^" which provides us 
with the clearest idea of the role of the home government in 
the administration of the Indian empire.
Prior to Auckland's arrival at Calcutta the home authorities 
were provoked to pull more tightly upon the reins of control and 
to make more explicit the relationship between the Home and Indian 
governments because of the embarrassment tausbdtby a number of 
measures passed in quick succession without the latter having
^"Unfortunately Hobhouse's diaries for the years l833-4l| Add.Mss 
56358-64 do not furnish an intiimte view of the manner in which 
policy was formulated. They reflect rather the author's career 
as member of the Cabinet than as head of the Board, "At the I.B. 
and the H of C" followed by a description of what went on in 
Parliament being the usual entiy.
sufficiently ascertaining the views of the authorities at home.
In February of 1833 Lord William abolished the practice of 
flogging among the Company's native troops, the following 
month^ he took a decisive step in education policy by announc­
ing that funds appropriated by Government would best be employed 
by exclusively devoting them to the spread of Western science 
and literature through the medium of the English language.
After Bentinck had left, Metcalfe's government passed into law 
Act XVII of 1833 decreeing a uniform currency for allof India, 
and more momentously Act XI, the Press Act, which dispensed 
with the necessity of obtaining from the Government a license 
to print.■*■ This gained the title of "liberator of the press" 
for Metcalfe but also the disapproval of the home authorities 
and the loss of further consideration for high office in India.
It appears likely that the Supreme Government under Ben­
tinck and his interim successor in their haste were apprehensive 
of the influence which the fall of the Whigs in 1834 would have 
on Indian legislation,as Macaulay wrote to a friend at home 
"A Tory Governor General is not very likely to agree with me
Macaulay Papers, 0-15-1213, Macaulay to E. Ellis, 29 May 1835- 
See also P.P. 1852-53« XXXII, 6657, for Sir Charles Trevelyan's 
testimony on the Press Act. "The general impression in India was 
that it was desirable that Sir Charles Metcalfe ... should take 
upon himself the responsibility of doing it, than that he should 
leave it /sic/ to his successor".
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about the very important law reforms which I am about to lay 
before the Council11.
At home these measures were keenly felt, not only by 
the Court and the Board but by the Cabinet and the King as well.
The practice of flogging ii the Kingfs army was under review 
by a Royal Commission and in Parliament a Conservative, Lord 
Hardinge, defended the practice an the face of Radical attack.^
The beleagured William IV was particularly upset about Bentinck’s 
measure and demanded at the very least public censure of it.
The sudden passage of the currency measure, which after all 
was the complement to financial centralization, provoked more 
unease about the state of the military rumours circulating that
2
the native troops had refused to accept payment in the new coin.
While the resolution on education was, with some justification, 
felt by the Court to be a departure from the, hitherto successful, 
latitudinarian policy of support for both Eastern and Western 
studies at the higher levels. However resentment was greatest 
in the Court over the Press Act which was more objected to than 
even the unexpected abolition of flogging. They felt, and most 
of the Cabinet agreed with them, so Hobhouse told Auckland, that
•‘‘Hansard. 3S, XXXII, see 1001 seq, H of C, 13 April 1836. 
Tfome Misc.. 833> 105, Hobhouse to Auckland, 1 April 1836.
such a great change of system was hazardous and unjustifi­
able and the Chairmen had a despatch prepared ordering the
1
Government of India to recur at once to the former system.
Though Hobhouse and the Cabinet quite concurred in
the Court's objections to the Press Act the President refused
to aceept the Directors* draft and instead substituted a strongly
worded one of his own which nevertheless left the final decision
up to the Supreme Government, that is to Auckland, a course which
was followed on the other measures as well for that appeared to
Hobhouse and the Cabinet to be the only practicable course with
2
respect both to British and Indian considerations.
While the Ministry was willing to concede that Auckland
would be the best judge of whether or not these enactments should 
3
be repealed they did not intend that Bentinck's independent 
style of legislation should characterize that of Lord Auckland.
In his first letter to the new Governor General Hobhouse relayed 
an objection which was as much Melbourne’s as his own, namely 
that ,fit is extremely unfair upon the home government to rush 
into these reforms without previous consultation with them. When
1 say the Home gov't I mean the administration, for it ensures
~*~Home Misc., 833 j 102, Hobhouse to Auckland, 30 January 1836.
2
Upon corporal punishment for example the Ministry wished to give 
Lord Bentinck's measure as little publicity as possible and there­
fore Hobhouse had to advise the King that H.M. *s Ministers did 
not consider the public censure of the Governor General's act 
advisable. Home Misc., 8339 Hobhouse to William IV,
lb March 183 .^
^In the event Auckland decided to repeal none of these measures. He
a squabble either with the Court of Directors or with the 
Parliament, and, in some cases with both". Thus while Hob­
house admitted that the Charter certainly did confer ..upon 
the Supreme Government the power of legislating without prior 
consultation he also observed "yet it ^ ls/^ surely most in­
expedient to use it, except in cases of emergency".'1' A 
despatch was therefore sent out which in very severe language 
instructed the Government of India not to resort to any great
administrative or legislative changes without the previous con-
2
currance of the home authorities.
The importance which Hobhouse placed upon the principle 
of the despatch of April 3836 emerges from subsequent corres­
pondence upon it between himself and the Governor General. Auck­
land, as H.M. *s Ministers well knew, was not a man disposed to 
rash action. While he conceded that the order could be seen 
as "no unnatural consequence of some of the measures which were 
apparently adopted with too much independence by my predecessors"
was satisfied that they were generally considered beneficial in 
India and he told Hobhouse "you may almost adopt it as axiomatic" 
that it was foiy to attenpt to reverse measures at ataost a year*s 
date from England. Home Misc., 837, 107, 20 June 1836.
^Home Misc., 833, 103 & 10*f, Hobhouse to Auckland, 30 January 1836.
p
See E/k/7^7. pp. 7^2-3, Legislative Despatch to India, April 
(No. i) 1836.
he was much pained by "The despatch of April last, which seems
to call upon the Governor General not to govern, and upon the
legislative council not to make laws11.'*' But Auckland's temperate
protest did not make Hobhouse relent in the slightest, he would,
he told the Governor General, "recommend the recall of the best
friend I ever had, were he to act in decided and repeated defiance
2
of his masters at home". The day after Auckland had entered 
his protest against the order for previous concurrance the Govern­
ment sent home its letter stating that the home government's
3
directive would be complied with.
Not only the recent legislation but the part played in it 
by Macaulay had attracted the notice of the Cabinet and Hobhouse 
in his letter of 30 January 1836 had added his "earnest entreaties,
if
at Melbourne's desire that you will keep B.M. a little more quiet". 
At Calcutta Macaulay had been the embodiment of the reforming 
spirit of Britishpolitics, his legislative minutes echoing the 
rhetoric of 1832-33- But British politics had moved on since then 
and the Fourth Member could not now expect the same degree of 
support he would have had from Charles Grant. On hearing of
~4fome Misc. t 837, 169-70, Auckland to Hobhouse, 26 August 1836. 
^Home Misc., 837, 173» Hobhouse to Auckland, 26 January 1837- 
^EA/155« Legislative Letter from India, 27 August (No. 10), 1836.
if
Home Misc., 833* 103* Hobhouse to Auckland, 30 January 1836.
Hobhousefs appointment he had written, in September of 1835 
expressing his desire ”to interest you in the reforms in which 
we are now engaged”,^  law reform and native education being 
uppermost. But Macaulay’s request did not result in the establish­
ment of a regular private correspondence with the President and the 
acquisition of that support from the Minister which he desired. 
Instead Hobhouse wrote to Auckland "Macaulay writes to me that 
he hopes to squeeze all the laws of India into a small octavo, 
and trusts that he will perform this exploitin a year or two”, 
observing ”0f his vigour and genius I have no doubt, tho I say
to you confidentially, that I entertain some alarm.” and adding
2
pointedly ”However you will repress his ardour”.
The request that Auckland should keep Macaulay ”a little 
more quiet”, should "repress his ardour”, conveyed through the 
medium of private correspondence, was as significant for the 
course of future legislation as was the Official’ despatch 
of April 1836. Both were in fact a reflection of the opinions, 
not merely of Hobhouse and the Court but, of the Ministry itself 
and of the state of British politics and there could be no doubt 
in Auckland's mind that a more cautious approach to the internal 
administration of India, particularly in legislation, was hence­
forth required.
^Add-Mss, k72Z7 % f.176, Macaulay to Hobhouse, Ik September l835»
2
Home Misc., 833* 10*f, Hobhouse to Auckland, 30 January 1836.
Auckland*s response to Macaulay corresponded to the views 
of Melbourne and Hobhouse* Though he declared his "admiratinn" 
and his "regard” for the Fourth Member, in what can be taken as 
a prompt response to Hobouse on the whole question of Indian 
legislation, he conceded that Macaulay*s conduct in Council had 
not always been prudent. This was because Macaulay had been en­
couraged to act too much alone "by the implicit reliance which 
my two predecessors placed in him"'*' and as Auckland*s statement 
implied, he would not extend such discretion to his Fourth Member** 
Rather a modus vivendi was immediately worked out between the two 
men: "I have yielded to him that it is as well to have no pre­
amble as to say ‘whereas it is expedient to enact as in herein 
after enacted* and he has yielded to me that when the reasons 
and the circumstances which have led to an enactment are not clear 
to its readers, they shall be stated in a preface. He has abandoned 
for me against his opinion, one projected act, that for the appeal 
to a single judge, because I thought at least it ill timed; and 
he has acquiesced with me in the propriety in every case of legal
importance, of our endeavouring to carry with us the authority of
2
the judges of the Supreme Court". With the loss to Macaulay of 
that preponderant authority in Legislation which he had enjoyed
~*~Home Misc., 837f 108, Auckland to Hobhouse, 20 June 1836.
2
Home Misc., 837, 109, Auckland to Hobhouse, 20 June 1836.
under Bentinck and Metcalfe, as the interpreter of the Act of 
1833 was lost for the duration of the Charter because of the 
comprehensive reform of the administration by systematic legis­
lation which had been provided for during the years of reform 
triumphant.
The fact that the last triumph of that vigorous contro­
versial style of legislation which was associated in the minds 
of the home authorities with Macaulay, the so-called Black Act 
of 1836, occurred at the very commencement <f Auckland*s admini­
stration serves as an illustration of the rapidity and effective­
ness with which the wishes of the President and' the Ministry, 
as well as the Court, were imposedupon Indian administration 
by Lord Auckland and of the importance not only of official 
correspondence but also of the private letters of Hobhouse to 
the Governor General in bringing this about. Moreover, the 
correspondence on this measure provides an additional insight 
into the influences which were connected with this change.
The draft of the act which was to transfer appellate juris­
diction outside the Presidency towns in civil cases involving 
European British subjects from the King*s to the Company*s courts 
had been discussed in Council and published to ascertain public 
opinion before Auckland’s arrival.^ The memorial presented
S^e.e Sinha. pp. 272-3
against the proposed act had occasioned one of Macaulay *s 
thundering defenses and Auckland on assuming the Government 
had refused to be dissuaded by the agitation against the bill 
which passed the Council unanimously as Act XI of 1836.
Initially Hobhouse was quite unequivocal when declaring 
his support of the measure to Auckland and he was in any case 
prepared to defend it in the Commons against the petition pre­
sented by Joseph Hume in July of 1836.^ But by the end of 
/
the year, when considering the prospectof further Parliamentary 
pressure against the measure, he wrote to Auckland, 1fyou tell 
Carnac and me that the unpopularity of the act does not extend
beyond Calcutta - that may be so - but the lawyers there keep
up a constant correspondence with the lawyers here, and Mr.
Hogg has given me notice of uncompromising opposition - I con­
fess I do not see much significance in the change ... generally
speaking it certainly would be desirable to take no very de­
cisive step in legislation without previous reference to the
2
home authorities11. Hobhouse's reservations were an indication 
of the role which the changing temper of British politics was 
having upon the style of legislation in India for they were 
motivated not by the reaction in India, nor by the attitude of
1See Hansard. 3S, XXXV, 19^-8, Ik July 1836.
Home Misc.. 837, 11?, Hobhouse to Auckland, 15 December 1836.
the Court, who as a body supported the change, but arose pri­
marily because of Parliamentary considerations.
Before the year 1836 was quite out the Law Commission over 
which Macaulay presided and which was to have enjoyed not only 
the central place in the elaboration of the general system of 
police, justice and laws but also in the legislative business 
of the Supreme Government generally received a major modification 
of function. Because of the pressure of business upon the Legis­
lative Council and the inability of the Law Commission to deal, 
not only with its general projects as quickly as expected but 
also with the numerous special reference made toi±, Auckland 
took the occasion in his minute of 19 December 1836 to recommend 
that the Government "should exercise more supervision over the 
Law Commission than it has hitherto done". In order to permit 
the Commission, weakened as it was by illness, to proceed more 
quickly with the tasks of codification it should be relieved of 
those references "which the Council may itself properly dispose 
of". Further, in future a fuller communication between the 
Council and the Supreme and Sudder Courts on legislation as well 
as the Commission was desirable.^- On the one hand the Law
^Add. Mss. 37710* see ff. 9> 13 & 12. Minute of 19 December 1836. 
Approved by the Home Government, Legislative Despatch to India,
16 August (No. 10) l837« Was there any significance in the 
Board's deletion from the Court's draft of the word "great" as 
applied to the work on which the Commissi on was engaged? See 
EA/752, 238.
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Commissinn was to be relieved of some of its burden so that it 
could devote itself more fully to the task of codification 
while on the other Auckland made it clear that he did not wish 
to accord the same centrality in the general business of law 
making to the law Commission as had the Charter and the commentary 
despatch of December 10 183 .^
Of the great conception of "a pyramid of codes11 which 
Macaulay had originally believed his term in India would encompass 
only the Penal Code had gone to press before he left India, while 
work on the Codes of Criminal and of Civil Procedure had not yet 
commenced*1 We have no evidence to show that Melbourne*s cabinet 
in general or Hobhouse in particular were especially concerned 
to see the radical program of law reform realized* Certainly 
the choice of a successor to Macaulay did nothing to change the 
trend away from the earlier conceptions of the function of the 
Law Commission and the Legislative Member* Despite Auckland1s 
favourable disposition towards C.H.Cameron and Macaulay’s re­
quest Hobhouse decided that the latter's health was a bar to 
his appointment and so Andrew Amos was made Fourth Member* It 
was subsequently remarked of Amos that he 'had shown towards his
2
predecessor a disposition to treat his acts and opinions lightly". 
See Stokes, pp. 213-4.
2
Home Misc., 836, 6 -^, The Chairman, J.L. Lushing ton to Hobhouse,
10 January 1839. See P.P.1832-33* XXVII, q.2873 for Amos's
critical attitude to the purpose of the Law Commission.
It may be remarked that this redefinition of the mode in 
which the Government of India was expected to carry on its legis­
lation was in large measure due to private correspondence, and 
necessarily so as regards, for ii^ance, opinion on Macaulay's 
proper role*
The same influences acting from home upon the conduct of
legislation were brought to bear upon educational policy under
Auckland. The legislative despatch of April 1836 had condemned
the manner if not the content of Bentinck's resolution onnative
education. The disapproval of Macaulay's conduct conveyed in
Hobhouse's letter of 30 January 1836 was reinforced by the President'
unwillingness to correspond directly with the Fourth Member on
the education question1 though the latter had written at length
2
upon the subject. The loss to Macaulay of his paramount posi­
tion in the counsels of the Governor General was a great blow to 
those who wished the Government to place a strict construction 
upon Bentinck's resolution and devote all the available resources 
to Western education in the English language to the exclusion of 
any patronage of Oriental literature, that is to the extreme Angli­
cist position. At the end of 1836 when writing to tell Auckland
^inha, pp. 5-6, and others have noted the influence of the despatch 
of April 1836 on Auckland's conduct of educational policy but that 
of the correspondence on Macaulay has generally received less 
attention. A recent study, J.L.Hilliker's British Educational 
Policy in Bengal, 1833-5**« London, Ph.D. 1968, p. 139 and n .8  
notes Auckland's comments on Macaulay but not the original ones 
by Hobhouse to which the Governor General's are the response.
^See Add.Mss., V?227, f. 176 seq., l*f September 1835, Macaulay
that he had cancelled the Courts despatch on native education,
and so left the question up to the Governor General, Hobhouse
took specific objection to the "vehement, argumentative, but I
repeat too controversial” language of Macaulay’s minute on
education. 1 During Auckland's term of office the strength of
2
the extreme anglicists tended to decline11 and it was not until 
the end of 1839» after two of the leading members of this group, 
Macaulay and Trevelyan, had returned to England that Auckland 
set forth his views on the future conduct of educational policy.^ 
While fully endorsing the paramount importance of English edu­
cation Auckland sought to provide through scholarships and patron­
age of Oriental literature sufficient support for Eastern edu­
cation to satisfy interested opinion in India and at home.
The lack of support accorded from home to the prospective 
provisions of the Charter during the years of Melbourne's second 
Ministry was particularly apparent over those dealing with the 
recruitment of the Company's civil servants. Neither Grant nor 
Ellenborough had given effect to the four fold system of nomination
begins his appeal by conceding "There is another question scarcely 
less important on which you will probably have to decide in the 
last resort. I mean the question of native educ&tion".
1Hoee Misc., 8371 117-8, Hobhouse to Auckland, 13 December 1836.
In the same letter Hobhouse takes exseption to the conduct of the 
leader of the Orientalist party, H.T.Prinsep, especially to his 
reference to "the conservative portion" of the Committee of Public 
Instruction.
^Hilliker. p.139.
^Add.Mss. 37712, f.13 seq. on Education, 2k December 1839. Auckland 
here asserts that he purposefully "refrained" from recording his 
sentiments until the Anglicist-Orientalist controversy had subsided.
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to Haileybury. Hobhouse when discussing the Government of
India’s query on the matter with Auckland told him that the
Court considered the scheme "impracticable" and confessed that
he himself did not "admire11 it. Nevertheless in 1836 Hobhouse
was unwilling to go to Parliament, and thus "re-open the Charter",
in order to give legal sanction to thecontinuance of the old
system. Moreover the four fold system was "the child of Holt
2Mackenzie" who "has many friends". The following year however
Hobhouse was able to bring forth an act which permitted the sus-
3
pension of the new system. Power was also given to the Presi­
dent to appoint a Board of Examiners for admission to the college, 
a gesture towards that opinion in the Commons which was critical 
of Haileybury, "by this scheme I hope to raise the character of
if
the Students, and to be able to save the college" he told Auckland.
The Court who had originally, when faced with the effective loss 
of their patronage, resolvdd upon the abolition of their college,
^Home Misc., 837, 91* Hobhouse to Auckland, 30 November 1836.
Home Misc.t 837* 120, Hobhouse to Auckland, 15 December 1836.
3
7 William IV & I Victoria c.70. The reference in Trevelyan's 
Lord Macaulay quoted in R. Moore's Sir Charles Wood's Indian 
Policy, p.86, to "backstairs influence in Leadenhall Street" 
and"backstairs influence in Parliament" tends to obscure the 
responsibility of the Whig Ministers for the non-implementation 
of the four fold scheme. Trevelyan's account is of course in the 
Whig tradition and must be judged as such. Indeed many of the 
political biographies, memoirs etc. of this period, including some 
of Indian administrators, are biased.
Home Misc., 838, 125, Hobhouse to Auckland, 30 August 1837*
nowl- dropped their objections to its continuance.
Hobhouse's efforts over the 87th clause were at least
positive but even here they were far removed from a coherent
policy towards the provisions of the Charter. When petitioning
Parliament against the "Black Act" Joseph Hume had asked "if
the 87th clause were to remain a dead l e t t e r " T h e  adopted
son of Raja Ram Mohun Roy had remained in England after his
guardian's death and Hobhouse had given him a temporary post
at the Board of Control. The young man had been well received 
2
in Whig society and the Chairman, James Rivett Camac, had sug­
gested to Hobhouse that a place in the covenanted service might 
be found for him. The Court as a body however were almost un­
animously opposed to the experiment and Auckland, sensitive to 
opinion within the service in India, did not support the idea. 
Under these circumstances the President abandoned the project 
and simply recommended his protege to Auckland's patronage.^ 
Hobhouse's efforts had been largely of a personal nature, with 
stimulus from Parliament, and this was insufficient to carry 
the scheme when faced with opposition from the Court and the
1Hansard, 3S, XXXV, 192 & 19^-5, l1* July 1836. When preparing 
his answer to Hume's petition Hobhouse had made the note "I 
shall regret this very much I have given a writership". See 
Add. Mss. 36^67. f.329.
2
See Hobhouse's Recollections, V, p.68.
^Home Misc., 838, 315-16, Hobhouse to Auckland, 9 April 1838.
apprehension of the Governor General.
It is evident that neither the Melbourne Ministry col­
lectively nor the President of the Board individually felt 
absolutely committed to the realization of the prospective 
provisions of the Charter either on grounds of principle or of 
politics. Moreover the support that these reforms could command 
in Parliament as part of a comprehensive measure which dealt with 
a commercial question of the first magnitude was not now forth­
coming even upon such a presumably popular project as that of 
depriving the Directors of their patronage. Yet this is not to 
say that Parliament could not at this time intervene decisively 
in Indian affairs. In 1838, when the Government's position in 
the Commons was extremely weak, Parliament effectively dictated 
the Indian Government's course of action on three notable, and 
highly emotive, issues.
Grant's despatch of February 1833 calling for the disassociation 
of the Government of India from the religious practices of the nat­
ives had not occasioned any vigorous action on the part of the 
authorities in India nor had Lord Ellenborough seen fit to call 
for its implementation. Hobhouse informed Auckland who was con­
sidering the matter that the original despatch "was forced upon 
the Court by Charles Grant who wrote it".*^  The Governor General
^Home Misc., 837, 118, 15 December 1836.
215
hoped that the agitation in India to have the despatch, which 
had become public knowledge, given effect would subside and 
allow him to deal discreetly with the matter,^ Unfortunately 
this did not happen, feeling on the matter reached such a pitch 
that the Commander in Chief at Madras resigned over the issue.
At home where the matter had been widely and vigorously taken 
up Hobhouse*s hand was forced by 1838. The Bishop of London 
announced in the Lords his intention to call for papers and Asley 
was known to be preparing to do likewise in the Commons. "As 
resistance is out cf the question" Hobhouse had to tell the Chair­
man "it will be advisable to yield with a good grace11. Sir James 
Lushington responded that he could "not see how it would be
possible to the Court to issue any such instructions as that
3
you have now suggested" but the Couht at length did yield, though 
with .an exceptionally large number of dissentients, and sign 
the despatch on the 3rd of August 1838. As a consequence, though 
not without further promptings from Parliament, the collection 
of the pilgrim tax by the Government was abolished throughout 
Bengal and Agra by Act X of iSkO and other forms of disassociation
t
Home Misc., 837, 278, Auckland to Hobhouse, 17 November 1836.
2
Home Misc., 836, l*f, Hobhouse to Lushing ton, l*f April 1838.
Home Misc., 836, 15, Lushington to Hobhouse, 20 April 1838.
B^/2*f2, 498 & 507. Dissents of 13 August 1838 signed by ten
Directors. For the Despatch on the "Withdrawal of Interfer­
ence with the Religious Ceremonies of the Natives", see EA/756t 359 
seq., India Revenue Despatch, 8 August (No. 9) of 1838.
from Indian religious practices followed in Madras and Bombay. 
Despite agreement by the highest authorities at home and in 
India upon the undesirability of tampering with the accepted 
relationship between the Government of India and religion in 
India sustained agitation in both countries proved irresistible 
when it finally expressed itself through Parliament.
Similarly neither the Government of India nor the home 
authorities had taken any "imprudent" steps to implement the 88th 
clause of the Charter which called for the extinction of slavery 
in India. Rather the matter had been referred to the Law Commission 
which had been directed to deal with it not as a separate issue 
but only inasmuch as the future Penal Code should be concerned with 
it. Hobhouse writing to Auckland in December of 1836 was of the 
opinionMthat the clause might as well have been left out, and 
the change, if any, left to the discretion of your Government11. 1 
But as with the pilgrim tax the abolitionists were not prepared 
to allow such discretion. Hobhouse was questioned in 1836 and 
again in 1837 on what measures the Government of India had taken 
to do away with slavery. In 1838 when the suppression of the last 
remnant of slavery in the West Indies, the apprenticeship system,
^Home Misc., 837} H9* Hobhouse to Auckland, 13 December 1836.
p
Hansard, 3S, XXXV, 668, Thomas Fowell Buxton, House of Commons,
29 July 1836. Ibid., XXXVIII, 1853, Buxton, House of Commons,
10 July 1837.
was being debated, and the nation, so Hobhouse told Auckland, was 
"half mad about slavery" the home authorities were again forced 
to issue a directive to the Supreme Government. "We could not 
help ourselves"^ the President had to tell the Governor General, 
and though the Court protested against this despatch they like­
wise signed without rancour what had clearly been forced upon 
them, not by Hobhouse, but by Parliament.
Also in the year 1838 the "anti-slavery people" and their 
allies "forced the Court and me ^Hobhouse7 to send out a despatch 
to you, ordering, you to prohibit by law all contracts and all im­
migration for the purpose of employing Indian labourers in our 
2
colonies". The emancipation of slaves in British colonies had 
created a demand for plantation labour which since 1833 had been 
reflected in the growing number of shiploads' of contract labour „ 
from India. The Ministry was favourably disposed towards the in­
terests in need of labour; in 1837 an Order in Council was passed
enabling the planters in Demerera to import contract labourers.
/
In India the Supreme Government had been called upon to legislate 
on the conditions of contract and transport of labour and Auckland
^Home Misc., 838, *f93» 1 November 1838. E/V756, India Legis­
lative Despatch, 29 August (No. lb) 1838, see p,106l, "We de­
sire that the attention of the Law Commission may be immediately 
recalled to this question". The decisive act on slavery was to 
be passed in 18^3*
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and his Council were "much more disposed to discourage than 
to encourage such an undertaking” as the Order in Council 
sanctioned. The Court felt that a deposit of 250 Rs. should 
be paid by the contractors for each labourer to ensure satis­
factory treatment while Hobhouse who shared the Colonial Secret­
ary^ views felt that a deposit of such a size amounted to a 
prohibition.'*' In 1838 however it was Parliaments view and not 
any of these other views, even the Ministry's, which prevailed. 
Melbourne's Government made another attempt in 184-0 to reverse
the prohibition, Lord John Russell arguing the administration's
2
case in an increasingly tumultuous sitting. They were defeated 
and the matter was left up to the Conservatives who were able, 
with a stronger majority, in 184-2 to pass the necessary legis­
lation.
The major lines for the conduct of Indian financialpolicy 
had been set down from home prior to Melbourne's second Ministry.
The Whig Ministers continued to insist that British finances 
should not come to the aid of the Indian and so the Court's pro­
position that Exchequer bills should be used to guarantee the
Company's bonds while the remittable debt was paid off was turned
■3
down. The dominant aim of Indian financial administration continued
^Home Misc., 836, 27, Hobhouse to Lushington, 20 July 1838.
^Hansard% 3S, LIV, 1386-8 , House of Commons, 22 June 184-0.
to be the obtaining of a surplus of revenues over expenditure 
and the home authorities showed themselves apprehensive of 
any apparent failure in this direction "Our sketch estimate for 
1836 gives a deficiency of £L25»000 at the least, and we shall 
be obliged to send out an admonitionary despatch to you. The 
Court and the Board are agreed in this view so pray be as economi­
cal as you can.11'*’ Continued emphasis had to be placed upon re­
trenchment according to this view, a reduction in the scale of 
civil allowances being ordered by the financial despatch of 
4th May 1836 despite loud protests from the Court to the effect
that Bentinck had already carried such reductions as far as they
2
could reasonably go.
With the advent of war in 1838 the aim of maintaining a 
surplus was of course frustrated, Government borrowing at five per 
cent was commenced and the reduction of the public debt was aban­
doned. The financial strain of warfare provoked no constructive 
measures for the reorganization of Indian financial administration, 
such as were to be undertaken by Auckland's successor, either at 
the suggestion of the home authorities or on the initiative of 
the Governor General. In fact the measure taken by Auckland at
~*~Home Misc., 837* 341, Hobhouse to Auckland, 10 March 1837*
^See B/242, 143 et seq. Dissent of 17 May 1836.
Auckland also protested at length against the despatch of 4 May 
1836 but, as with the Directors, to no effect. See Home Misc.,
837, 275-7, Auckland to Hobhouse, 17 November 1836.
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the very end of his administration, a measure which it seems 
unlikely he would have ventured to take had his own colleagues 
been in power, that of suspending all remittances, on the part
bankruptcy in the face of the great financial problems which 
three years of warfare entailed. The Ministry at home for its
speedy solution of the Chinese war in order to relieve Indian 
finances, which, as will be shown in the following chapter, Peel’s 
government did.
The Select Committee’s Report of 1832 had envisaged a 
general reform of the Indian fiscal system, something which was 
more an expression of the aspirations of the free traders than 
of the realities of the Indian situation. Indeed the increased 
pressure on the Indian revenues imposed firstly the loss of the 
proceeds from the China trade and later by the burdens of an 
active foreign policy combined with the lack of alternative 
sources of income to make any large surrender of revenue such 
as would be involved in the abolition of the salt or opium
See E.P. k2„ Lord Fitzgerald, President of the Board of Control, 
to Ellenborough, the Governor General, k April 18^2. ”It is un­
necessary that I should describe to you how embarrassing has been 
the position in which the Court has been placed by the course 
suddenly taken in India, for suspending all remittances to England. 
Lord Auckland seems to think lightly ofintercepting the supplies 
of the Home Treasury and advises with ready facility, the raising 
of three or four millions in England by loan.”
of the Government,'*’ to England was a confession of administrative
2
part gave no thought to a withdrawal from Afghanistan or a
to the burdens of increased military charge the Financial
monopolies an impossifcility.'*' Nevertheless, if overall reform
was not possible,action in those areas where no great surrender
of revenue was required was not and Auckland's concern for the
promotion of Indian commerce, his efforts to remove obstacles
to its expansion, reflected that increasing attachment to a
liberal economic policy which characterized the Whig Ministries
of the 1830s. Auckland's experience at the Board of Trade
equipped him a&flirably for reforming the customs duties of Bengal,
a task which he took up immediately upon his arrival. The duties
"must necessarily bellow" he told Hobhouse "For imports the
country is poor, and cannot pay high duties; for exports, industry
2
is in its infancy, and it ought not to be checked". Over the 
transit duties Auckland felt "my administration will have been far 
from worthless ... if without serious embarrassment I can only 
effect their total abolition throughout the empire". In Bengal
Despatch to India of 23 May (No. 13) l84l observes "no relief of 
importance can therefore be expected under this head for some 
time to come at least" and it rather inconsequently goes on "but 
we rely with confidence upon your utmost exertions to carry into 
effect the retrenchments of civil charge which we have pointed 
out or which may further be found practicable ..." E/4/766 379 •
^In response to Parliamentary representations a Select Committee 
on the Salt Monopoly was appointed in 1836. The only change 
effected as a result was the substitution of the sale of Govern­
ment salt at a fixed price for that by auction. See P.P. 1832-53» 
XXVIII, 3347.
2Home Misc.. 833, 111, 12 April 1836.
Home Misc.. 837, 318-19, Auckland to the Chairman,
20 September 1836.
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these duties were abolished in 1836 and in 1838 Auckland and 
Sir Robert Grant had the pleasure of seeing themdispensed with 
in Bombay though in the relatively poor Presidency of Madras 
the reform had to wait until after the Afghan War, Elsewhere 
Auckland’s administration was remarkable for the amount of legis­
lation on trade and navigation, almost half the number of acts 
passed in the years 183^-52 being effected at this time.^ At 
home rather patchy progress wan made by Melbourne’s government in 
lowering the duties on Indian produce, the equalization of the 
duties on East and West Indian sugar in 1836 being the most con­
spicuous success. A thorough reorganization of the British tariff 
along free trade lines however had toawait the event of Peel’s 
second Ministry.
In the external policy pursued during Auckland’s time, which 
was to make a mockery of the efforts to balance revenues with 
expenditure and to render the Indian Government impotent to further 
reform the fiscal system, the links between the policy pursued 
by the Whig administration at home and that of the Indian govern­
ment are particularly striking. This is especially true in the 
case of finance. Peel was later to remind the Whigs in Opposition
^See P.P. 1832, X, Appendix, p.353- In 1838 alone Haws were passed 
on banking, on the registration of native shipping, of wills of 
persons in India, and for the incorporation of the Bengal Bonded 
Warehouse Association among other subjects. Encouragement was 
also given during Auckland's period to the experimental growing 
of Assam tea and of cotton.
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"that Indian finance had followed the course of the finances at 
1
home" and to point out how much this result was due to a
2
vigorous external policy. While it is true that the paramount 
cause of this embarrassment in India was the burden of the Afghan 
Warf that imposed by India*s role as banker to the British Govern­
ment for the prosecution of the war in China was an important 
contributory cause. Moreover there were a variety of other 
operations, which, though none of them individually would have 
imposed any great strain, are important nerertheless for their 
range and for the connection which they show between British 
foreign policy and finance under the Whigs and the administration 
of India,
Taken together the extent of these operations is truly re­
markable: the Government of India at one time or another during
Auckland*s administration was engaged in activities over a vast 
area stretching from the East Coast of Africa to the China seas.
The Euphrates expedition, the maintenance of a flotilla in the 
Persian Gulf, the occupation of Aden inl^39 and of Karrak in the 
same year, the maintenance of diplomatic representation in Persia
1Hansard, 3S, LXI, 1177-78, Sir Robert Peel, 23 March 1842,
House of Commons, "that in 1836 you began with a great surplus 
^Ehe budget of 1835 had been Peel'sJ^ ; that in l8*fl you had a 
great deficit; that in 1836 you found a surplus of 1 ,300,000 £ 
at least ,., by l84l, a deficit of 2,^00,000 £; that the Indian 
Government were now raising 2,000,000 at 3 per cent,"
2ibid., Il80,
and the Gulf states, the despatch of missions or agents to 
Central Asia and even to the kingdom of Shoa in Abyssinia were all 
undertaken at Indian expense. In 1838 the Government of India be­
came involved in war in Afghanistan, and in the following year in 
a war with China while hostilities with the neighbouring states 
of Nepal, Burma and the Punjab were seriously discussed in the 
private correspondence between the President and the Governor 
General.
The connection between the Foreign and Financial policy of 
the Whig Government in England and that of India is most clearly 
apparent in the case of the war with China. Here Auckland was 
first informed privately of the Cabinet's decision to open hosti­
lities with the Chinese Empire, and subsequently, to exert him­
self to the fullest extent to insure that H.M. *s instructions to 
Rear Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland were carried into effect.'*’
This meant that India had to advance a large part of the resources 
for the conduct of the war, it being intended that Chha, when de­
feated, should repay the outlay by way of an indemnity. In tell­
ing Auckland of the proposed method of reimbursement Hobhouse 
had to add that Baring would not consent to burden his budget for
p
the year 18^0 by more than £100,000. That is to say that for a
^Home Misc., 839* 2.26, Hobhouse to Auckland, 16 October 1839.
^/P&S/3/5A? Secret Despatch of b November 1839.
wax decided upon by his own Whig Cabinet the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, already struggling under a crushing budgetary 
deficit, required, with what appears to be Whig self-righteousness, 
that for any expenditure over and above £100,000 India should be 
called upon to make the necessary advance.
In the links between the foreign policy of Britain and the 
Government of India there were obviously a number parliamentary, 
strategic, diplomatic. But as in the case of the China War, the 
most powerful - and to this the parliamentary is closely related - 
was the financial. Thus in order to continue the Euphrates expedition, 
finally abandoned in 1837, Hobhouse had to turn to the Company for 
additional support for a policy which though it had immediate 
reference to the ambitious designs of the Pasha of Egypt "ulti­
mately", so Hobhouse frankly averred, regarded those of the Enperor 
of Russia.’*' Moreover, since the subterfuge of using Indian and 
British money for the pursuit of an essentially political object­
ive still left Parliaments original intention of providing for a 
steam connection with India unfulfilled, Hobhouse turned for a
second time to the Company and attempted to have it put up the
2
whole amount required for a line east of Suez. The conversion
~*~Home Misc.. 833* 38, Hobhouse to W.S.Clarke and J.R.Carnac,
13 February 1836.
2
Home Misc., 833* 30, Hobhouse to Carnac, 21 June 1836.
The Conpany however held fast to the principle of an equal division 
of costs and this was the basis for the agreement reached in 1837. 
See Home Misc., 838, 11, Hobhouse to Auckland, 1 April 1837
"the assent of the Court was handed to me today".
of the Indian navy into a steam flotilla and its use in the
Persian Gulf and the Red Sea can be seen as largely adjunct
to Palmerston’s active policy in the Middle East, his resistance
to the advance of Mehmet Ali in these regions.^" Something of
the torturousness of the attempt to impose Ministerial policies
on an unwilling Direction which regarded itself as the guardian
of the Indian finances is apparent from Hobhouse*s letter to the
commander of the Mesopotamian squadron: nI will do what I can
to prevent the little squadron being subject to any orders that
may tend to embarrass the service. But it is not easy to remove
entirely the control of the Indian governments from the operations
of the Mesopotamian steamers, and even the Court of Directors
2
would perhaps be jealous of such interference.*1
Whatever the arguments put forth in defense of charging 
these numerous operations to the Indian finances, and a number 
of arguments were put forth, the determining factor in so doing 
seems to have been the inability or the unwillingness of the 
Whigs to obtain the necessaiy funds from Parliament. The costs of 
the Persian Mission had of course long been borne by India but
1In the beginning of 1833 the number of steam vessels in India was 
eleven, six sea vessels and five river craft. By the end of Hob- 
house* s first term in office that number had been increased to 
thirty one, fourteen sea vessels, thirteen for river service and 
four fit for service on both. The Indian navy was used in the China 
campaign, and in the occupation of Karrak and Aden among numerous 
other duties, many of which were also auxilliary to Palmerston’s 
foreign policy. See L/P&S/^IO,pB3l,Memorandum of Thomas Love Pea- 
^cock, August l84l.
Home Misc., 839* 2^3» Hobhouse to Colonel Taylor, 4 December 1839.
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when Palmerston proposed to Hobhouse a project by which the Company 
should contribute £30,000 a year to enable an efficient military 
force along Western lines to be organized in Persia he frankly 
stated his unwillingness to apply to Parliament for it, one con­
sideration being that "for such a vote the reasons on account of 
which it would be proposed must be stated in detail11.'*’ Similarly 
M.E.Yapp finds in the Cabinet*s decision, when faced with the 
Shah*s advance oh Herat, to recommend that the Governor General 
should take in Afghanistan rather than Persia the possibility
that they were motivated in part by the view that action in Persia
2might entail a charge upon Great Britain. But aside from the 
major crises involving Mehmet Ali or the Shah, even the payment 
by India for thejmission to Shoa, or the proposal that &he stould 
assume the burden of founding a naval base on ihe Western side
3
of the Red Sea so as to forestall the Frenctr must be seen as the 
result of the chronic state of British finances in the latter years 
of Melbourne's Ministry and of the disinclination of the Ministry 
to approach Parliament for further support for Palmerston's policy, 
a policy which was itself responsible so largely for these finan­
cial difficulties..
~*~Home Misc.» 8331 186-87, Palmerston to Hobhouse, 23 May 1836.
2Yapp, p.227.
3
To the President's preliminary enquiries, the Chairman responded 
"Mr. Bayley can scarcely venture to offer any ppinion upon the 
subject further than to suggest that the Eastern Coedb of Africa
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The view that emerges of the connection between the liberal
foreign policy of Lord Palmerston and the Whigs and the state of
British and Indian finances, witlyall its repercussions on other
branches of administration,is admittedly an unfavourable one*
Nevertheless it b  the view taken by Sir Robert Peel at the time
and that which Peel's greatest pupil in the field of financial
adninistration took into the politics of the second half of the
nineteenth centuiy.'*' During the debates on the India Bill of
1858 it was Gladstone who procured the introduction of a clause
which prohibited the use of the Indian army outside India without
the permission of Parliament, to provide, as he said privately,
11 standing-ground from which a control might be exercised on future 
2
Palmers tons”.
In two areas connected with finance and foreign policy 
Auckland, notwithstanding his declared preference for caution 
and the ’’gradual11 introduction of changes, was primarily responsible, 
along with Hobhouse, for the pursuance of policies which had a 
great and unsettling effect on Indian society, namely those on the 
resumption of rent free tenure and towards the native states.
would seem to be rather beyond the sphere of the Indian government; 
and that the objections which have alresdy been taken to the occupancy 
of Aden might apply with, at least, equal force, to any attempt at 
forming a settlement in Africa". Home Misc.. 836, 1^3, W.B.Bayley
to Hobhouse, 1 July 184-0. The Court had objected to the occupation 
of Aden but as instructions dealing with the subject were sent out 
through the Secret Committee they were not a party to it.
^See M.R.D.Fobt and J.L.Hammond, Gladstone and Liberalism, p.77.
For Gladstone's development of this theme at the time of the second 
Afghan War, see below, p. ^ £ 3
Little improvement in the revenue from sources other than 
the land could he depended upon during Auckland's administration 
and indeed throughout the years under review. It was from the 
land, by increased collections of revenue, by the Government's 
resumption of rent free and other tenures, and by the addition 
of new territories that the largest part of the increase came.^
On the progress of resumption policy in particular it appears 
possible to indicate something of the importance of the relation­
ship between Hobhouse and Auckland especially of the importance of 
their private correspondence.
Auckland's administration saw a virtual revolution in the 
application of resumption proceedings, with his arrival "re­
sumption which had moved at a snail's pace under Bentinck,
2
began almost to gallop". Under Auckland "views which had remained 
dormant in the past few years began to reassert themselves...
A change of personality at the helm of affairs in India and also
at the Board of Control seems to have given them the necessary
3
opportunity". The, Court as a body were opposed to this policy
J. C. Melvill gave the improvement in revenue between 1833/3^ 
and 1850/51 as £7 ,519,716 of which £/f, 288,963 came from the 
land, see P.P. 1852-53« XXVIII, 8198-9. Opium, the other source 
of considerable increase, was always a fluctuating and uncertain 
quantity particularly in Auckland's time when war actually broke 
out with China, the largest consumer of Indian opium.





and they sent out a number of despatches voicing their dis­
pleasure with and opposition to it. Moreover various revenue 
officers and even members of Auckland*s Council expressed dis­
quiet and compromise schemes were proposed to lessen the harshness 
of the proceedings. Nevertheless resumption was persisted in
1without let-up until almost the end of Auckland*s administration.
The question arises how it was that Auckland was able to 
disregard theofficial correspondence on resumption proceedings, 
particularly in view of his compliance with the warning issued 
over the style of legislation which was expected and also as re­
gards his general desire to act in conformity with the wishes of
2
the home authorities particularly as regards revenue matters.
The answer seems to emerge not from any particular official despatch
\
but rather from the whole context of the private correspondence 
of the Governor General with the President of the Board, From 
1836 onwards if not before Hobhouse was fully cognizant of the 
policy which would be pursued under Auckland: "The population will
■^ See ibid., pp. 226-7.
H. Prinsep, Three Generations» pp. 23^-3> referring to Auckland’s 
hesitating adoption of a financial measure ,which he suggested 
to the Governor General,draws a picture of the latter*s almost 
abject "anxiety as to the judgement that would be passed upon 
it by the authorities in England."
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long feel uneasiness within the border of the perpetual settle­
ment under the necessary operation of the resumption laws ...
and I am most anxious in some districts, by a temporary in-
1
crease of establishment to advance our proceedings1’. For his
part Hobhouse never questioned the propriety of the proceedings
notwithstanding the official despatches and only sounded a
2
cautionary note when the matter was raised in Parliament, by
which time the bulk of resumptions had: been got through. If
then Auckland’s policy.on resumptions did constitute a major
departure from previous administrative practice he was clearly
disobeying the order on ’’previous concurrance” of the legis-i
lative despatch of April Ik 1836 unless that order be taken to
3
mean Hobhouse*s concurrance alone.
Home Misc., §37, l69i Auckland to Hobhouse, 26 August 1836.
With respect to political ’’principle" it is significant that 
as a partial justification Auckland proceeds to use the Radical 
argument "we are endeavouring however to lighten the effect of 
these in favour of the ancient occupier against the zamindari 
legal claimant11. Moore. p.l80, in the section dealing with 
lands tenures and revenue settlement, refers to Sir Charles 
Wood’s "Whiggish conviction of the importance of the landlord 
class in society". Assuming that Auckland as a Whig shared 
this conviction the principle can be seen to have carried no 
weight with him over the resumption proceedings.
See Wahiduzzaman. pp. ^39 & ¥f3. Regarding his tacit agreement 
with Auckland’s policy it is significant that Hobhouse supported 
him over the need for "a temporary increase of establishment to 
advance our proceedings", see Home Misc.. 838, *f, Hobhouse to
Auckland, 29 March 1837.
3
Over the *lated question of the revenue settlement of the Ceded 
and Conquered Territories this seems to have been somewhat the 
case, for Hobhouse told Auckland "It is probable that the majority
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Some of the features that are characteristic of the course 
of resumption policy during Auckland’s time are also apparent 
in the conduct of policy towards the mtive states. Foremost is 
the complementary character of the convictions of the Governor 
General and the President of the Board in the pursuit of a funda­
mentally interventionist policy. The difference of views between 
Grant and his Board on the one hand and Lord William Bentinck 
and the Court on the other had prevented the inauguration of any 
very vigorous policy, particularly towards Oudh, under the pre­
vious Whig government. It was during Auckland’s administration 
that the necessary conjunction occurred, that the policy which was 
to emerge as a frankly annexationist one in the time of Lord Dal- 
housie first manifested itself.
It is apparent from Hobhouse’s margin notes upon the drafts
   1 ...........................
and pre-corns xn the political department that months before
Auckland ever set foot in India the President had begun to ex­
press himself most forcefully in favour of intervention. In Sept­
ember 1835» lor example, Hobhouse noted on a memorandum upon the 
tributary states of Rajputana, ’’my conviction is that sooner or
2
later all these states must be subjected to British authority”.
of the Court will disagree with me - and that I shall be obliged 
to have recourse to the legal powers of the Board, in order to 
send out such a despatch, as will, I think meet with your views...
I think it is veryprobable that by the time you receive our des­
patch you will have taken some decisive step - So much the better 
if that step be in the right direction.” Home Misc., 837, 262,
23 February 183?.
^Unhappily this set, L/P&S/2/3 seq.,is unique for our period because 
those in other departments were disposed of when the Government was
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Even earlier he had expressed himself against the apparently
successful "experiment11 of subjecting the son of the deposed
Rajah of Cutch to the tutelage of the Resident, the type of
approach which Bentinck had favoured: "If Colonel Pottinger
had been a different man the result might have been different"'*'
Hobhouse remarked negatively. Elsewhere he entirely agrees with
the opinion of a clerk of the Board that allowing the new Nizam
to assume the whole civil administration of his state, Hyderabad, 
2
was premature, a view which the Court had successfully con­
tested in 1831.
The results of the newstate of things were not immediate.
In his first letter from India Auckland observed that "Oude is 
very much as it was" but he added "it would seem but ill to 
accord with the present just and moderate policyof India, sooner
to interfere with a stronger hand than that which is now held 
3
over him". Later that year he assured the Chairman that the 
Home Governments orders of March 1836, confirming the exten­
sion of a further trial to the King would be "followed almost to
transferred to the Crown in 1858.
P&S/2/67. Note enclosure prior to page one.
^L/P&S/2/$5i Note enclosed prior to page one.
^L/PScS/2/63, Note enclosed between pp. 606 and 607.
the letter"However the death of the King in the following year 
provided the opportunity for the pursuit of a distinctly different 
approach, one which raises the question of whether Auckland had a 
preconceived view on policy towards Oudh. The Resident, Colonel 
Low, was able to place before the heir a treaty which provided 
for the assumption of the administration of any province in the 
event of flagrant misgovernment and, what was a new departure, the 
disbanding of the present army and the substitution of a force 
commanded by British officers: "you may think I have done too
little" wrote Auckland to Hobhouse, "but it is more than some 
here have thought right"; apparently Auckland was aware of Hob- 
housed general views on the native states though neither the 
private nor the official correspondence is sufficient in itself 
to establish this. Notwithstanding the fact that Hobhouse was 
initially "as I told you, obliged to approve" of the treaty the
unanimous opposition of the Court, and quite possibly an appre-
3
hension that the case would be taken up in Parliament, obliged 
Hobhouse to agree to its cancellation, although this was to be 
left "to yourself ^Sucklan^, to be announced to the King of Oude
^Home Misc., 837, 321, Auckland to C a m e ,  20 September 1836.
^Home Misc., 84l, 112, Auckland to Hobhouse, 16 December 1837.
^See Hansard, 3S, XXXXIV, 132, House of Commons, 10 July 1838 
and ibid., 1006-7, House of Lords, 6 August 1838.
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in such a way as will maintain unimpaired your influence and
authority with himH.^
But though checked over Oudhtthe process of intervention
was soon to find expression elsewhere. The advent of war in 1838
with the consequent increase in political activity provided the
necessary stimulus and with respect to opinion in England, so
Hobhouse judged, the necessary freedom of action. Writing on
the states of Baroda and Satara Hobhouse told Auckland f,As for
the Guicower I agree with you and so does Camac; his day of
indulgence is fast passing away. I may say the same for the
Raja of Sattarah. The present crisis will permit of a decided
2
course of policy which would be inexpedient in quiet times11. 
Events proceeded apace, the Raja of Satara, who was implicated 
in a wild plot to overthrow British rile in India was deposed as 
was, though on more substantial evidence, the Raja of Kurnaul. 
Contrary to Hobhouse's expectations interested opinion in Eng­
land did become sufficiently aroused to pose problems for the
^Home Misc. t 838, 317-8, Hobhouse to Auckland, Ik April 1838.
Home Misc., 839» 59» Hobhouse to Auckland, 26 December 1838.
It appears from the correspondence of Auckland's secretary,
John Colvin, with the political agents at the native courts, 
see. Add. Mss. 37&9^% as well as the Governor General's own 
correspondence with Hobhouse that a similar process to that 
which was taking place with respect to resumption policy occurred 
here, namely, that those agents, Sutherland, Low, Fraser, Wilkin­
son, Hodgson and others who were markedly interventionist in 
their views were the ones whose opinions appear to have enjoyed 
the greatest weight at this time. That this was so appears quite 
clearly from the reaction which occured during Ellenborough's ad­
ministration, 1842-M-.
President of the Board. Hobhouse had to caution Auckland about 
the intensity of the proceedings, particularly those of the 
Madras Government: !fThey are going to work with a good deal of 
what is called ’vigour* and I now find that they have very 
nearly resolved upon dethroning the nabob of Kurnaul - about 
the same time that this had been in agitation His Highness of 
Sattarah has lost his guddee, and Maun Singh appears likely to 
undergo the same fate; and perhaps the Guicower will follow - 
each of the dethroned princes will have Vakeels in England, and 
I shall have to fight the battle of the deposers in Parliament,
I therefore lope that you will be a little more cautious in adopt­
ing such measures, and if you do adopt them at least send me over 
a defensible brief. *'^ The activities of Joseph Hume,Lord Brougham 
and others rather than any reservations pertaining to the Indian 
situation,or for that matter the resistance of the Court which
in these later cases never matched their opposition over the Oudh 
2Treaty, was clearly the President*s main worry here.
^Home Misc., 839 j 221, Hobhouse to Auckland, 4 November 1839*
^See B/243. 71-9i 224 and 234. Dissents of April 1840 and
April I84l. However over the question of resuming the Rohilla 
Jageers in the North Western Provinces strong representations 
form the Court, particularly from Neil Benjamin Edmonstone, 
succeeded inpreventing the realization of what Tucker for one 
considered a very dangerous measure. See L/P&S/2/89, letter be- 
. tween pp. 147 and l47A. But whatever the success or failure 
of the Court in impeding this process of intervention Tucker 
was sufficiently alarmed about the resumption proceedings and 
those against the native rulers to write in 1842, against the 
background of the Afghan War a long letter to thenew Governor 
General about the internal scurity of the Indian empire which he
felt was far from satisfactory. See E.P.71t Tucker to Ellenborough, 
18 March 1842.
In addition to this marked increase in intervention a step 
was taken, in 1840, of large significance for the development of 
policy towards the native states. This was the annexation of 
the petty Mahratta state of Colaba near Bombay. The moderate 
tone of Auckland's minute on the subject does not obscure the 
radical nature of this assertion of the Government’s interest in 
an annexationist policy and it makes clear Auckland's primary 
responsibility for the measure: "in causes where we are not
opposed by strong particular considerations I would not renounce 
in regard to such states the claims of the Government ... The 
Government of Bombay ^Ehen under the ex Director J.R.Camac^' 
would maintain the independence of Petty States, and so would I 
where to interfere with it would lave the character of harshness... 
but otherwise I must assert that for the general good of the empire, 
and for the general good of the population which inhabit them,
I would rather see such states under our own rule than that of 
their own chief tans". ^ It was at this time that Sir Charles Tre­
velyan made his statement before a Parliamentary committee about 
the financial advantages of bringing the "whole of India under 
our direct administration", one of which was a large annual surplus
to be laid out in making roads, bridges, penetentiaries, and public
2works of every description, and in educating the people". Supporters
^Add.Mss. 37713« f.17, Undated Minute, about August 1840. 
^P.P.l&fO, VIII, 189^ 5 .
of annexation, as was the case with resumption, were frequently 
found in the camp of those who to a greater or lesser degree 
argued for unity of administration as securing the greatest 
public good, i.e. the Utilitarian argument. Such an argument
coincided admirably with the real needs of the Government of India
%
during a Whig administration. It can be argued that the Charter 
Act, as a Whig measure, had greatly increased the need for alter­
nate sources of revenue particularlyin the minds of those who were 
associated with that act and that resumptions and annexations may 
have, to some extent, seemed to supply part of the answer. Many 
years later an ex-political agent, General Briggs, was to write 
,!I have good reason to believe that in Lord Auckland's time, 
long before the appointment of Lord Dalhousie, there was a con­
clave of Whig Ministers and magnates at Lord Lansdowne's place, 
Bowood, to discuss the policy of upholding or absorbing the 
Native States, and it was decided that we should avail ourselves 
of all opportunities of adding to our territories and revenues at 
the expense of our allies and the stipendary princes".'1’ It is 
not possible from our sources to say whether such a formal de­
cision was ever taken but it is evident that this lifelong critic 
of annexation clearly associated an annexationist policy with 
the Ministers of a particular party.
^T.E.Bell, Memoirs of General Briggs, p.277> Letter of 8 May 1872.
This chapter has been concerned in particular with the 
relationship between Lord Auckland's administration and the 
Ministry at home. A connection has emerged most clearly in 
the field of foreign affairs where to a considerable extent 
India's efforts were subsidiary to those of the British Govern­
ment. This relationship may seem less evident elsewhere, aside 
from the effect the financial consequences of an active foreign 
policy had on every branch of the administration. However the 
legislative despatch of April 1836 and the related private cor­
respondence were largely an assertion that the legislative style 
current at the time of the Great Reform Bill, the style which 
Macaulay had hitherto embodied at Calcutta, was no longer desired 
by the Ministry* for British as much as for Indian reasons. 
Moreover upon the 'Black Act', the pilgrim tax, slavery, coolie 
emigration and a number of other questions the tone and content 
of Hobhouse*s private correspondence reflected the impact of 
British politics and the strength of the Ministry at the time. 
Less easy to define has been the effect of political 'principlesI 
Certainly Auckland's conduct over resumption policy and that to­
wards the native states suggests that his moderation on legis­
lative matters and education may have been more pragmatic, more 
the result of hi,s private correspondence with Hobhouse, than the 
result of the tenets of a moderate Whig. Among other things the 
following chapter, providing as it does the contrast of the
administration of India during Peel's second Ministry, will 
make possible a clearer deliniation and evaluation of Whig 
and Conservative principles.
Chapter Five
PEACE AND CONSOLIDATION , THE CONSERVATIVE
ALTERNATIVE DURING THE MINISTRY
OF SIR ROBERT PEEL, 1841-46
The administration of India during the years 1841-46, those 
of Sir Robert Peel'B second Ministry, affords the opportunity, 
crucial for this study, of observing and analyzing the formation 
of Indian policy during an extremely important period of Conservative 
government in Britain and contrasting it with what had occurred under 
the Whigs. How much did the change from Whig to Conservative Govern­
ment at home affect the conduct of foreign and financial policy, that 
towards the native states or upon law reform? If there was a change
in the style and content of Indian government how much was this due>
to Conservative, as opposed to Whig or Radical principles of Govern­
ment, how much to personalities?
Sir Robert Peel's party had won a solid victory in the June- 
July elections of l84l and the energy with which his Government em­
barked upon its administration contrasted sharply with the feeble 
character of the last years of Lord Melbourne's Ministry. The prag­
matic program of conservative reform, the answer put forth by Peel 
and his followers to the problems of change in post-Reform Britain,
had begun to emerge during his first Ministry, had been matured 
during the long years of Opposition, and was now to be implemented 
by the most talented Ministry of the century. The greatest of 
Peel's disciples was to characterize this policy as one of "peace 
abroad, of economy, of steady resistance to abuses, and promotion 
of practical reform at home; with a disinclination to questions 
of organic change gratuitously raised".^ Peace abroad and economy 
were the foundations upon which the great fiscal reforms of this 
Government were to be based and for the success of Peel's admini­
stration it was as essential that there should be peace in Asia 
as in America or Europe. Writing to H. Goulboum, Peel's Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, J.C.Herrie6 uses the language of practical poli­
tics in presenting the relationship "The very unpalatable burthen 
of an income tax is now to be laid on property in England and Scot­
land to the extent of 3 pe* cent; but no man can shut his eyes to 
the probability that a further sacrifice in the same direction may 
hereafter (and perhaps speedily) be required. The present appearance
of Public Affairs in Europe in America and in India are sufficiently
2
menacing to warrant anxiety on that point." The consequences of
1C.S.Parker, Sir James Graham, 2, p.296, Gladstone to Graham, 2 
December 1836.
^Add. Mss. 40443, f. 144, Herries to Goulboum, 7 March 1842.
this view, held by Peel and his Cabinet, for the conduct of Indian 
administration were to be immense both during this administration
and because Gladstone would carry them into the second half of the
1
nineteenth century.
It is almost with a sense of relief that we turn from the 
papers of Hobouse to those of Peel and his Ministers, In theseA
latter the role of the Cabinet in the major decisions affecting
Indian policy emerges unambiguously. When in early l8*f3 the Prime
Minister was to assure a harassed President of the Board, who took
office after Ellenborough's departure for India, that "Everything
you have done, has been done with the full sanction and authority
2
of the whole Cabinet11 he was simply stating the truth: Peel domin­
ated the Cabinet and was in constant correspondence with every mem­
ber of it; there was no question of a Palmerston or a Russell 
going his own way. Consistent with this frank acknowledgement of 
his Ministry's responsibility for the conduct of the Indian admini­
stration is the fact that Peel spoke more frequently on Indian matters 





Add. Mss. ^0^63, f.2*f, Peel to W. Vesey Fitzgerald, 12 January
T8&
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Considering the state of Indian affairs, finance and foreign 
policy, it appeared essential to the Prime Minister that the man 
chosen for the Governor Generalship should go out "from the Councils 
of the Queen m and in full knowledge qf the views and sentiments of 
Her Government"Ellenborough who had taken up his old post at 
the Board in September of l8*fl was considered by both Peel and 
Wellington as the most capable man, not already charged with more 
important duties. Peel noted ELlenborough's tendency towards "pre­
cipitation and over activity" but supposed that his "very good and 
steady advisors", the Supreme Government, would check this. Welling­
ton’s observation that the Government of India is "the will of the 
Governor General declared in Council11 was closer the truth but his
judgement that they could rely on ELlenborough's "sound sense and 
2direction", in the position of supreme command was perhaps tempered
............................................................ 3
by the old soldier's close association with Lord Ellenborough.
The story of ELlenborough's vigorous conduct of his administration,
•'Add. Mss. 40^71, f. 37, Note by Peel, 9 October l84l.
See Add. Mss. 40459. f. 48, Peel to Wellington, 6 October l84l; 
f. go, Wellington to Peel, 7 October l8*H.
3
Ellenborough on the other hand was not particularly close to Peel 
who had established his leadership of the party subsequent to his 
association with Ellenborough. Moreover the latter regarded Welling­
ton rather than Peel as his mentor.
of his clash with the home authorities and his subsequent recall 
provides a measure of the discretion enjoyed by the Governor 
General both as regards the content and the style of his admini­
stration.
The reaction by the body of Directors to the Conservative 
victory was one of utter relief that the control of Indian affairs 
had passed from the hands of the Whigs, Tucker wrote to Ellenborough 
immediately, rejoicing at this ♦•glorious triumph of principle and 
patriotism’1 terming it second only to the "immortal victory of 
Waterloo in its influence on the destinies of this Etapire and indeed 
the civilized world",^ Sir James Law Lushington whose relations with 
Hobhouse had been quite cordial nevertheless saw fit, as the Chairman 
once again, to congratulate Ellenborough on his return to the Board
"and also upon the happy change that has taken place in the Govern-
2   . . . . .
ment generally". Ellenborough went out to India enjoying a fund /of
goodwill at the India House, "I rejoice that India is in such hands 
3
at this crisis" William Astell, senior Director and therefore almost
if
constant member of the Secret Committee, wrote to Sir Robert Peel. 
^Add. Mss. 40*f?l, f.ll, Tucker to Ellenborough, c. August lfftl.
p
Add. Mss. *f0*f71, f.l8, Lushington to Ellenborough, 3 September l8*fl.
3Add. Mss. kO507, f.191, Astell to Peel, 3 May l8*U.
4
The bias in the Court at this time towards the Conservative Ministry 
is also attested by the fact that five Directors namely John Iyall, 
J.W.Hogg, John Masterman, Patrick Vans Agnew, and Hugh Linday sat 
as Conservative M.P.s.
Astell is listed as a Protectionist but not one Director sat 
as a Whig M.P. at this time.
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Before Ellenborough left for India, months before the news of 
the disastrous retreat from Cabul reached England, the Ministry em­
barked upon that policy whose object was to secure peace in Asia as 
soon as possible. Plans were laid for the maximum exertion to be 
made to f!terminate the Chinese War in 1842”.^ A Secret Despatch 
was sent to the Government of India ordering a halt to the advance
on Herat, decided upon by Palmerston and Hobhouse,if that operation
2
had not already commenced. Even more important there were frank 
exchanges of views between Lord Aberdeen, and other Conservative 
Ministers, and Baron Brunnow the Russian Ambassador. As a result 
Brunnow in his report of 19 November l84l was able to inform his 
chief, Count Nesselrode, that it was the intention of the present 
British Government to withdraw its forces as soon as possible from 
across the Indus.^ Thus} after Ellenborough had in October of 1842 
proclaimed his ’’pacific and conservative” policy in retiring from 
Afghanistan^Brunnow was able to inform Nesselrode that this manifesto
"^See Add. Mss. 40471, £. 33, Ellenborough to Peel, 4 October l84l.
*X/P&S/5/5761 p.l88, Secret Despatch of 4 September l84l.
^Reference to this report is found in the ”Copie du D^peche du Baron 
Brunnow au Comte de Nesselrode” of the 30 November 1842 enclosed in 
Brunnow1 s letter to Ellenborough of 2 January 1843, E.P. 37. On 
this and supporting evidence, see Add. Mss. 43198, f. 26, Ellen­
borough to Aberdeen, 6 October l84l, we are forced to contest Dr.
Yapp’s statement, op.cit., p.421, that ’’Ellenborough was committed 
to no policy on his arrival in India” and to his contention that the 
Peel Government had no ’’constructive policy” on Afghanistan, see p.428.
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realized ,!la sage intention que Sir Robert Peel ainsi que Lord 
Aberdeen m*avoient indiquees d'avance et que Lord Ellerborough 
m*avoit confiees lui-meme a la veille de se rendre a sa destination11*^
The major objectives of Indian foreign policy had, then, been 
fixed before Ellenborough left England* Moreover while the immediate 
conduct of the war in Afghanistan, and that in China, had of neces­
sity to be left to Ellenborough it is equally true that the letters 
from the Prime Minister and his colleagues constantly reiterated 
the general position originally decided upon by the Cabinet. Thus 
when commenting on the disaster at Cabul Peel assured Ellenborough 
that the Government was fully sensible to the necessity of extending 
him f,full liberty of action11 he also added, MIt will probably be neces­
sary to take some decisive measures for the purpose of retrieving our 
Military credit ... But we shall lose nothing ultimately ty acting
cautiously and deliberately by securing ourselves against the risk
2
of even greater disasters in Hindoostan". Similarly with respect 
to China Fitzgerald in his first letter to Ellenborough wrote that 
the Cabinet were t(looking anxiously for news from China; but I ex­
pect no results ... until you have directed the operations which were 
decided on when you were here in England11. At the same time Fitz­
gerald expressed the hope r,that some of your embarrassments will be
^ftCopie du Depeche11, op.cit.
2Add. Mss. WV71, f. 179, 6 April lf&2.
diminished by the completion of the Persian Treaty*”^ which had been 
discussed between the Cabinet and the Russian ambassador when Ellen­
borough was still at the Board.
The coming to power in England of a Conservative Government in 
184-1 can now be seen to have had a crucial effect on the conduct of 
Indian foreign policy. The relatively small repercussions on Indian 
administration which resulted from the difference of approach between 
Whig and Conservative to British foreign policy in the immediate post 
charter period were thus indications of a difference the result of 
which for India was enormous.
The results of the “pacific and conservative11 policy pursued 
during the years of Peel's second Ministry are best given in the words 
of those whose efforts it superseded. Hobhouse writing to Palmerston 
after their return to office in 184-6 observed that the general course 
of action in all that regarded the"ftestward policy" of the Government 
of India had been entirely changed: "Our former operations on the
Mesopotamian rivers had all been given up, and the last steamer sent 
back to Bombay. Baghdad had been entirely left to its fate; the little 
squadron in the Persian Gulf reduced to one brig, or no pennant at 
all; the expedition to Abyssinia /Shoa? and the project for founding 
a station on the Western mouth of the Red Sea altogether abandoned.
^E.P. 42, Fitzgerald to Ellenborough, 4- January 1842.
And these submissions together with the restoration of Dost Mohammad 
of Cabul had given a new character to the policy of Great Britain in 
Central Asia. The conquest and annexation of Scinde might have done 
something in the old direction, but this measure was notoriously dis­
approved of by the Home Government".^ Much of the credit for this 
achievement must go to the energetic and courageous manner in which 
ELlenborough executed it but the fact remains that the policy was set 
on foot before he arrived in India.
The conquest of the Sind, running contrary as it did to the 
general line of policy expected of ELlenborough, was of crucial im­
portance in the relations between ELlenborough, the Directors and the 
Ministry. It is characteristic of this relationship that its main 
assumptions appear to be implicit and that their explicit statement 
was usually a result of some friction or crisis within this system. 
Wellington wrote to warn ELlenborough that "the cabinet is not satis­
fied with your having left the question of Peace or War with the 
Ameers, and all the consequences, so entirely to the decision of Sir 
Charles Napier" and he went on to stress the international implica­
tions of the action in Sind "Some twenty years ago such an action 
as this would have been merely local. The Government would have had 
no occasion to take cognizance of it ... But at this moment in
^Home Misc. pp. 100-01, Hobhouse to Palmerston, 3 April l#f7.
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particular everything that occurs in that part of the world is of 
importance and becomes an Imperial Question11 Peel who had to de** 
fend the action in Parliament reminded ELlenborough that "every act 
of the Government of India11 was becoming increasingly subject to 
"Parliamentary scrutiny". Both as regards British foreign policy 
and domestic policy the conquest of the Sind and the treatment of 
the Amirs was the business of the Ministry, not merely of the Court 
of Directors and the President of the Board. Thus despite Ellen- 
borough*s desire for a speedy confirmation of what had been done the 
matter continued to be discussed throughout 18^3 and the sanction 
of the home authorities was not sent out until the end of that year. 
"Considering the consequences involved in a decision" Peel frankly 
told the Governor General "the immediate unhesitating approval and
confirmation of everything that was done could hardly have been ex-
3 ................................
pected". As Gladstone noted, the Cabinet had at length decided
"to acquiesce in the annexation of Scinde not (as Peel said) satis-
factory but as having no other alternative".
•‘‘Add. Mss. k0k63, ff. 279 & 28l, U February 18^3.
; p
E.P.37. Peel to ELlenborough, 6 June 184-3.
^Add. Mss. 40472, f.120, Peel to Ellenborough, 2 January 1844-.
L.





Unable to control events in Sind owing to their swift and un­
foreseen nature the Ministry did not intend that anything similar 
should happen with, since Ranjit Singh*s death, the increasingly 
turbulent kingdom of the Sikhs. lfThe Punjab is an alarming chapter; 
a formidable relic of the Afghan War” Eipon observed while the trans­
actions in Sind were under consideration by the Ministry, tfLet us 
know all that goes on there: but keep us out of it".^ The signi­
ficance of the Punjab for British foreign policy was more pronounced 
than that of the Sind and before Ellenborough left India Peel had 
written to him of the Russian monarch's strong desire that no cir­
cumstances should occur which would necessitate British intervention 
2
there. The fact that there was no official despatch strictly
forbidding such intervention though Ellenborough understood that
3
!,the Punjab was to X?e forbidden fruit" is yet another comment on 
the nature of the relationship between the authorities at home and 
the Governor General.
^E.P.*f2. Ripon to Ellenborough, 6 July 18^3•
2Add. Mss. f. 208, Peel to Ellenborough, 7 June l8¥f. The
Tsar was at this time paying a royal visit to Windsor where he 
and Peel discussed questions, the Punjab among them, of mutual 
concern.
^Add. Mss. f. 1**3» Hardinge to Peel, 1 August l8 f^ . Of the
greater discretion over the Punjab allowed to his successor, as a 
consequence of Hardinge'is greater devotion to the line set down 
from his home, Ellenborough commented "They would let you eat what 
they would not let me touch". E.P. 21/7, Ellenborough to Hardinge,
3 April 18^5.
The view taken by Peel's government of the relationship 
between Indian finances and British, a view which was a complete 
contrast with that assumed by the Whigs in the previous decade, was 
stated by the man who took Peel's principles of finance into the 
second half of the nineteenth century, W.E. Gladstone, in one of his 
Midlothian speeches. Condemning the military expense incurred by 
India during Disraeli's second Ministry Gladstone reminded his audience 
that "Sir Robert Peel, in 1842, with great sagacity, repudiated the 
idea that the British taxpayer and the British citizen had no in­
terest in the state of the Indian account."^" Peel had, when pro­
posing :his income tax measure in 1842, cited among other causes
of Britain's deficit the war in China and that to the west of the
2
Indus and he warned the Commons "that ere long your credit might
be required to be brought in aid of Indian credit, should any great
3
reverses or difficulties arise". Peel then was asserting that Par­
liament had a direct financial interest in the maintenance of peace 
in the East; a stronger case for a pacific foreign policy on the 
part of the Government of India could not have been made.
The immediate task of the Ministry as regarded Indian finances 
was to relieve the pressure on the depleted home treasury. Though
1W.E.Gladstone, Midlothian Speeches, ed. M.R.D. Foot, p. 143.
p
Hansard, 3S, LXI, ll80, House of Commons, 23 March 1843, see 
also ibid., 468, 11 March 1842.
3ibid., 1178, 23 March l8kZ.
Peel certainly was inclined to respond to the Court’s plea for
help their contention that the British exchequer should bear some
part of the cost of the Afghan War went past what was feasible
with respect to British politics at the time for as Fitzgerald
had to tell Ellenborough as well as the Directors f,no Government
in England will come to the relief of India, till the day arrives
1
when it can no longer withold it11* What Peel could propose in
Parliament, and shortly afterwards affect, was the repayment '
of the advances made by the Company on account of the China war
and in addition an advance on account for future expenditure by
2
the Government of India for the pursuit of that war. This 
measure was successful in averting a crisis in the Company’s home 
finances.
Beside the immediate relief over the costs of the China war
Peel’s Government afforded to Indian finances the great blessing of
a constant insistence upon and support for the attainment and main-
tenance of peace in the East. "You take the 'first effective step
towards the reduction of expenditure by confining the operations of
3
our army within our own frontier” Fitzgerald was soon to observe.
^See ibid., 11?8 and E.P.42, Fitzgerald to Ellenborough, 2 April 
1842; for Fitzgerald's letter to the Chairmen see E/2/L7« p*391,
25 May 1842.
2
See Hansard, LXIII, 1020, Sir Robert Peel, House of Commons, 21 
May 1842,' and Add. Mss. 40444. ff. 28-29, Memorandum by H. Goulboum, 
December 1842. The payments amounted to £800,000.
^E.P.42« Fitzgerald to Ellenborough, 6 July 1842
As has been observed this impetus from home applied even to such 
minutiae as representation at Baghdad and the Shoa mission* The 
Secret Despatch on Indian finances of 4 July 1842 conveyed the ex­
pectation that the "expense of the Shoa mission will, we trust, 
shortly cease; and we perceive that your attention has been directed 
to the steam flotilla on the Euphrates11.'1'
Congratulating Ellenborough\pon the cessation of hostilities
in Afghanistan and China Peel added his hope that this would "leave
you at full liberty to establish those reforms in the Civil and
Financial Government of India without which victories in the field
2would be fruitless". Peel had cited Ellenborough's determination 
to control expense and put the revenues of India on a sound footing 
as one of the major considerations in his appointment and Ellenborough 
in India like the Ministry at hogie sought to give that charity and 
firmness of financial control that had been lacking under the pre­
vious administration. His major reform in this respect was to consti­
tutors a separate off£r the Finance Department of the Government of 
India, his original intention being "to make every new demand pass 
through the ordeal of the Financial Department before it could be 
submitted to Council, as in England all new charges must go through
1See L/P&S/5/55k. para. 7.
^Add. Mss. 40^71, f.262, Peel to Ellenborough, 5 December l8te.
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the Treasury11.^ In his financial reforms Ellenborough enjoyed constant
support from home. When by his resolution of 23 June l8*f2 Ellen
borough had announced his intentiai to appoint a Committee of Finance
to review expenditure in Bengal and the North West Provinces the Court
understandably protested against the prospect of yet another round
of retrenchment in their civil administration. Fitzgerald, however,
refused to sanction any despatch which did not approve of the appoint-
2
ment of the committee.
In the two and a half years of his Governor Generalship Ellen­
borough succeeded in retrieving the finances of India from the peril­
ous condition in which he had found them. The deficit which stood 
a £1*771, 000 in X&Vl/bZ was reduced to £?V5,000 by lWt/5 ,3 while 
the discount upon Government securities which stood at 161/ 2 per
cent when he assumed the administration had been reduced almost to
u
par by the time he quit India. By September of 18^3 Ellenborough 
was optimistic enough to predict in a letter to Peel that a surplus
5
could be achieved in the following financial year.
^E.P.8*f« Ellenborough to J.A.Dorin, 2 August 18^3* By a resolution of 
November l8*f2 Ellenborough appointed Mr* Dorin Secretary of the 
finance department.
See E.P.*f2. Fitzgerald to Ellenborough, 3 December 18^2.
^See P.P. 1832. X, Appendix, pp. 278-9.
L
K.I.Garrett, Lord Ellenborough* s Ideas on Indian Policy, London,
M.A., 1935*
^Add. Mss. 40*f72, f.33» Ellenborough to Peel, 21 September 18^3.
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The reversal of the Government of India's foreign policy was 
accompanied by a reversal in that pursued towards the native states.
At the Board of Control the critical position taken towards inter­
vention by Conservatives while in Opposition was now maintained in 
office and the margin notes made by Fitzgerald and his subordinates 
on the political drafts and pre-coms are in complete contrast with 
those of Hobhouse. References to the feelings and sympathies of In­
dians for their native rulers, to "persons of influence and respect­
ability" replace the frequent condemnations of existing conditions and 
relations so characteristic of Hobhouse's notes. One eloquent ex­
pression of this difference is given in the note of Fitzgerald's 
private secretaxy, A. Gordon, upon Colonel Sutherland's measure, 
in the Rajput state of Alwar, of replacing the hereditary servants 
of the prince with Company's native officers: "Now this is precisely
what we did everywhere. We displaced all the old the hereditary ser­
vants of the states and put in our Baboos who very soon planted their 
friends - and this caused rebellion in many places - and all our old 
servants declared it was no wonder".^ There is in this note an ex­
pression of a different appreciation of Indian society from that 
which prevailed during the previous decade of Whig Government. The 
available evidence suggests that it was among Conservatives rather than
1EA/773. 736, :*« 
March (Mo. k) 1&*3
.'Pencil note on Political. Despatch to India, 1
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Whig statesmen that there was a strong concern for the traditional
fabric of Indian society, and this includes the idea of "the im-
portance of the landlord class in society"."^
As a solution to the problem of relations between the Supreme
Government and the native states annexation was particular re-
pellant to Fitzgerald and his successor Ripon. Referring to the
case of Colaba, whose annexation was still awaiting the approval
of the home authorities Fitzgerald observed "can anything be more
likely to interfere with the opinion entertained of our generosity,
or our justice, than our thus grasping at every tenure, or territory,
2
which may lapse?", this was a far cry from Auckland*s declared view
though in the event both the annexation of Colaba and the deposition
of the Raja of Satara had to be confirmed because neither could be 
conveniently undone both for reasons of Indian policy or British poli­
tics.^ But aside from such inherited cases the tenor of the official as 
well as the private correspondence was against intervention and annexation 
and the despatch sent out over the case of the succession to the petty 
Rajput state of Kishangarh was more characteristic of the new approach 
Although the proof that the Ranee of Kishengurh had been authorized by 
her deceased husband to adopt a son, was imperfect "the adoption
"Ssee Moorg, p.l80.
2
E.P. 42, Fitzgerald to Ellenborough, 2 April 1842.
^See E.P. 42, Fitzgerald to Ellenborough, 4 August 1842.
was approved and supported by all the chiefs except those who were 
personally interested in opposing it, and we therefore approve the 
recognition of the adopted h e i r . M o r e  conclusive even were the 
transactions over the state of Gwalior with whom the Government of 
India was at length forced into hostilities as a result of the un­
controlled condition of the country after the death of Jankoji Rao 
in 18V3. Here was a prima facie case for annexation had either the
home authorities or Ellenborough wished it but such a course was never
2
contemplated by either. Instead after hostilities had been concluded 
Ellenborough imposed a treaty whereby a council or regency, and other 
administrative reforms, were instituted which ensured the stability 
of the state until the majority of the Maharajah in 1833*
While the general line of policy Ellenborough pursued towards 
the native states, a reversal of that pursued under the Whigs, was 
what was desired by the authorities at home in manner and detail he 
frequently exceeded what was acceptable. Certainly the Court and 
Ellenborough's Cabinet colleagues shared his view that it was necessary 
to remove "from the minds of our allies and neighbours the apprehension 
that we desire further aggrandisement". The circular letter he issued
^EA/773. 733, Political Despatch to India, 1 March (No. *0 l8*f3.
p
See E.P. te, Ripon to Ellenborough, k January l8Mf and Ripon to Ellen­
borough, 6 March lWf, "I trust you will have found yourself in a con­
dition to deal with the enemy on moderate principles ... your former 
letters showed that you were as forbearing as possible". Here again 
what was expected of Ellenborough over Gwalior emerged not through 
single official despatches but in the context of a correspondence which 
began when the question of the Gwalior succession was raised in early 
18^3, see E.P. 77, Ellenborough to Ripon, 19 February l8*f3«
^E.P. 102, Ellenborough to the Secret Committee, 30 April l8*f2, enclosing 
his circular letter of 26 April l8**2 to the political agents.
260
to the political agents instructing them "You will distinctly under­
stand that the further extension of our dominion forms no part of the 
policy of the British Governmentt that it is desirous on all occasions 
of respecting the independence of the native states*' indeed amounted 
to a striking assertion that the policy pursued under Hobouse and 
Auckland was to be reversed and Fitzgerald told Ellenborough that he 
"read with no little pleasure your instructions to the Political agents".^- 
The fact that the Governor General subsequently made the contents of 
his circular known to the princes themselves was, however, objected 
to as it militated against the illusion of continuity in the conduct 
of the Supreme Government. Moreover Ellenborough's harsh treatment 
of individual political agents such as Hodgson in Nepal and Blundell 
in Tenasserim, or indeed the whole European civil establishment in 
the Saugur territories after a serious insurrection there, could not 
but have been resented by the Directors who were responsible for the 
original appointment of these men.
The most striking example of Ellenborough's radical approach 
was undoubtedly his proposal, made directly to the Queen, rather than 
through the Prime Minister, that the sovereign should become the nominal 
head of the Indian Etapire thus making the native chiefs her feudatories. 
Peel juj^ ged this suggestion to be profoundly inappropriate and refused 
even to consider it until "brought before me in the regular and con-
p
stitutional manner". Whether or not such a measure would have served 
'lE.P. *f2, k August l#f2.
2Add. Mss. J+0*f71, f.293, Peel to Ellenborough, 6 April l8^3«
to reassure the princes about their relationship with tie Government 
of India was not the decisive consideration for Peel who had to deal 
with the realities of British politics and from that point of view 
Ellenborough's idea was three decades in advance of his time^for it 
was not until l8?7 that the Queen was proclaimed Empress of India.
There was in Ellenborough's manner towards the princes a ten­
dency not merely to reassure, which the authorities at home desired, 
but to over-awe the princes, an inclination greatly exacerbated by 
his conviction of the gravity of the situation on his arrival in India. 
"We have", he wrote to Fitzgerald, "to fight for Empire and even now 
almost for existance in India - I feel this but hardly anyone else 
does".^ It was his conception of the gravity of the situation which 
led him to deport certain of the Amirs of Sind and their families, in 
other circumstances he observed "clemency ... might have been possible" 
and it was these proceedings, rather than the actual conquest of the 
country which drewfrom the Court their resolution of August 29 l8*f3 
condemning his conduct as "unjust and impolitic".
The attitude towards the conduct of law reform and legislation 
at the Board during Peel's second administration can be summed up 
in the phrase used as part of the characterisation employed for the 
whole administration, that is a preference for practical reform and
1E.P. 77, 5 April l&te.
2
A. Imlah, Lord Ellenborough. p.l*fl.
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an aversion to questions of organic reform gratuitously raised.
If during Hobhouse's administration of Indian affairs at home 
there had been no encouragement given to the work of the Law Com­
mission comparable to what had been extended during ; Grant1 s Presi­
dency the existence and ultimate purpose of that body and its ap­
proach to law reform had never been explicitly raised, even less 
bad that of the Law Member of Council. With the advent of the Con­
servatives they were. By the close of 1842 Fitzgerald was writing 
to Peel flIf Lord Ellenborough approves of it, as I know he is sure 
to, I shall have a Bill ... to repeal so much of the Charter Act, 
as created this job for Mr. Macaulay”.1 Those Directors
critical of systematic codification now felt the time appropriate 
to express themselves. Fitzgerald, writing to Ellenborough about 
the Law Member's position added "they propose also, and I believe 
they are quite right, to dispense hereafter with the Law Commission,
I was the first suggester to Sir James Lushing ton that these as well 
as other reductions might be effected ... • The saving would amount
to £35%000 per annum, and ... we ought to make the reduction if with-
2
out prejudice to the public interest it can be done."
^Add. Mss. 40462, f. 335% Fitzgerald to Peel, 25 December 1842.
^E.P. 42, Fitzgerald to Ellenborough, 4 January 1843 (mis-dated in 
the manuscript 1842). Fitzgerald enclosed the letter from the Chair­
man of 13 December 1842 as well as a letter in the same vein from 
Tucker.
Had these offices in fact been abolished the style, content 
and evolution of law reform in India >must have been profoundly 
changed. But agreed though the home authorities and the Governor 
General initially were on the desirability of abolishing the Law 
Commission and the position of Fourth Member of Council this aim was 
not realized. In the course of 1843 a complete about face was exe­
cuted by the Home Government on the matter. By their legislative 
despatch of 1 March 1843 the Court observed that the receipt of Mr. 
Amos's letter of resignation provided a fitting opportunity for the re­
consideration of the constitution of these offices with a view to 
take measures "for the discontinuance of both" and they called for 
opinions from the Government of India. After once more intimating 
that they wished the opinions of the Government, this time specifi­
cally Ellenborough's Councillors, the Court with the Board's sanction 
sent out a despatch giving their conclusion that the Fourth Member
could not be dispensed with and in addition desiring his attendance
2
at meetings other than those for the purpose of legislation.
The esqalanation of this remarkable change of position lies in 
the increasing alarm of the home authorities at Ellenborough's auto­
cratic conduct and his disregard of the Court's representations as
^See E/4/775. 722. The account of these transactions given in P;P.
1832-53. XXVII, Appendix, pp. 53**-^ 0, omits in its mention of the 
despatch of 1 March the crucial words "for the discontinuance of 
both". Parliamentary papers during our period habitually mute evi­
dence of a difference of approach based upon party.
2See P.P. 1852-53. XXVII, 53k & 537 8. The Legislative Despatch
relations between himself and the Directors became ever more 
strained. The Court were "in constant dread of that he may do, 
without his Council" Fitzgerald told Ellenborough with respect to 
Ellenborough's protracted absence from Calcutta and his proximity 
to the distracted Sikh state. The Count were even talking of order­
ing him to return to Calcutta or desiring the Governor General to 
summon his Council in Delhi or wherever he might be.^ * It was this 
crisis of confidence which led to the reversal of the position which 
both the Court and the Board had shared a year previously.
This reversal of attitude ran counter to the change of course 
that should have followed naturally from the replacement of Mel­
bourne's Ministry by one which had no responsibility for the creation 
of either the Fourth Councillorship or the Law Commission and was 
not beholden in any way to those Radicals who championed law reform
along Benthamite lines. The appointment of Sir Lawrence Peel, a re-
2
lative of the Prime Minister to be advocate general at Calcutta 
and, subsequently, to the Chief Justiceship of the Supreme Court 
there was in itself a guarantee of an empirical approach to law reform
to India, 29 November (No. 22) 1843 desiring the retention of the 
Law Member did express the expectation that the Law Commission would 
subsequently be abolished by Act of Parliament but this was not to 
be effected.
1Add. Mss. kCM>3 f. 182, Fitzgerald to Peel, 17 March 18^3.
“Teel also offered the Director and Conservative H.P1, J.W.Hogg, 
a Privy Councillorship where as a member of the judicial committee 
of that body his services would lave been valuable in cases of appeals 
from India. As a Director however he was obliged to decline the o£er. 
see Hansard. 3S, CXXIX, 79.
for a court whose prestige had greatly increased since its nadir 
of 1832-33• Moreover A. Amos the Law Member in 1842 had never 
shown himself disposed to champion the cause of the Law Commission 
and certainly was not indisposed towards ELlenborough's stated view
that "I greatly prefer legislating bit by bit to large changes in
1the law”. Yet one of Ellenborough1 s first acts was to exclude 
Amos from all meetings of the Council except legislative. This 
consistency with the position he took in 1835 was in fact counter 
productive of the ends Ellenborough sought.
Partly owing to the strain of the burdens he had assumed, and 
also to his growing estrangement from the home authorities, Ellen­
borough displayed an increasing tendency towards changes in the in­
ternal administration of India which largely pertainted to his own 
long held views on Indian administration and went beyond what was 
desired either by the Court or the Board. An important motive for 
these innovations was Ellenborough vs preference for a semi military 
form of administration which had already manifested itself in the
1820s. 2 request for the title of Captain General of the forces
3
made before he left for India was refused by Peel. The constitu­
tional objections to such a measure were later given to Ellenborough,




See Add. Mss. 40471 f. 66, Peel to Ellenborough, 15 October l84l.
who appears to have repeated the request, by Sir James Graham.
It would, the Home Secretary told him, "impress on our Indian 
Government a stamp by no means desirable: it would be considered
the consumation of the triumph of the Military over the Civil Ser­
vice". ^ Ellenborough's bias towards this form cf administration 
also found expression in the formation, early in 18^3, of units 
of military police in the Saugor and Nerbudda territories and sub­
sequently in his order for the extension of the system in the North 
Western Provinces. Ripon who was later to tell Peel that he found 
the measure "a most extensive, or rather I should say an entire
p
change in the whole eastern of police" permitted the Court to forbid 
its extension. Ellenborough's concern that young native gentlemen, 
and noblemen, should connect themselves with the Government parti­
cularly the military service was not foreign, to conservative pater­
nal sentiment. Yet Ripon who thought the principle a good one in 
itself permitted the Court to disapprove of Ellenborough1 s initiative
in the formation of two noble corps of horse in the Governor General'
3
bodyguard. Neither did Ellenborough1 s proposal for the formation
4
of a noble college command any support from Fitzgerald or Ripon.
“4s.P. 371 Graham to Ellenborough, 1 April l8Mf.
2
Add. Mss. 4-0^ 65. f. k63. Ripon to Feel, 31 December l8¥t. and
s
^EA/775. 6CA-06, India Military Despatch, 6 September (No. 18) 18^3
Ellenborough was instructed not to fill up any vacancies in this 
'corps in the future.
4
See Garrettt pp. 279-82.
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The negation of many of Ellenborough's pet projects and 
proposals serves as an indication of the limits on the exercise 
of a personal approach within the system of Indian government.^
Admittedly the Court's response was related to their conviction that 
Ellenborough's conduct posed the question of whether or not the 
Directors were to have a place within that system. However the fact 
that Fitzgerald and Ripon were prepared to overrule the Court when
they thought necessary, as was the case over the appointment of
2
the Finance Committee, is an indication that had others of Ellen­
borough's controversial measures originated in the commonly held 
opinions on administration of his Cabinet colleagues thej: would 
have enjoyed the support of the Board. Fitzgerald's assurance 
to Peel on this point "They fihe Court^ have not objected to a single
reform which he has proposed - nor if it were a real reform would I 
* 3permit them" sums up the situation. Leaving aside the case of 
such a fait accompli as the Sind, the policies of the Governor Gener­
al had to be directed within the limits of the climate of opinion 
at home, Whig or Conservative, if they vere to receive the Home 
Government's support.
^See A. Imlah, Lord Ellenborough, pp. 22^-3. The author points out 
that Ellenborough's response to the Court's resolution condemning 
the Sind transactions as "unjust and inpolitic", and even more so 
to their criticism of his dismissals in the Saugur territories con­
stituted a virtual declaration of Independence fnm their authority.
^E.P. *f2, Fitzgerald to Ellenborough, 5 December l8*t2, had stated 
that he would "sanction no despatch which does not express approbation 
of your Finance Committee".
^Add. Mss. kQk63* ff. 218-9, Fitzgerald to Peel, 9 April 18^3.
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Ellenborough* e recall itself was the formal act of the 
Court of Directors taken in April of l8*& but the Governor General 
had by that time placed himself beyond the effective protection of 
the Ministry, Despite the increasingly critical view the Cabinet 
was taking of EUenborough*s conduct Peel had not been prepared in 
September of l8*f3 to cooperate with the Court when as a consequence© 
of the Governor General's deportation of the Amirs of Sind the 
question of recall came to a head* Indeed Peel told Ripon that he 
should place '*the whole responsibility** for any such attenpt on 
the Court* 1 When at length the Court, as a result of Ellenborough's 
refusal to communicate the reasons for the Saugur dismissals, re­
solved upon his recall the Ministry refused to have any part in the 
action* Nevertheless Peel and his colleagues found it impossible 
to effectively oppose the Court by taking the matter to Parliament 
and having their power of recall abrogated as it would have been im­
possible to have obtained a majority for Ellenborough in the Commons. 2 
It is certainly true that had Ellenborough heen recalled for having
^dd* Mss* 40^63, f. 12, Peel to RLpon, 19 September 18^3* Peel 
listed as objections to such a course the difficulty of finding 
a successor not already charged with more important duties, the 
risk of a collision of opinion between the civil and military in 
India over the justice of such a measure, and the making of Ellen­
borough a decided enemy of the Conpany;;, The Chairmen had hoped at 
this time that the Government "would take the next step and advise him", 
Ellenborough* "to resign", ibid., f.20,
2
See S. Gopal, "Lord Ellenborough and the Home Authorities*1, Indian 
Historical Records Commission Proceedings. 1953« II9 3*K
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obeyed their instructions, or indeed had not openly challenged 
the Court's authority, the Ministry would not have acquiesced in 
the Court's decision. Thus painful though that decision was it 
did not result in any cleavage between the Court and the Board, 
or the Ministry, and the Directors willingly accepted the Prime 
Minister's suggestion for a successor to Ellenborough.
Whatever the peculiarities of Ellenborough's spproach and
whatever the success or otherwise of his !lpetu projects, the fact
must not be lost sight of that in its major outlines his policy had
1
its roots in that of the Ministry at home. The speedy termination 
of the war in China and the withdrawal from Afghanistan were agreed 
objects of policed.thin the Cabinet prior to Ellenborough's depart­
ure from England and the reversal of the whole policy to the west­
ward of India, in the Persian Gulf area, in the Bed Sea and beyond, 
were as much initiatied by the Foreign Office and the Board of Con­
trol as by Ellenborougfcjhimself• The restoration of Indian finances 
from the bankrupt position the Whigs had left them in was a major 
concern of the Ministry and Ellenborough's financial ability had 
been a major reason for his appointment. Subsequently Peel, over
^Peel in fact told Ellenborough at the time of his recall "we had 
approved of your general policy", E.P. 37« Peel Jo Ellenborough,
6 May l8Mf.
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the payment of the Company's China expenses, as well as Fitzgerald 
and Ripon, afforded Ellenborough every possible support in his finan­
cial arrangemeris. The reversal of policy towards the native states, 
closely linked to the reversal in foreign policy, was likewise
firmly supported from home and it is evident that the approach of
Fitzgerald and Ripon to questions involving the native states was 
in complete contrast with that exhibited by Hobhouse, that the ad­
vent of the Conservative Ministry itself had been the determining
factor in this change of policy. Finally the attack on the Law 
Commission and the post of Law Member, the 'Macaulay job', had been 
initiated at home by a Conservative President of the Board whose 
presence was the prerequisite for the assertion of the true opinion 
of the Directors on these institutions.
The selection of Lord Hardinge for the Governor Generalship 
had to answer for a number of considerations hardly less important 
than had Ellenborough'6, certainly more discretion was demanded. 
Considering Peel's suggestion of the Secretary at War Wellington 
observed "It appears to me that this is by far the best arrange­
ment as concerns every interest - that of the Crown - of the public -
of Lord Ellenborough and of the East India Company",^ and he 
added "it will be the best proof that past policy is to be pursued11. 
Veiling ton was quite right, the fact that Hardinge was Ellenborough's 
brother in law meant that his appointment gave the least possible 
offence to the latter and the Court of Directors showed their re­
lief by making the appointment unanimously. More important Hard­
inge, a former staff officer of Wellington's during the Penin­
sular War, was, in his stout soldierly way, a devoted follower of 
Peel and sought constantly while in India to conduct his administra­
tion along lines acceptable to the Ministzy. In August of 1845 he 
could, with justice, write to his wife "One year of my Indian admini- 
stration is over to the approval of Peel and Ripon", he could have 
added to their satisfaction too. Vith Hardinge at the head of the 
Indian Government, we have the translation of the Conservative ap­
proach to government uncomplicated by the type of long-matured, often 
highly personal views which had distorted Ellenborough's administra­
tion. In broad terms what Peel expected from Hardinge was given 
in his first letter to the new Governor General "If you can keep 
peace, reduce expense, extend commerce and strengthen our hold on
^Add. Mss. 40460, f. 206, Wellington to Peel, 3 May 1844.
^Hardinge Papers. Reel 1533, Hardinge to His wife, 7 August 1845. 
Before he departed Hardinge left a memorandum "upaa all the import­
ant points with which he will have to deal when he gets to Cal­
cutta", Add^ . Mss. 40365, f. 286 Ripon to Peel, 7 June 1844.
India by confidence in our justice, kindness and wisdom - you
will be received here on your return with ... a welcome infinitely
more cordial than if you have a dozen victories to boast of and
1
annex the Punjab to the overgrown empire of India. 11
The Ministry*s great concern was that Hardinge should main­
tain a manifestly pacific policy towards the Punjab, whose fate 
bore directly upon the maintenance of friendly relations with
Russia and indeed,Peel felt, the whole course of British foreign
2
policy at this time. In his first letter to the Prime Minister 
Hardinge declared “Everything is perfectly quiet ... and if the 
Governor General abstains from going to the frontier, confining 
his preparations to measures of a defensive character, I am satis­
fied the case for justifiable intervention will not occur this year". 
This letter was shown by Peel to Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign 
Minister, as a proof that “consolidation and improvement11 were de- 
sired rather than the “extension of our Etapire”. Such was the 
Governor General*s subsequent conduct towards the Punjab, essentially 
a policy of watchful waiting, that when war at length seemed to be 
approaching, Peel could assure him that Brunnow was “satisfied that
^Add. Mss. 40^7^1 pp. 172-3, Peel to Hardinge, 6 November l8¥f.
^Congratulating Hardinge in lSb6 on his conduct towards the Punjab, 
Peel wrote “I firmly believe that what has taken place on the 
Banks of the Sutlej will have its influence on the Banks of the
Oregon”. Add. Mss. *K*75, f. 211, 22 April 18^6.
^Add. Mss. *t0*f7^ , f. 1^ *-, Hardinge to Peel, 1 August l8¥f.
^Ibid., f. 169, Peel to Hardinge, k October lWf.
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the occupation of the Punjab - if it takes place - would be forced 
upon us by an absolute necessity11*'*' The Treaty of Lahore while it 
provided for an indemnity and the cession of territory yet main­
tained the independence of the defeated Sikh nation. This settle­
ment was fully within the context of Hardinge *s private correspond­
ence with Peel and Ripon and he could with justice say, after the 
Peel Ministry had left office, f,The instructions of your Government 
were to avoid by evirry means in my power the annexation of the Pun- 
jab" .2
From the outset Hardinge assumed a moderate policy towards 
the native states uncomplicated by any grandiose visions in the 
Ellenborough manner. In his first letter from India he reported to 
Peel MQn my arrival I wrote a letter to our residents at Lahore, 
Gwalior, Indore, and Nepal desiring them to explain to the Native 
Durbars in the most explicit terms that the present Governor General 
contemplated no change whatever in our foreign relations with these 
states - you may rely upon my adherence to the most conciliatory 
system of policy11. Subsequent correspondence makes it clear that 
Hardinge was conscientiously, and with the full support of Ripon 
and as unanimous an endorsement as it was possible for a Court of 
twenty four Directors to give, adhering to just such a policy not
^Add. Mss. bOk75$ 68, Peel to Hardinge, 26 October l8*f5.
2ibid., f. 276, Hardinge to Peel, 21 December l8*f6.
^Add. Mss. 40^7^1 ff. lVf-5, Hardinge to Peel, 1 August lWt.
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only towards the strategically placed states menioned above but 
generally* Whereas under Auckland a vigorous foreign policy had 
helped to give scope for an equally vigorous policy towards the 
states^that followed by Hardinge towards the Punjab would, he 
felt, be seen as t(a proof of our disinterestedness, which will give 
confidence to all Native States by this proof that we don’t voraciously 
take advantage of the misfortunes of an ally11«^ Towards the once 
restive Nepal Hardinge could now ’’conceive no combination of cir­
cumstances which can render the Nepalese, dangerous to our Govern- 
2
ment in India”* Over the Portuguese colony of Goa Hardinge refused 
to concur with the Government of Bombay that a&mand should be 
made for the restitution of certain military fugitives as he felt 
that this would have unavoidably involved the occupationof Goa 
by an armed force”. Likewise he also refused to the Bombay Govera- 
nent the deposition of the Raja of Kolhapur, a boy of fourteen, after 
an insurrection in that state, ’’our remedy against the recurrance 
of this sort of thing is clear”. Their hill forts must be dis­
mantled and thrown down and the privileges of the hereditary militia
if
directed to more peaceful objects.”
•‘'Add. Mss. 40474, f. 2i7, Hardinge to Peel, 23 Hanaaty 184$.
Ibid., f. 189, Hardinge to Ripon, 23December 1844.
I
^AddJ.Mss. 4087^, f. 269, Hardinge to Ripon, 2 December 18^5.
**Add. Mss. f. 188, Hardinge to Peel, 23 December l8¥f.
Hardinge was by no means impervious to the problem of re­
form in the native states, he held the subsidiary system to be, 
at this date, rlmischievous and disreputable*1^  and declined employ­
ing it over the Punjab. After the downfall of that last great 
Hindu kingdom Hardinge noted with satisfaction the voluntary agree­
ments entered into by lesser states to abolish the practices of sati 
infanticide and slavery and even went so far as to give his opinion
that the Supreme Government would be justified in coercing those
2
dependent states who failed to follow suit. Yet at the same time 
the treaties entered into with the native states held weight with 
Hardinge. There was, he wrote to the Queen, lfno part of the public 
business in India requiring more tact and forethought than the
dealing with these kingdoms, in alliance with the British Gijvem-
3 sment by treaties. 11 His subsequent conduct towards Hyderabad and
if
Oudh made clear to all his concern about these engagements. When, 
upon the accession of a new monarch, the administration of Oudh 
deteriorated once again Hardinge journeyed personally to Lucknow 
to Mread a lecture11 to the King on what was ejected allowing the 
latter a period of grace of two years in which to improve matters.
^dd. Mss. hQk?5> f* 275» Hardinge to Peel, 21 December l8*f6.
^Add. Mss. 36V75, f* ^91-2, Hardinge to Hobhouse, 23 December 18^7* 
Had Hardinge, at this time been writing to a Conservative Presi­
dent of the Board he might well have expressed himself more moder­
ately. Hardinge*s policy of persuasive pressure to correct abuses 
was more akin to Bentinck*s policy than the liberal one of inter* 
vention and annexation favoured by Hobhouse.
^Home Misc.. 833« Hardinge to Lord Jocelyn, 2.k June 1846.
S?he Calcutta Review. 18V?, VIII, p.338, observed that l,the whole
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By this stage it is possible to identify and describe both 
a “Whig11 and a "Conservative" policy towards the native states.
It appears that while both for financial and for political reasons 
intervention and annexation were proper to the policy pursued under 
Auckland and Hobhouse they were not to that pursued under the Con­
servatives. Under Hardinge particularly it was held to be unde­
sirable to add more territory to, in Peel's words, the overgrown 
empire of India. It was undesirable both as regards the maintenance 
of a pacific foreign policy and also because the addition of terri­
tory would militate against Hardinge fs desire to reduce his military 
force as the only effective manner of improving the Indian finances. 
As regards the two "outlooks", ideology is perhaps too strong a 
term, it is apparent that while Fitzgerald or Hardinge may express 
concern about the faith of treaties or impressing the princes and 
natives of India with the moderate character of British power and 
policy such a view did not count teavily with Hobhouse. Even with 
Auckland the direction of his policy, as opposed to his manner of 
expression was of course the same as Hobhouse9s.
Under Hardinge the most significant contribution from home 
to the state of Indian finances continued to be the determination 
of the Conservative Government to maintain a pacific foreign policy,
tenor of Lord Hardinge's career might have satisfied people ... he 
would not annex Oude to India in the manner many desire to do".
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particularly as regards its entente with France and similar under­
standing with Russia. Thus despite the Cabinet*s anxiety about 
French activities overseas, in the Indian Ocean among other areas, 
the Indian Government did not become involved in anything more ex­
tensive than the strengthening of the defenses at Aden. Hardinge*s 
statement upon the subject of Indian coastal defenses vfwith 4000 
miles of coast any system of Gun Batteries would be most expensive - 
very useless and therefore very unnecessary"^ was accepted as was 
his determination not to become "entangled in any doubtful operations"
in support of the Imam of Muscat with whom a treaty had been con-
2eluded in the time of Auckland and Palmerston*
Of course it was over the Punjab that the foreign policy of 
Peel and Aberdeen had its greatest impact upon Indian finances for
the Punjab policy was ultimately the result of the Ministry*s and
therefore the financial results which flowed from it were as Well.
As a military man Hardinge had been the ideal choice for the mainten­
ance of a conciliatory policy. His abilities, as a former Secretary 
of War, in matters of military finance as well as military organi­
zation enabled him to assemble the necessary force on the frontier 
without any dramatic increase of military expenditure, as for example, 
it enabled Hardinge to judge precisely what force was necessary in
^Add. Mss. *f087**, f. 193* Hardinge to Ripon, k November 18^5*
2Add. Mss. kO&fk, f. 2^2, Hardinge to Ripon, 19 November 18^5*
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Bombay and Madras and to move the remainder to the North West.'*'
One result of the cautious policy Hardinge pursued, which had its 
bearing on Indian finances, was the fact that when the war with the 
Sikhs did finally come it was not with a people united in the de­
fense of their independence, as the Afghans had temporarily been, 
but against a distracted state which had begun to tear itself apart. 
After the war Hardinge was able to write to Peel his estimate that 
,!after crediting the East India Company with I1/** millions of in­
demnity money I do not think the Sikh War will cost the state 2£ lacs 
or 4250,000" .2
While the problem of the Punjab waB unresolved a decisive re­
duction in expenditure was not possible for as Hardinge put it to 
Ripon and Peel "I know of no means except by military reduction by 
which expenditure can be lowered for it is our large military estab- 
lishment that now keeps us with a deficit of a million11, yet with 
"the Punjab and Scinde on our hands we cannot reduce the army at pre-
if
sent". Under these circumstances the most Ripon could do was to
suggest borrowing at four per cent r,in order to effect the reduction
5
of the higher rate of interest upon your loans11. But once Hardinge
^See Charles, Viscount Hardinge, Viscount Hardinge. pp. 166-8.
2Add. Hss. 40475, f. 252, Hardinge to Peel, 22 July 1845.
^Add. Mss. 40474, f. 268, Hardinge to Peel, 8 April 1845.
Add. Mss. 40873, t. 42, Hardinge to Ripon, 10 July 1845.
^Add. Mss. 40873, f. 36, Ripon to Hardinge, 7 July 1845. Ripon was
had settled the Punjab crisis he was able to embark upon a major
program of military reductions si that on the eve of his return from
India he could tell Peelthat "during the last eight months 60,000
1
men have been disbanded and expenditure reduced by £1,200,000,"
The postwar policy of military reduction was another consequence 
of the nature of Hardinge1 s foreign policy supported by and ultimately 
deriving from that of the British Government under Peel.
Another consequence of the Ministry's view that Hardinge had 
achieved a lasting peace in the Punjab was Ripon*s readiness to see 
that Public works were now more liberally supported. The previous 
year in referring to the great works on the Ganges Canal Ripon had
remarked "I shall be vexy stingy, at all events till I see daylight
2
on the Sutlej". The war once over a despatch was sent out sanction-
3
ing the "vigourous prosecution of the Works" and a similarly per­
missive attitude is apparent over the progress of the Agra to Bom­
bay and the Grand Trunk roads. The indications are that had Peel's 
Ministry remained in power Hardinge1s other projects for canals,
prepared, subsequently, in contrast tothe situation under the Whigs, 
"to do all he can to give assistance from home by Exchequer Bills"
i in order to prevent Hardinge again having recourse to five per cent 
loans to cover the deficit’. See Add. Mss. 40877. f. 21&,; Hardinge 
to Maddock, 20 July 1846.
XAdd. Mss. 40475, ff. 28^-4, Hardinge to Peel, 9 January 1848.
^Add Mss. 40874, f. 18, Ripon to Hardinge, 6 October 1843.
^E/4/788 , 371, India Revenue Despatch, 1 July (No.8) 1846
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railways, expanding the educational establishment (qv) and 
perhaps even that for raising government loans for public works 
would have received Ripon*s support in like manner. Even as things 
were Hardinge *s administration showed the greatest activity in the
p
field of public works of any thus far under the new charter.
From the outset, Hardinge*s internal administration no less 
than his external was characterized by his desire to act in conson­
ance with the views of the Ministry and the home authorities and 
within the bounds of the constitution of the Indian Government. Upon 
his arrival Hardinge discreetly informed Ellenborough that it would 
be improper for the incoming Governor General to receive an invitation 
to the dinner the military who were **devotedly attached** to the de­
parting head of government were giving in his honour. **I could not
3
make my first act, that of a Partisan1* he wrote to Peel and subse­
quently Hardinge did everything in his power to allay discord be-
k
tween individuals and services." With his own Council the Governor 
General maintained the most aimiable relations so that when he was 
forced to quit Calcutta Ripon could write to Hardinge **It is very 
satisfactory tjiat your Colleagues agreed so well with you in making
^Qn May 7 18^5 Ripon had written in response to Hardinge*s earlier 
letters in favour of railways **You will receive by this mail a 
despatch on railways. We are very anxious to support them. But we 
must have a preliminary inquiry through the medium of a Commission**. 
Add. Mss. 40872. f.97.
2See P.P.1851. XLI, paper 622.
^Add. Mss. kCkyk, f. 1^5, Hardinge to Peel, 1 August l8¥f.
2i
He was supported in this from home. Over the Napier-Outram controversy
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the arrangements ^ o r  the transaction of business in Hardinge*s 
absence^*. *■
While it could be asserted with justice that Hardinge*s con­
duct satisfied men*s minds ftthat ... there would be no systematic
repeal of Lord ELlenborough's acts ... because they were those of 
2
his predecessor” it was equally true that Hardinge was obliged
*'to smash most of Ellenborough's pet novelties; military police,
3
service battalions and legions etc. etc.” The respect paid by
If
Ripon and Hardinge to the Court's opinions told against Ellen­
borough's egregiousreforms.
Preoccupied with the prospects of war to almost the same ex­
tent that Ellenborough had been Hardinge nevertheless conducted 
his administration in far greater conformity with Peel's exhortation 
to follow the paths of peace and economy and to "strengthen our 
hold on India by confidence in our justice, kindness and wisdom".
"I divide my time between Calcutta and Barrackpore" he wrote to 
his own confidant, the most important civil affairs being "education,
which originated in the policy towards Sind and which was carried
on in the press Ripon wrote to Peel "The Duke said he would write
something to Lord H. Gough, with a view to check the practice
which is but too common in India". Add. Mss. 40871, f. 51 * 14* January 1845.
~*~Add. Mss. 40874, f. 15, Ripon to Hardinge, 5 October 184^ 5.
^Calcutta Review. 1847, VIII, p.460.
^Home Misc., 8^4, p.40, Hardinge to Hobhouse, 9 June 1847.
it
I Writing to Harding upon the noble bodyguard Ripon requested "Pray
be so good as to look at the question ... the principle I think 
is a good one in itself} but the Court didn't like it". Add. Mss.
40870, f.285, 4 December l8¥f.
t1
law and police-filling up the chinks of spare time, and they are 
very narrow, with Canals Roads and Bridges.^ Thus Hardinge was able 
to "devote a great deal of time to educational matters and to ini­
tiate reforms and innovations of far reaching importance'1* En­
couragement was given to "useful and sound elementary education" 
through the vernacular language, it being decided to establish over 
a hundred schools for the purpose; this of course was a decided 
shift in emphasis from the English centred approach of Macaulay and 
Bentinck's days* Higher education through a series of Government
colleges with district schools attached was also projected and ulti-
2
mately the foundation of a University. But it was Hardinge*s re­
solution of 10 October 18bh which was most characteristic of Hard­
ings* s approach "In order to reward native talent and render it 
practically useful to the state, Sir H* Hardinge, after due deliber­
ation, has issued a resolution by which the most meritorious stud­
ents will be appointed to fill the public offices which fall vacant 
throughout Bengal" he wrote in a letter to the Queen, and added "This 
encouragement has been received by the Hindoo population with the 
greatest gratitude".
^H.P* Reel 1539, Hardinge to his doctor, Sir W.C. James, 20 February
l55F.
2
See D.P.Sinha, The Educational Policy of the East India Company in 
Bengal to 185**. pp . 257 * 266 and 26>0*
^Add* Mss* kQkyk, f. 177, Hardinge to the Queen, 23 November l8Vf* 
Over medical education Hardinge pursued a similar course, "These
Hardinge*s resolution appears to have embodied his own ideas 
rather than anything he found on his arrival1 and is certainly con­
sonant with the i nip roving and somewhat paternalistic views present 
in his exchange of letters with Peel and Ripon. In its pragmatic 
and concilia to zy aspects it might be contrasted with the combative 
and visionary minute of Macaulay on education and might fairly be 
termed a Conservative document, while the letter was Radical, for 
by it HazsJinge sought to reconcile the social effects of the Govern­
ment* s educational policy with the needs of the administration 
rather than to create an Anglicised and possibly dissatisfied class 
of Indian.
Harding^fe administration affords a particularly clear example 
of the effect which the presence of a Conservative Government in 
England, and therefore a Conservative Governor General and Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court at Calcutta, had upon the course of 
legislation and law reform in India. In the first pLace Hardinge *s 
determination to conduct his administration within the framework 
provided meant that he would make no attempt to limit the presence 
of the Fourth Member of Council. On the other hand however Hard­
inge was prepared tdoppose Cameron’s unconstitutional attempts to
Black Doctors I am encouraging by better pay and more extensive employ­
ment - our friend Dwarkanath Tagore very generously pays for the educa­
tion of two native students, who went to England under Dr. Goodeve... 
these boys will return skillful men and a great deal of collateral ad­
vantages will result11. H.P.. Reel 1339» Hardinge to James, 21 March l8*f3* 
Peel and Ripon were personally acquainted with Tagore, whom Hardinge re­
marked was **the generous patron of everything that is useful and charit­
able and is on all occasions most loyal to the British Government**, 
see Add.Mss.0^7^. f.2331 Hardinge to Peel, 8 March 184-3 •
^See Hilliker, p.261. Peel’s Government, in 18^3, attempted to bring 
forth a Bill for a system of national education. Speaking in defense
further reform the administration in line with his Utilitarian 
principles. Hardinge would not, for example, accept the Fourth 
Member’s proposal that the Governor General should have the power, 
on his own authority, to remove any area from those subject to the 
Cornwallis Regulations, which it was a goal of the Benthamite re­
formers to replace with their own codes. He could not consent,- 
Hardinge wrote, to adopt any such change without positive orders 
from home after the whole case had been laid before H.M. ’s advisers 
Similarly, Hardinge was unwilling to accept the advice of his Council
to pass the Bill for incorporating the Assam Tea Company until de-
2finite orders to that effect had been received from home.
Towards law reform Hardinge was well disposed and the Penal 
Code was, after a lapse of some years, a$Ln brought forward for dis­
cussion by the Supreme Council. On the question of enacting a lex 
loci for Christians in India Hardinge was in favour of the measure, 
as were, he told Ripon, the majority of the authorities in India.^ 
Nevertheless in Council he insisted that "it had never been intended 
to pass the Lex Loci act without first referring to the home authorities” •
Of the Measure Sir James Graham argued that it would render the 
uneducated masses in the industrial towns, prone to Chartism, less 
of a threat to society. See Halevy. IV, p. 64n.
1 Indian Legislative Proceedings. R. 206, vol. 4*1, Consultations for 
27^  June^ lo4-6, No. 7.
2
Indian Legislative Proceedings. R. 206, vol. 32, Consultations for 
14- September 1844, No. 9.
^Add. Mss. 40873# ff• 120-21, Hardinge to Ripon, 7 August 1843.
^Indian Legislative Proceedings, R.207, vol. 36, Consultations 
for 2 August 1845, No. 2.
ij
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The despatch sent out reflected the extreme concern of the Court 
on anything connected with the religion of the inhabitants and it 
directed the Government not to pass any legislations on the subject 
without its prior sanction.**"
The nature of the conflict that was actually taking place 
between the Radical and Conservative views of law reform, and the 
role of the Conservative Governor General and Chief Justice in it, 
emerges most clearly from private correspondence on the subject of 
providing small cause courts for trying cases of lesser monetary 
amount than those appropriate for the Supreme Courts. A lively con­
troversy was being pursued in India not only on the matter itself 
but upon its relation to the ultimate purposes of law reform.
The issue and its relationship to the whole course of law re­
form in India is described at length in a letter from the Chief Just­
ice of the Supreme Court, Sir Lawrence Peel, to his relative the 
Prime Minister. Passing the latter on to the President of the Board 
Sir Robert Peel commented Hit seems that legal reform is come to a 
standstill in consequence of differences of opinion between Judicial
^See S.V.Desika Char, Centralized Legislation, p. 196.
2
The Law Member, C.H.Cameron, even questioned the competence of the 
Court to insist that no legislation be passed on the subject with­
out their prior approval. Sir Lawrence Peel, the Chief Justice, how­
ever upheld the Court's position. See Hansard. 3S. CXXIX, 775-7,
J.F.B.Blackett and Sir Charles Vood, House of Commons, 25 July 1853.
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authorities and Commissioners of law reform in India. **^*
Sir Lawrence*s account makes clear the basic difference of
I
approach to law reform between himself and C*H*Cameron, between 
the Conservative approach and the Utilitarian* Cameronf whom the 
Chief Justice was aware was of Mthe school of Jeremy Bentham** did 
not view the question of a Small Cause Court Act as a matter in it­
self* Bather he proposed that tlall cause should be tried in one 
and the same mode**, by the projected Courts, rather than dividing 
the cases between the Supreme and the Small Cause Courts* The pro­
jected court he hoped would be f,so successful that it will draw
i
suitors away from the Supreme Court**, That is Cameron saw the act
as a major step in getting rid of the Supreme Courts, the dispensers
of the law to be codified according to Utilitarian principles, should
2be the only onex in existence in India*
Sir Lawrence's essentially Conservative approach was akin to 
that of Sir Bobert Peel who as Home Secretary in the 1820s had 
reformed the Criminal Law of England hot by constructing a new code 
but by consolidating the existing laws, dispensing with those which
^Add* Mss* 4087^, ff* 2^9-50, Peel to Bipon, 19 November l8*f5*
p
Add*Mss* ^087^, ff. 251-56, Sir Lawrence Peel to Sir Bobert Peel, 
l4 September 18^5.
had outlived their usefulness* The emotional roots of Cameron's 
approach lay in his belief that "the whole system of procedure of 
administering the laws of England" was "vicious" as was that of 
"the Queen's Courts IndiajP". Cameron's attitude towards law 
reform in India was an extension of what he felt about the English 
situation* So too in a quieter and more balanced fashion was Sir 
Lawrence Peel's*
The result of the clash of views was a stalemate in the pro­
gress of law reform in India "The Government here decline to pass 
his ^ameron'fT1 measures, doubting of their advantages and knowing 
our opposition to them. His opposition is equally fatal to the suc­
cess of our operations*"1 This clash though it occurred in India 
was ultimately determined by the course of British politics upon 
which the presence in India of the Conservative Governor General 
and Chief Justice at Calcutta depended*
Hardinge's government of India in the years l8¥f to lBk6 
was a faithful application of the concepts of administration proper
Ibid* For the utilitarian viewpoint in this controversy see the 
anonymous article, "Indian Law Reform", in The Calcutta Review* 
18^7 » vol. III^. 41$ ,which appears to have been written by
Cameron*
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to the Conservative Ministry of Sir Robert Peel in the Indian 
setting. His policy towards the Punjab was in fact simply an ex­
tension of British foreign policy as pursued by Peel and Aberdeen 
in which the desire to maintain a cordial understanding with Russia 
played a major role. The position taken by Ripon and Hardinge on 
the conduct and prospects of Indian finances was directly related 
to this essentially pacific foreign policy. The shared conviction 
that "peace offers the only mode of getting the Finances of India 
into a wholesome and safe state" had as its corollary the fact that 
Hardinge became the first Governor General during this period to set 
about reducing the military establishment as the means of balancing 
revenue with expenditure. Likewise their willingness to contemplate 
an enlarged public works program was connected to the belief that 
a durable peace had been achieved. The "conciliatory line of policy" 
which Hardinge maintained towards the native states also was con­
sistent with the tenor of his foreign policy and with his financial 
too for he did not contemplate annexation as a means of adding to 
the revenues of India. As policy towards the native states under 
a Conservative Governor General differed from what it had been under 
a Whig so did the attitudes, or principles, entertained towards the 
native rulers by Hardinge and Ripon differ from those held by Hobhouse 
and Auckland. Similarly with Hardinge vs educational reforms a 
conservative approach to social policy is apparent, particularly 
with his educational minute of October l8kk in which te sought to
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reconcile the Government's educational policy with its social 
effects. Over legislation, notwithstanding Hardinge's accept­
ance of the Fourth Member's position within his Council, the 
profound difference between the Conservative and Radical approaches 
were sufficient to ensure that C.H.Cameron's efforts to force 
Indian lav reform into a Utilitarian mould would be unsuccessful 
at this time. The very faithfulness of Hardinge's Governor Generalcy 
to the guideline set down from home and to the general principles 
of his party explain the unvarying support which his measures 
received from home.
Chapter Six
A SUCCESSION OF MINISTRIES. INDIAN POLICY
DURING THE GOVERNMENTS OF RUSSELL, DERBY
AMD ABERDEEN, 18^6-53
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In India, Hardinge correctly apprehended the impending 
fall of Peel1 s Ministry over the issue of the Corn Laws ,!I admire 
the* moral courage you display and the true patriotism which marks 
every act of your Public Life - I fear your administration will 
not outlive the session - the folly of 1830 will be repeated".^
The great party which Peel reconstructed had split in 1846, the 
great administrator was no longer at the helm of affairs and the 
loss would be felt in India as well as in England. The Whigs were 
back in power, Hobhouse at the Board, Palmerston at the Foreign 
Office. Yet the conditions under which Russell took office were 
markedly different from those under which Melbourne had entered 
his second Ministry. Until the l8V? General Elections the Whigs 
were actually without a majority in the Commons and could only main­
tain themselves because of the division among the Conservatives, 
that is largely upon the suffrance of the Peelites. The admini­
strative successes of Peel's second Ministry had made only too plain 
the deficiencies of the Whigs. Under these circumstances, Russell 
felt obliged to make overtures to various of Peel's lieutenants to
A^dd.Mss. Hardinge to Peel, 26 May l8*f6
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strengthen his own Government, as well as to attempt to adopt 
many of the policies, above all the fiscal, of the previous 
Ministry.^ Wellington was maintained as the Commander in Chief and 
Russell wrote at once to Hardinge to request that he remain in India 
as Governor General.^
Writing to Hardinge at the time of Peel's resignation,
Ripon considered the question of Hardinge's staying on in India 
and concluded f,in order to enable you to remain with advantage, 
it would be indispensably necessary that you should possess the real
if.
and entire confidence of the new Government11. The remainder of
Hardinge's Governor Generalship would form a comment upon the ability 
of the Whig Ministry and the Minister for India to give such support 
to a Governor General whose policies had been so closely associated 
with the Conservative administration of Sir Robert Peel.
See P.R.0. 30/2^?B, Russell to Dalhousie, Lincoln and Sidney Her­
bert. Russell continued to try to recruit Peelites throughout his 
first Ministry, his offer of the Governor Generalship to Sir James 
Graham, primarily political, had also an administrative motivation 
for ITthe finances ... of India require the most vigilant application 
of sound principles’1, see P.R.O. 30/22/6D, Russell to E. Ellice,
16 June 1847. Dalhousie's appointment as well as Hobhouse's re­
placement were part of Russell's continuing efforts to strengthen 
his Ministry.
2
An example of this as regards Indian affairs was the 
by Russell's Government to Hardinge's restoration of 
the native troops "although you know how distasteful 
to the ^Radical/ gentlemen on my side of the House".
853, p.l43, Hobhouse to Hardinge, 8 December 1846.
^P.R.O., 30/22/33, Russell to Hardinge, 8 July 1846.
^Add. Mss. 40877, f.194, Ripon to jHardinge, 6 July 1846.
support accorded 
flogging among 
that subject is 
Home Misc.,
For a year and a half Hardinge’s presence in India was to 
serve as a barrier to the sudden reversal of that policy of peace 
and consolidation which he had formerly pursued. The crucial issue 
here was his 'Lahore experiment', Hasrdinge's attempt to induce the 
formation of a self sustaining Sikh state in the North West favour­
able to British interests. Upon this Hardinge assured Peel: "If
their Russell Ministry's/ instructions are averse to the 
Lahore policy, I request immediately to be removed. If not I have 
consented to remain till the end of l8V7".^ The Governor General 
was thus consciously "adhering to the policy of the late Government 
which policy the Court of Directors have approved".^
Opinion in the Russell Cabinet was predominantly against 
the Lahore experiment, but given the state of British politics it 
was hardly possible to disavow the policy of the late Government. 
"You will perceive", Hobhouse wrote to Lord John when sending him 
the draft of the Secret Despatch on the Punjab, "I have followed 
the advice you gave me in Cabinet, and have confined myself to stat­
ing an apprehension that the Lahore Government will be overthrown 
when our troops are withdrawn, and that there will be no reduction
^Add. Mss. kO^75, f.266, Hardinge to Peel, 3 September 1846. 
^ibid.
of our military establishment consequent on that event”.^  Pal­
merston^ return to the Foreign Office had seen an end to the 
policy of entente with France and Russia. As a security against 
Russian advance in Central Asia, he told Russell, Tfwe must have 
the country up to the pass ^the Khyber^11. Hardinge, notwithstand~ 
ing the discreet wording of the secret and private correspondence 
he received, was well aware of the climate of opinion at home,
flthe fact is” he wrote to Ripon ”he f^obhouse/'' and Palmerston are
3
for direct and immediate annexation”. Nevertheless as long as 
Hardinge was in India his Punjab policy was maintained, and on the 
eve of his departure he wrote to Peel ”1 have a strong conviction
4.
that a lasting Peace has been secured”.
Hardirjge*s presence also made its contribution in the wider 
sphere of Indian foreign policy. Of course the assumption, largely 
in independence of his colleagues, of an aggressive foreign policy 
was much more strongly opposed under Russell than it had been under
^Home Misc., 833, p.52, I October 1846. The Secret Committee pro­
tested loudly against the despatch which they maintained was an 
implied censure on Hardinge’s arrangements. See Add. Mss. 43749« 
f.53, Hobhousefs Diary for 9 October 1846.
^P.R.O. 30/22/3B, Palmerston to Russell, 9 June 1847.
^Add. Mss. 40877, f.236, Hardinge to Ripon, 20 April 1847. Hardinge 
was aware that ”the old story has been revived of Russian invasion” 
on which he commented ”What a Bug-a-boo”.
Add. Mss. k0k75. f. 28^, 8 January 18W.
Melbourne. By 1848 this opposition obliged the Foreign Secretary 
to undertake in future to "submit all his despatches to Russell for 
approval"**' and by the end of 1831 Palmerston was obliged to resign be- 
fcause;srf the action he took, without consulting his colleagues, 
over Louis Napoleon's coup d'etat. Nevertheless Hardinge's contri­
bution to this new state of things as concerns India at least 
energes clearly from a remarkable exchange of views between Hobhouse 
and Palmerston over the question of renewed Persian pressure on 
Herat: "the immediate vicinity of Russia and her daily encroach­
ments on Persia, give a totalEfer different character to all the move­
ments of the Shah in that direction", Hobhouse conceded. Then he went 
on frankly, "if you ask my opinion I have no hesitation in saying that 
I should instruct Colonel Sheil to warn the Shah that he must be 
prepared for extremities, if he attacks Herat. But I would say 
nothing about India; norwould I employ the Governor General nor the 
Secret Committee as on a former occasion. The war should be a war 
between the two Crowns. Indeed with the present head of the Indian 
Government, and such a Secret Committee as I now have to deal with,
all cordial cooperation from those quarter would be quite out of the 
2
question." Though Palmerston replied in a characteristically
^F.A.Dreyer, The Russell Administration. 1846-1832, Ph.D. St. Andrew's, 
p.138. The Whigs' efforts to maintain the fiscal policy refashioned 
by Peel may well have been a strong contributory factor to this de­
termination. Speaking of the financial situation in 1848 the Chan­
cellor of the Exchequer commented to Hobhouse that things were 
going on pretty well "if Palmerston did not drive the country into 
a war". See Add. Mss. 43751, 1.76, Dairy for 28 January 1848.
p
Home Misc., 843, pp. 102-03, Hobhouse to Palmerston, 3 April 1847.
See also, ibid., p.106 for Palmerston's reply.
undaunted manner there was no further question during the Russell 
Ministry of using Indian troops to the westward of the subcontinent.
Over the progress of policy towards the native states Hardinge's 
presence had, if anything, a more clear cut effect than over foreign 
policy proper. Hobhouse appears to have been taking care when re­
ferring to events in Bhopal, Nepal, Rajputana, or Oudh^ not to use 
the occasion of some difficulty to urge upon the Governor General 
a decidedly interventionist course of action. Indeed Hobhouse*s 
private correspondence would seem to bear out the repeated assertion 
made to Hardinge that "It is the earnest wish of the Government that 
you should act just as if no change of ministers had taken place".^ 
Only when Hardinge's successor has already been chosen does Hobhouse 
express himself unguardedly "It has always appeared to me that, when 
all the restcf India is entirely quiet, and there is no menace or 
thought of external agresssion, it would be just and expedient to 
assume the entire authority and control of Hyderabad State ... £&&&? 
the Kingdom of Oude also". Even more revealingly he continues "I 
know you will smile at such schemes, when quietly planned in a Board 
room on the banks of the Thames, and left to the execution of a 
Viceroy on the borders of the Ganges: nevertheless, very sober men
have decided that, at no very distant period, the consummation to
See for example, Home Misc., 833, P* 195, Hobhouse to Hardinge,
7 January 1847.
*Tiome Misc., 853, P*68, Hobhouse to Hardinge, 7 November 1846.
which I have alluded must inevitably come to pass".*1" Hobhouse
was saying in fact that a forthrightly annexationist policy could
be expected after Hardinge*s departure. For the time being, however,
Hobhouse had to accept Hardinge's approach to the problem of Oudh,
that is to the Governor General's granting to the new monarch two
years grace in which to improve the administration of his country:
"Lord Hardinge did not leave any other course open to us; except
indeed we had chosen to upset his policy altogether, which would
2
not have been altogether expedient". Of course the question of 
expediency was not limited to Indian considerations alone, it re­
lated to the relationship of the Peelites to Russell's Ministry.
On financial questins Hobhouse's views were as much at variance 
with those of Hardinge as they had been on matters of foreign policy 
and on those regarding the native states. In Hardinge's view the 
end of the war in the Punjab marked the turning point "I have no 
gloomy apprehensions as to Indian Finance. Every year, with peace
^Home Misc.. 8 *^*, pp. 26-7, Hobhouse to Hardinge, 7 January l8**7.
*Tfome Misc., 8^9, p.2, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 2*f April 1848. 
Similarly Hardinge declined to intervene more strongly in Hyderabad 
with but "three months of Government of India before me", and he 
quoted chapter and verse of the despatches sent out during Peel's 
administration to justify his restricting the agent, Col. Fraser, 
to maintaining the status quo, see Home Misc.» 8**5, PP* 179-8**,
Hardinge to Hobhouse, k October l8*f7.
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and confidence, Hindos;tan will make rapid strides in wealth, 
population and agriculture. The yearly deficit looks awkward, and 
we must get rid of it. I think we may effect that object in 1830" .1 
But Hobhouse had taken another view: 11 You reckon I see ... the
probable deficiency of the financial year at a million. I am sorry 
to say that we here make it amount to nearer two millions than one. 
At all events, the deficiency will be very large and there is no
2
prospect, as far as I can see, of any diminution of expenditure11. 
This difference of view was maintained throughout Hardinge*s ten:, 
and to the man who next became Governor General Hobhouse would
write lfI told you at the India Board that I distrusted the very
3
golden prospects of your predecessor".
Hobhouse*s attitude towards Hardinge’s projects for increased 
expenditure on works of public utility, in contrast with that of 
Ripon, was from the first markedly negative. The President poured 
cold water on Hardinge’s hopes for the sanction of "two hundred and 
fifty thousand pounds a year for railways, two hundred and fifty 
thousand pounds a year for the Ganges Canal, and so on": "You
~4iome Misc., 833, P-318, Hardinge to Hobhouse, 6 February l8V?. 
^Home Misc. t 833, p. 152. Hobhouse to Hardinge, Zk November 184-6. 
^Home Misc., 839, p.3, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, Zk April l8*f8.
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will, however, have before this time heard that neither of these 
outlays, to the extent you mention, are determined upon at home11.
Nor did Hardinge’s proposal for "A loan raised each year for each 
specific object of public utility11 seem ’’advisable11 to the Presi­
dent.^ Though Hobhouse was careful to make these decisions seem
impersonal it is evident that he took the initiative in having Hard-
Z
inge’s projects curtailed. Since the President disagreed with the 
Governor General on the prospects for Indian finances, he objected 
to what had been sanctioned during Peel’s Ministry: "I cannot ima­
gine how this office permitted such a despatch as that of the first 
of July ^ F8*f6,on canals/ to be sent out to India without specify-
3
ing the limits beyond which the annual expenditure was not to go.”^ 
Likewise with railways, Hobhouse, who showed himself anxious to 
limit the Government's commitment over the issue of guaranteed in­
terest upon the investment from private railway companies, regretted
that "the business was in progress when I came to the India Board and
if
I could not disallow what was already begun".
1HomeJMisc., 853, pp. 298-9. Hardinge to Hobhouse, 21 February 184-7; 
ibid., p.293» Hobhouse to "Hardinge, 7 April 184-7-
^Home Misc.. 84-3, p- 77» J.W.Hogg to Hobhouse, 11 March 194-7- Hogg 
warmly supported the Ganges project.
^Home Misc., 84-3, p.76, Hobhouse to Hogg, 13 March 184-7.
^Home Misc., 857y p-204, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 22 August 184-9- 
Hobhouse had insisted: "it is obviously our duty to restrict that
guarantee within the narrowest possible limits" despite the Court’s 
eagerness to encourage the railway companies. See Home Misc.. 850, 
p. 128, Hobhouse to Hogg, 11 December 184-6.
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Hardinge*s ambitious educational programme was likewise 
seriously impaired by want of support from home, essentially from 
Hobhouse. The project for founding a University was disapproved 
outright. Exception was taken to Hardinge*s resolution on the 
Government employ of meritorious students as being too biased in 
favour of those at Government colleges. The project for the ex­
pansion of vernacular schools had been approved under Ripon. Now 
the proposal that these should be financed by Government grants of 
land was turned down. While the plan for expanding the number of 
Government colleges and grouping district schools around them was 
approved, it was subject to financial limitations.^ Elsewhere even
Hardinge*s endorsement of the project for a uniform rate of postage
2
throughout India met with a discouraging reply soon after the Whigs 
had returned to office.
While Hardinge saw the reduction of the military force as his 
major means of eliminating the deficit in Indian finance, Hobhouse 
saw !,no prospect ... of diminution of expenditure11. The President 
was of the the opinion, declared in the secret despatch of October 1, 
that Mthere will be no reduction of our military establishment con­
sequent upon the withdrawal of forces from the Punjab. Hardinge fs
See D.P.Sinha, Educational Policy, pp. 262, 279 n.2; Public 
Despatch to India, 25 August (no. 20), l8V?, and Sinha, p. 277 n.5.
p
See E/V790, p.325 seq., Legislative Despatch to India, 21 October 
l8*f6.
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programme of military, naval and police reductions therefore was 
entirely the result of his own view'1- of the prospects of peace.
Hobhouse however made no overt attempts to oppose Hardinge*s ef­
forts. Even with the reduction of the Indian navy, where Hobhouse 
was of the opinion that !lthe present naval establishment of India 
is inadequate to its purposes”,^  the Governor General’s measures 
received his approbation.^ On the question of the removal of the 
last steamer from Mesopotamian waters, where Hobhouse told Hardinge 
that he was in sympathy with Palmerston’s ’remonstrance* against 
the measure, the President concluded by observing ’’you will, how­
ever,^ doubt consider the subject in all its bearings, and do what 
is right”.
If Hobhouse was not prepared to give Hardinge the measure 
of support over expenditure which Ripon had, neither was he pre­
pared openly to contest Hardinge *s programme of reductions. These 
economies rested ultimately upon Hardinge*s Punjab policy, a policy 
which the Russell Ministry found it inexpedient to challenge, im­
plemented as it was by one of Peel’s lieutenants.
^See Home Misc. r 85^. Hardinge to Hobhouse, k October l&k?.
Hardinge complained ”1 am provoked with the sister Presidencies in 
their lethargic indifference to second the Governor General with 
his efforts to make reductions”. Had Ripon rather than Hobhouse 
been at the Board it is probable that the subordinate Presidencies 
would have received a sharp rebuke from home.
^Home Misc., 8*1-3» p. 13^* Auckland to Hobhouse, 12 April l8*f7.
^Home Misc., 833» p.320-3^11 Hobhouse to Hardinge, 2k April l8*f7.
^Home Misc.. 833, p.191, Hobhouse to Hardinge, 7 January l8*f7
It is evident that Hardinge had received somethng less than 
the f,real and entire11 confidence and support of the Ministry and 
the Home Government* He had gone ahead with his Punjab policy and 
with his military reductions, in spite of, rather than with the co­
operation of the home authorities. On public works and education 
there had been a clear lack of support which had all but checked 
progress in these areas. Hardinge*s presence in India during 
Russell’s administration was manifestly due to considerations of 
British politics, rather than Indian administration, and his foreign 
policies in particular could hardly be expected to be upheld once 
he had left the scene.
Lord Dalhousie was nott in contrast to the three men who pre­
ceded him, a member of the Cabinet which was responsible for his 
appointment as Governor General. His selection however was part 
of Russell*s continuing attenpt to strengthen his Ministry by recruit­
ing Peelites to its service or otherwise detaching them. Hobhouse, 
for one, was not in favour of the attempt, l!Lord Dalhousie and Lord 
Elgin are very good men, and would fill the post in question veiy 
fairly**, Hobhouse conceded to Russell, but he saw "no necessity for
going beyond your own political friends for a Governor General of*
India**. ^
H^ome Misc., 8*f5, p.20*f, Hobhouse to Russell, Ik July l8V?.
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Though Dalhousie had indeed shown himself a capable admini­
strator, first as Vice President then as President of the Board of 
Trade during Peel’s second Ministiy, he could not be considered by 
1847 a close associate of his former leader.'1’ More important, 
there was no question of any connection on Dalhousie*s part with 
the policies that had been pursued under Hardinge. ”Lord Dalhousie 
is with me11, Hobhouse now wrote approvingly to Russell ”and I am
happy to say that, so far as Indian matters are concerned, nothing
2
can be more satisfactory”. Dalhousie*s somewhat ostentatious in- 
(fependence of manner notwithstanding, his actual conduct of policy 
was to be consistently along the lines desired by Hobhouse and the 
Ministry.
Nowhere is the change occasioned by Dalhousie*s appointment 
more immediate and apparent than in the case of the native states.
In his first letter to the new Governor General Hobhouse spoke of 
the ill health of the Rajah of Satara and observed unambiguously 
”on the death of the present Prince without a son, and no adoption 
should be permitted, this petty Principality should be merged in the 
British Empire; and, if the question is decidee in my day ’day of 
Sextonship* I shall leave no stone unturned to bring about that
See Dreyer, pp. 76-7.
^Home Misc.« 84^, p.284, Hobhouse to Russell, 3 October 184-7.
result".'*' This communication could have come as no surprise
to Dalhousie who had gone through Hobhouse*s private correspondence 
2
before he left for India, and whose letters display an easy familiar­
ity with the President’s view on such matters. In his first comment 
on Satara Dalhousie assured Hobhouse that nothing had been done 
which would fftend to promote the agitation1* still being carried 
on in England on behalf of the Raja deposed in Auckland's time, 
and referring to opinion expressed in India by some of his subordinates 
in favour of permitting an adoption by the present Raja, the Governor 
General observed discreetly ' **At present I will give no opinion*1.
After the Raja had suffered a fresh attack, however, Dalhousie 
wrote to Hobhouse f*If anything should happen to him, clearly the Raj 
should be resumed ... • The policy which commended its foundation 
as a Mahratta state has no longer an existence**, an adoption **of
if
course could not be permitted*'. On the death of the Raja, later
placed
in 1848, Satara was immediately/under British administration and 
subsequently it was annexed.
~Slome Misc., 85*f, p.191, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 2*f December l8*f7.
^Add. Mss. *f3751, ^8, Hobhouse*s diary for 6 November 18^7*
"Dalhousie came to finish the reading of my private correspondence".
^Home Misc., 854, pp. 238 & 240, Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 8 Februaryisw;
Sfome Misc., 855i P«^8, Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 8 April 1848.
.3 9-5
"We have sent a despatch to India by this mail ordering the
assumption of the Sattarah territory" Hobhouse was able to tell
Dalhousie early in l8*+9» and he added "we shall have debates in
Parliament about it; but I do not anticipate much opposition".^
Over Satara he was right, but eventually the Governor General’s
minute,containing a statement far more formidable than Auckland’s
upon Colaba, formed the focus of a serious attack in Parliament on
this policy of annexation of the native states. In his minute
Dalhousie declared: "in the exercise of a wise and sound policy
the British Government is bound not to put aside or to neglect such
rightful opportunities of acquiring territory of revenue as may ...
arise from the lapse of ; subordinate states ... from the failure
2
of heirs natural". This ’doctrine of lapse' set forth in the 
first year of Dalhousie*s administration was in fact little more 
than an overt statement of what Hobhouse had been quietly working 
for during two decades.
Hardinge’s arrangement for a period of grace over Oudh had 
tied Hobhouse and Dalhousie's hands somewhat but upon Hyderabad 
the President "after some discussion" with the Chairman had a 
despatch sent out "which will enable you to take a far more decisive
^Home Misc., 839, p. 10*+, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, Zk January l8*+9.
p
See Sir W. Lee Warner, Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie, II, p#ll6, 
Minute of 30 August 1848.
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course in regard to the Nizam than has hitherto been adopted. We
differ essentially from Lord Hardinge as to the conduct of General
Fraser and so far from disapproving his interference, authorize a
similar course of conduct under similar circumstances.Hobhouse
expected Dalhousie to take a \ery different line from Hardinge on
interference in the affairs of the states. Even on Oudh he was
"inclined to think that the Treaty with the former State will not
2
stand much in your way". However the situation in the Punjab did 
interpose itself and Dalhousie wrote to Hobhouse, "Oude and Hydera­
bad we must try to hang up until after this trouble in the North 
3
is over".
The future of the Delhi succession did not present such diffi­
culties of timing as did Hyderabad and Oudh and by April 1849 Hob­
house was reading the Governor General1s despatch on the Delhi 
sovereignty, in which Dalhousie proposed to put an end to the "House 
of Timoor" by lapse on the death of the existing Emperor. As "at
present advised" Hobhouse agreed with Dalhousie, "and I trust the
^Home Misc., 8^4, p.220, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24 January 1848.
^Home Misc., 8^4, p.246, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 4 April 1848.
^Home Misc.,855« p.113* Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 9 June 1848. Yet in 
offering the Residency at Lucknow to Colonel Sleeman "with especial 
reference to the great changes which will in all probability take 
place" Dalhousie was anticipating the future assumption of at least 
the administration of Oudh. See Dalhousie Papers« GD 43/6/78, Dal­
housie to Sleeman, 16 September 1848.
307
Court will do the same11.'*' The Court did not agree,however, still 
Hobhouse, assured Dalhousie if they persist **the Dispatch will
p
be written at Cannon How and the Court will sign it, that is all, 11 
Indeed, though the Court quoted f,the authorities of Mountstuart 
Elphinstone and Sir George Clerk and Professor Wilson*1 to persuade
3
Hobhouse f,to agree with them and to maintain the foolish phantom*1, 
Hobhouse was not moved. What appears to have carried greater 
weight was pressure exerted in Parliament **Sir Edward Colebrooke 
brings forward a motion for a committee to enquire into the law of 
succession amon gst the Native Princes; chiefly, as I understand 
from him, to give himself an opportunity of controverting certain
if
doctrines advanced by you in your minute on the Sattara case**.
This being so, Hobhouse could **not helplletting my colleagues 
know something** about the matter and Lord John Russell subsequently 
had Hobhouse convey his view to Dalhousie that **you will not carry 
your proposed measures into effect on the death of the present king 
should you ... see any reason to doubt the expediency of taking such
~4iome Misc., 8^9, p. 1^4, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, k April 18^9.
^Home Misc., 859, P.215, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 3 October l8*f9•
3
Home Misc., 859, P.231, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 6 December 18^9.
^Home Misc., 859, P.2^7, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, % February I85O.
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a course".'*' Dalhousie complied with the substance of this caution 
and his official letter abandoning the project was gratefully re­
ceived T?y the Court who had been overwhelmingly against it.
The setback over Delhi probably provoked Dalhousie to ask 
whether in the event of the King of Delhi wishing to surrender his 
kingdom and become a state pensioner Hobhouse would "back me or would
throw me over". "To be sure", Hobhouse protested, "I am not aware
2
of ever having throw* you over". But though the President would be
"most happy if the putting an end to the ricketty systems both at
3
Hyderabad and Oude should be reserved for you" the great annexations 
of Dalhousie*s administration were largely to occur after Hobhouse 
had left office. Nevertheless, the Hobhouse-Dalhousie partnership 
had already seen the most important development af that policy 
which had been pursued under successive Whig Ministries throughout 
our period. Already this policy had assumed a significant role in the 
financial administration of the Government of India under Dalhousie. 
"Eightful" opportunities to acquire "revenue or territory" had al­
ready yielded more than a quarter of a million pounds a year with the 
annexation of Satara. When early in 1851 the former Maratha Peshwa,
~*~Home Misc., 859, pp. 2*f9?50, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 25 February 1850. 
Home Misc., 860, p.7*S Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 6 October 1851.
^Home Misc., 860, p.5$, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 August 1851.
See P.P.1861. XLIII, paper 522.
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a state pensioner who had surrendered his sovereign rights in 1817, 
died, Dalhousie determined not to extend the payment of the stipend 
to the Peshwa's adopted son: !,the old Peshwa is dead at last. This
will add nearly nine lacs to our annual income11^  he observed with 
evident satisfaction. An even more explicit statement followed over 
the case of the-arrears owing by the Nizam of Hyderabad for military 
contributions. Dalhousie was now free to take that lffar more decided 
course in regard to the Nizam1* that was to result in the assignment 
to the Government of India of districts yielding some fifty lacs 
annually. The importance to Indian finances that policy towards the 
states was now assuming, emerges very clearly from Dalhousie*s re­
mark to Hobhouse lfThe amount of the debt would of itself compel us 
to act under present circumstances for I am sorry to say that the 
regular estimate to April 18^1 again shows a very large deficit 
. and compels us to collect our ways and means wherever we can find 
them".^
With Hardinge *s departure the man who had created the Lahore
experiment and maintained it in the face of the Ministry's critical
3
attitude, and that of many of his own officers, was removed from 
^Home Misc., 857, p.251, Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 19 February 1851.
o
Home Misc., 8.57, p.274, Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 5 May 1851.
3
The crucial position played by the Governor General in the mainten­
ance of such a policy is revealed by Hardinge's admission that most 
of his officers verf initially critical, but that now "Almost all!', 
are gradually veering round" to his position that "annexation would 
be a source of weakness". See Home Misc., 859, P * l6 ,  Hardinge to 
Bipon, 24 June 1846.
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the scene. The Ministry had been committed to nothing more than 
not overtly reversing that policy. There had been nothing in Hob­
house 's private correspondence, or in the secret despatches, that 
had contributed to its furtherance, and as regarded the expression 
of opinion, much to the contrary. The generally accepted view that 
Dalhousie "had come out to India firmly believing in the wisdom and 
justice of Lord Hardinge's scheme for nursing the growth of a strong 
and stable native Government in the Punjab"^, cannot be accepted un­
critically. Dalhousie was not as Hardinge had been, pledged to the 
upholding of a policy towards the Punjab which related to the foreign 
policy of the previous Ministry. Dalhousie had been privy to Hob­
house 's private correspondence in England and was, on the basis of 
this alone, well aware of the Ministry's views on the Lahore experi­
ment. That he went out to India believing in the policy of a Ministry 
with which he no longer had any connection, totally immune to the 
views of the Ministry which appointed him, is highly doubtful. More­
over, that Dalhousie should have accepted, uncritically, Hardinge's 
policy towards the Punjab, when he immediately rejected his prede­
cessor's policy towards the native states, would also seem to be 
somewhat incongruous.
"4j. J. Trotter, Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie, p.37. See also 
B.J.Hasrat, Anglo-Sikh Relations 1799-1&49, P.303.
It is not possible in a study of the workings of the Home 
Government to say conclusively how much effect, in India, Hardingev& 
replacement by Dalhousie had upon the Lahore experiment, that is how 
much responsibility the Ministry's appointee, Lord Dalhousie, bore 
for the outbreak of the revolt at Multan, its spread and the conse­
quent conquest of the Punjab.^ It is, however, possible to say some­
thing about the Ministry's role in the decision to annex that state,
The declared attitude of the Russell Ministry on the Punjab was largely 
determined by considerations of British politics. Russell had never 
been personally unsympathetic to the desire of Palmerston and Hob­
house to have the Punjab annexed, the deference paid to Hardinge's
policy had stemmed from Russell's desire to maintain cordial relations
2
with the Peelites, rather than any conviction of the soundness of the 
Lahore experiment. In 1848 ostensible deference continued to be paid 
to the opinions of Hardinge and Wellington on the matter both by Hob­
house and by Dalhousie. Moreover Russell had to contend with a divi­
sion of opinion within his Cabinet over the Punjab. Auckland ex­
pressed himself in favour of Hardinge's policy and Lord Grey, the
Colonial Minister, e^>ressed himself very strongly against any action
3
which would involve annexation. Under these circumstances Russell
Hardinge, for one, regretted "the delays which have encouraged dis­
affection", that is the slowness in dealing with the outbreak at 
Multan. See Hardinge to Peel, 8 January l8?9, Add.Mss. kQk75« f*288.
The fact that Ripon and Lord Jocelyn "moved for the Despatches" on 
the Punjab may have also had an effect. See Add. Mss. 4-0877, f.2^6, 
Hardinge to Ripon, 21 April 184-7.
■^ See P.R.O. 30/22/7D, Grey to Russell, 22 November 184-8. Hardinge wrote
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was unwilling in October 184-8 to comply with Hobhouse fs request for 
a clear pronouncement from home on the annexation desired by Dal­
housie. Rather Russell requested Hobhouse to convey to Dalhousie 
the view that "if the urgency of the case shall have induced him to 
take any step of importance without authority, we shall be ready 
to put the most favourable construction on his conduct".'*’ While 
the Ministry thus avoided formally committing itself to annexation 
it had virtually given Dalhousie authority to do just that.
In tie wider field of foreign affairs the Russell Ministry main­
tained its determination to curb Palmerston, and Dalhousie was spared 
that large scale involvement in an active British foreign policy which 
the Indian government had had to undertake under Auckland. Renewed 
friction at Canton led to no more than the despatch of one regiment 
from India in 1848 and when Hobhouse received reports of Afghan parti­
cipation in the Second Punjab War he told Dalhousie that Dost Moham­
mad's men "must be driven back into their own territories and not 
2
followed". Likewise the report that Persia was again preparing to
’ to Peel that "Ld. Grey volunteered the night before last at Lord 
J. Russell's to say that the Punjab policy ^lardinge's? was right .. 
The Cabii^ t apparently is divided". Add. Mss. 40475, 1-295* undated, 
1848-49-
Home Misc., 846, p.25- Russell to Hobhouse, 11 October 1848;
Home Misc., 859* p.60, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 23 October 1848.
^Home Misc., 859, P-H6, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24 February 1849-
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undertake an expedition against Herat merely prompted Palmerston
1
to instruct his agent, Shiel, lfnot to interfere in any way”. Pal­
merston was now even disposed to defer to Dalhousie over questions 
of diplomatic representation at Baghdad.^
While ihe Government of India was not at this time burdened 
by an involvement in an active British foreign policy, it is also 
true ihat the Russell Ministry failed to give it that positive guid­
ance in the avoidance of costly foreign wars that Ellenborough and 
Hardinge had received fromlPeel and his colleagues. This was markedly 
so over the Punjab, and when Dalhousie was becoming embroiled in 
worsening relations with the Burmese authorities at Rangoon toeards
the end of 1851, the Secret Despatch sent out declared !,we entirely
3
approve of all the proceedings of your government11^  on the matter.
The control and direction exercised from home over Indian finan­
cial policy remained largely negative in the years 1848 to 1852. This 
was especially so during the financial crisis which gripped Britain and 
Western Europe in the years 1847-48, the latter part of which coin­
cided with the resumption of hostilities in the Punjab. From 1849 
onwards there was a gradual relaxation of the stringent control
'Sfome Misc.. 860, p.74, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 6 October 1851#
^ ee Home Misc., 857, p.351, Col. Rawlinson to Hobhouse, 5 November 1851. 
^L/P&S/5/559« Secret Despatch of 7 January 1852, para.7.
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exercised over Government expenditure. In the case of the newly- 
conquered Punjab this wets largely for reasons of security, but 
mounting pressure in Parliament over such questions as railways, 
cotton cultivation, banking and steam communication did force 
the Ministry and the Board to makeconcessions which in some cases 
involved expenditure by the Indian Government. These were piecemeal 
concessions, however, and no general approach to the problem of 
Government expenditure on works of public utility was arrived at 
before the Russell Ministry left office.
The commercial and financial crisis of 1847-48 entailed a fall 
in the volume of trade with the East so great that the position of 
the Company’s Home Treasury, which depended upon this trade for its 
remittances from India, was quite desperate. f,Our worthy Chairman”, 
Hobhouse told Dalhousie, ’’has lately been in great alarm as to the 
state of our Home Treasury, and I have so far fallen in with his fears 
as to consent to sending another half million ^ in bullion^ from India ... 
we do not wislito have recourse to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or 
the Bank, until the Indian supply fails us.,,'L Indeed the response 
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was not such as to prevent the 
Court from hastily selling off their long term securities, and to Hob­
house* s complaint about this measure Tucker,once again Chairman
~4iome Misc., 8^4, pp. 221-2, Hobhouse to Dalhousie,24 January 1848.
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replied, lfSir Charles Wood was very gracious and pleasant, but if 
he had admitted our claim tothe two hundred thousand pounds, or had 
given me the slgithest reason to expect that he would, eventually, 
have afforded us assistance, there would have been no question about 
the sale of the Long Annuities".'*' Rather than coming to the aid of 
the Company at a time of crisis the Chancellor felt himself obliged 
to pursue a controversial course. He and Sir Charles Trevelyan in­
formed Hobhouse that they "were resolved not to repay the £200,00 0 
advancedaby the E.I. Company to pay the China batta to the troops -
Trevelyan read correspondence to show that it was not a separate 
2
account". Subsequently Wood told Hobhouse that "he must positively
have an alleged balance of three hundred and seventeen thousand pounds
due to the Grant for pay to Royal troops. I say alleged because the
Court dispute the claim ... I do not feel myself in a very pleasant
position between the hammer and the anvil ... I think I must ... ask
3
you to ... remit as fast and fully as circumstances will allow."
^Home Misc., 84*5, p.397, Tucker to Hobhouse, 27 December 184*7.
2Add. Mss., 4*3751, 32, Hobhouse’s Diary for l8 November 184*7.
Hobhouse himself had earlier, ibid., p.Vf, 31 October 184*7, commented 
on Wood's attitude to Indian finances "I have somewhat lost confi­
dence in my Downing Street Financier".
^Home Misc. t 859, p.38, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 6 October 184*8.
In 184-2, a time of acute difficulties for the British Exchequer,
Peel had been able to help relieve the pressureon the Indian fin­
ances because of his mastery of the British. Now Wood because of 
his ineptitude was being forced to add to their difficulties.
The renewal of hostilities in the Punjab had been long anti­
cipated by Hobhouse. "There is an end of all the golden dreams 
^Hardinge'equalizing revenue and expenditure" he wrote to 
Dalhousie with something, almost, of satisfaction "and there, too, 
must be an end of some at least of the great public works in which 
your predecessors have somewhat unwarily engaged. I do not see how 
you can, for exanple, go on with the Ganges canal at this time of 
depression in your resources. It is fortunate that you have not en­
gaged yourself in any immediate outlay for railroads; and care will 
be taken that you shall not now be called upon for any such expendi­
ture."'1' The home authorities insisted upon the observance of the 
ceiling of 50,000Rs. upon the discretionary power of the Government
of India over expenditure and Dalhousie responded promptly and
2
effectively to this order.
The more positive attitude at home towards works of public im­
provement from 184-9 onwards was of course not due to any change in
~*~Home Misc., 859, pp. 80-81, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24- November 184-8.
2 4 India Financial Proceedings, Range 209, vol. 53, Consultations
of liS September 184-8, No. 1. The subordinate governments were noti­
fied immediately of the order which does not appear to have been for­
mally repealed during the remainder of Hobhouse's term.
Hobhouse's view of their desirability, to the elaboration of a 
plan for Indian development as such, but to renewed pressure upon 
Russell’s Ministry by interested parties in England. On the sub­
ject of railways Hobhouse early in 18^9 informed Dalhousie that 
"the improving state of the money market induces the companies here 
to pluck up spirit again ... I am to see a large Deputation ... to­
morrow. In the face of the political pressure brought by these 
interests,^ Hobhouse's former objections were of little consequence, 
and by June of the same year he was writing to Dalhousie to inform 
him that an agreement had been reached. Similarly though Hobhouse 
objected to the threat to Indian land revenue involved in the en­
couragement of cotton cultivation, the pressure exerted in Parlia­
ment by John Bright and others was such as to induce Lord John Russell 
to write personally to Dalhousie a long letter in which he concluded: 
"If upon enquiry you shall find that additional measures can be taken 
to encrease the supply in India I rely upon your recommendations in
Zf
their favour to the Court of Directors and the Board of Control."
Progress over works of public improvement, though very signi­
ficant, remained largely confined to the experimental stage during the 
years of Russell's administration. By the beginning of 1851 trial
~4fome Misc., 859, p.Ill, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 February 184-9.
2
"the delegation was one of extraordinary power "including John 
Bright, Richard Cobden and ten other Midlands M.P.s, see D. Thorner^: 
Investment in Empire, pp. 158-9.
•^Home Misc., 859, p.173, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 7 June 184-9.
Siome Misc., 859, pp. 34-5-6, Russell to Dalhousie, 19 November 1850.
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railway lines were under construction in Bengal and Bombay. By
1852 three small experimental telegraph lines had been set up in
Bengal, and Dalhousie had written his minute on postal reform,
though the approval from home of a uniform rate of postage had not
yet been sent out.'1’ A despatch giving instructions that a commission
to enquire !linto the whole subject of the superintendance and exe-
cution of public works ... should be formed at ^jeach/ Presidency”,
had been sent out though the real extension of public works was to
3
occur after the Russell Ministry had left office.
The approaching debate on the Charter renewal promised a general­
ized pressure in Parliament on Indian questions, particularly upon 
public works ”We are threatened with a great movement when the 
Indian Q$nmittee comes to be proposed” Hobhouse observed, but subse- 
quently added: ”1 very much doubt whether we ought to volunteer any
if
committee at all”. Concerted pressure in Parliament might well have 
forced the Russell Ministry to take a comprehensive attitude on public
^See M.N.Das, Studies in the Economic and Social Development of 
Modern India, pp. 63. 1191 1§1 & 186.
^See BA/805. pp. 39)-l> India Public Despatches, 30 January l8f?0.
3
Lee Warner begins his discussion of public works policy with Sir 
Charles Wood*s arrival at the Board, op.cit., II, 182 seq.' The 
works in the Punjab got off to a comparatively early start but this 
was largely owing to considerations of security in the newly con­
quered province. See Home Misc., 856, p.298, Dalhousie to Hob­
house, 22 December 1849.
Siome Misc., 8591 P*3579 Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 4 January 18^1. 
ibid., p.35Si Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24 January 1851.
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works had it remained in office after Februaiy 1852.^ In that event 
the change would have been wholly due to British political considera­
tions rather than administrative considerations, something which might 
be said for the Whig handling of British finance as well.
A recent study of "economic policy" in India during this period 
contains the comment, to do with public works, that "The East India 
Company, by the very nature of its structure and function, was ill
equipped to provide the territory which it ruled with social overhead 
2
capital". It has been the object of this study to show that the 
Minister for India was primarily responsible for such shortcomings. 
Under a Conservative Ministry Hardinge had put forth a programme of 
improvements, supported by the ability of the Government, whose fin­
ances had been restored and secured against the burdens of warfare, 
to borrow from the public. Under the returned Whigs, who did not 
share Hardingers view of the prospects of Indian finances, or of 
peace, these projects were severely curtailed. That encouragement 
was subsequently given to works of public utility towards the end 
of the Russell Ministry, was due to political considerations rather 
than to a settled administrative policy.
Attitudes at home towards law reform in India were increasingly 
influenced by the impending discussins in Parliament on the renewal
^But even at this later date the Cabinet was in agreement with Hob­
house that they "should not propose any serious change" in the 
system of Indian Government. See Add. Mss. ^3736*f 80, Hobhouse*s 
Diary for 8 December 1851.
^R.D.Collison Black, "Economic Policy in Ireland and India in the 
Time of J.S.Mill1,1 Economic History Review, XXI, 1968, p.335*
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of the Charter in 1833* While Hobhouse himself had never been a 
strong supporter of the original conception of codification or of
A
the Law Commission in general, and while the Court had, when oppor­
tunity arose, shown itself hostile to both, a Whig Ministry in parti­
cular would be under an obligation to show some tangible results over 
the legislative provisions of the Charter in 1853- Moreover the in­
fluence, in Whig circles, of those who had been closely associated 
with the comprehensive, Utilitarian, conception of law reform in India, 
Macaulay, Sir Edward Ryan and through him, Cameron, was considerable.
Lord John Russell was disposed to offer Cameron's Legislative Councillor- 
ship to I^ ran,^  and it was the latter's refusal on grounds of his 
health which led at length to the appointment of J.E.D.Bethune, a 
Scottish Barrister, and a Whig in outlook rather than a Radical.
The question of filling up impending vacancies in the Law Com­
mission allowed the Chairman in 1847 to raise once again the question 
of that body's existence. Hobhouse while concurreing that the Com­
mission had "little to do" was not inclined to make an approach to
2
Parliament to have it formally abolished. However when Bethune went 
out to India he took no instructions with him on the Commission and
3
none followed him; In his private correspondence with the Fourth
^Home Misc.. 845, p.269, Russell to Hobhouse, 21 September 184?.
^Home Misc., 845, p. 226, Tucker to Ho bouse, 2 August 1847#
Home Misc., 845, p.206, Hobhouse to Tucker, 3 August 1847*
^Home Misc., 855* P*l84, Dalhousie to Hobhaise, 15 August 1848.
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Member, and with Dalhousie, Hobhouse was consistently critical of the 
Commission. Nevertheless Bethune took the view that the Act of Par­
liament was "imperative1* as to that body*s existence and he there­
fore devised a plan by which "we will obey the law, and yet save the 
expense"'1" by selecting those already in the Company*s employ and so 
saving the payment of the salaries. But while Hobhouse accepted this
plan he scrupled at paying even the relatively small sum of 36 ,000 Rs.
2
a year for a full time Secretary to the Commission. Dalhousie, 
taking his lead from Hobhouse's privately expressed views, replied 
"I am not sorry to have your prohibition salaried on which to
3
rest my resistance to ... reappointment". No replacements were made 
and after l£&8 the Commission became all but legally extinct.
Over codification, what definite support did come from home at 
this time was directed towards Macaulay’s criminal Code. From the 
commencement of his correspondence with Bethune, if not before the 
Fourth Member had left England, Hobhouse urged upon the latter the 
importance of fitting Macaulay’s work for legislatin,"it would be 
a feather in more caps than one if you were to cut the Macaulay Code 
into laws", and here considerable importance appears to have been
Home Misc., 833, P-5^, Bethune to Hobhouse, 2 May l8*f8.
^Home Misc., 839, P*&2, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 2b November l8*t8.
■Z
Home Misc., 836, p.26, Dalhousie to Hobhouse, 7 February 18^9.
L
Home Misc.. 839, P*31, Hobhouse to Bethune, 7 July 1848.
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attached to the former Fourth Member and Whig Minister*a author­
ship of the Code. This emphasis was continued throughout Hobhouse*s 
term and Bethune*s attempt to give his own interpretation to the work 
drew a sharp rebuke "a little bird ^3alhousie7 informs me that you 
are cutting and slashing the Macaulay Code at a furious rate, and are 
determined it shall be a Bethune Code or nothing .... All,you are 
asked to do is, to fit the Code for actual legislation**.'1' When as 
a consequence of Bethune *s untimely death in l8f?l Sir Barnes Peacock
was appointed Legislative Councillor Hobhouse wrote to Dalhousie "we
<Lhave set him to work at once upon the Penal Code**. More support was 
now being extended from home towards codification than at any time 
since Charles Grant was at the Board and this was quite clearly due 
to the fact that the Whigs, if still in office at the time of the 
Charter renewal, would bear a particular responsibility for the fate 
of codification in India.
Another potent source of support for the primacy of Macaulay’s 
code came from the supporters of the comprehensive conception of law 
reform among whom Sir Edward Hyan, a member of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council who enjoyed considerable authority in Whig circles 
appears to have been the most active. After Cameron’s departure from
^Home Misc.t 859, P*330j Hobhouse to Bethune, 6 October 1850.
^Home Misc., 860, p.105, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 23 December 1851*
Calcutta the focus of the struggle for codification along Betham- 
ite lines shifted to England, yet here too it would have consider­
able influence on the Fourth Member’s activities at Calcutta.
One of the men Bethune wished to place upon the Law Commission was 
Frederick Millett, member of the Supreme Council, whose work on a 
digest of the existing civil procedure in the Company’s Courts had 
been laid aside by the Law Commission in 1836 on the grounds that 
it "was on the point of being superceded by their Code of Procedure 
which would be enacted directly after their Criminal Code". Beth­
une wished Millett to proceed with his digest, but Ityan, displaying 
the same orthodox insistenee on the primacy of codification as Cameron 
had done over the small cause court act, strongly criticised the 
prospect of Millett's taking up his digest while the Criminal Code 
remained undisposed of.*1* "so far as I can form a judgement" Hob­
house wrote to Bethune "I quite concur in this opinion and hope 
that you will not consider it necessary to continue your caresses
to Mr. Millett so exclusively as to postpone the revision of the
2
Criminal Code merely to please the author of the Digest".
^Home Misc., 855* p. 196, Ityan to Hobhouse, 12 October 1848. Ityan 
and his colleagues also disallowed Sir Lawrence Peel’s rules of 
pleading for the Supreme Court notwithstanding Bethune*s favourable 
view of them. See Home Misc., 859, p.330, Hobhouse to Bethune,
6 October 1850.
^Home Misc., 859, p.66, Hobhouse to Bethune, 24 October 1848. For 
his part Bethune was not sympathetic to the Benthamite approach.
He found Cameron’s draft for the small cause court act "wild and 
impracticable" and Bethune*s own act was far more in line with Sir 
Lawrence Peel’s views. See Home Misc. % 855, PP« 53-4, 2 May 1848.
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Adherence to the generalized view of law reform and legislation
on Cyan’s part also contributed to the disallowance of Bethune*s
efforts to make British European subjects amenable to the jurisdiction
of the Company’s criminal courts outside the Presidency towns, the-pro-
jected "Black Act" of 1830. Here Ryan argued that "the time now rapidly
approaching for the renewal of the Charter must necessarily give rise
to a full consideration of the administration of justice in India" and
he added "if a temporary measure were deemed necessary ... the well
considered scheme of the Law Commission ... might have been adopted" .1
2
Rather than controversial legislation, what Hobhouse particular­
ly desired from Bethune was the efficient preparation of individual 
acts which had relevance to English interests: "If instead of fram­
ing black Acts", the President complained, "he had been attending
to the marriage bill, and to the Unchartered Bank question, his ser-
■3
vices might have been useful". The attitude displayed by Hobhouse 
towards the Law Commission, the Macaulay Code, the 'Black* and other 
individual acts, might well have appeared contradictory to those who 
took a comprehensive view of law reform, to men such as Ryan or Cam­
eron. Viewed as being determined by the political consideration of 
the hour - they were not. Indeed the attention paid to men of more
^ome Misc., 848, pp. 182 and 183, Ryan to Hobhouse, 20 March 1850.
2
It appears likely that the decision not to allow the passage of 
the "Black Act" of 1850 was due, in part, to apprehension of Par­
liamentary pressure similar to that exerted over the Black Act 
of 1836; the Caste Disabilities Act of I85O was allowed which, 
though controversial in India, entailed no risk of being raised in 
Parliament.
^Home Misc., 839, P*284, Hobhouse to Dalhousie, 24 May I85O. The
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or less Benthamite views such as Ityan could be seen as being de­
pendent upon the weight they carried in Whig political circles.
The replacement of the Whigs by Lord Derby's Ministry in Feb­
ruary of 1852 did not have the effect on Indian affairs which might 
be expected. The Ministry was admittedly of short duration, sur­
viving until December of the same year, but then Peel's first Ministry 
had lasted for even less. The new Government's lack of administrat­
ive ability was notorious though the man who was given the Board, 
J.C.Herries, was one of the exceptions to this. But the most import­
ant deficiency was the absence of a settled approach to the prob-
the
lems facing the Government of the day. having rejected^abolition 
of protection in 1846 Derby and his colleagues were 6till without 
an agreed fiscal policy of their own, and Disraeli's attempt to 
introduce a budget at the close of the year was the disaster which 
brought about the fall of the Ministry. In foreign affairs there 
was an equal want of direction, and the relatively unknown Foreign
Minister, Lord Malmesbury, and the Ministry at large showed them-
\
selves disposed to follow the advice of Lord Palmerston on major 
questions. 1 Thus the great party which Peel had reconstructed and
marriage bill for Christians in India had relevance to the contin­
uing controversy in England on the Church's role in marriage.
^ee W.D. Jones, Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism, pp. 168-9.
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endowed with a coherent fiscal and foreign policy was become by 1852 
a rump, lacking leadership and direction. From the party of admini­
stration it had sunk to becoming the party of manoeuvre. The • situ­
ation of the Ministry was not lost on the Governor General who writing 
to his confident remarked "I think the position of the present Govern­
ment appealing to their opponents for forbearance, and at the aame 
time refusing to say what they intend, is not tenable.”'1"
The hesitations, the change in attitude, and the length of time 
taken in arriving at a policyupon the Burmese War, displayed by the 
Derby Ministry was characteristic of their lack of direction on foreign 
affairs generally. At the Board Herries was initially "in hopes that
nothing permanently mischievous may arise from the reported skirmish 
2
off Rangoon". Though Dalhousie subsequently received approval of 
his conduct, no instructions were sent out until September, and in 
the meantime the Governor General complained, "I sincerely hope 
that I shall very shortly receive the instructions of the Government
3
as to the future". When however Dalhousie did receive their Secret
Despatch of 8 September he found its instructions "tantamount to
4ordering the conquest at once" of all Burma. The fact that he failed
^J.G.A.Baird, Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie, p.199-
2
Add. Mss. 57443, f.5» Herries to Ellenborough, 4 March 1852.
^Add. Mss. 57411, f.60, Dalhousie to Herries,7 August 1852.
I±
Add. Mss. 57411, f.100, Dalhousie to Herries, 25 October 1852.
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to act uponthemis a comment upon the ineffectiveness of the Derby 
Ministry, and also upon the view that the effectiveness of the In-
of the Ministry.
Derby in explaining to Herries why he inclined to the stiff 
line taken in the Secret Despatch rather than the more moderate one 
desired by Dalhousie, and advocated at home by Herries, explained: 
‘■Had I acted on my own judgement alone I should have been disposed 
to concur with the Governor General, and close the war by declaring 
our intention to retain the Province of Pegu ... but you will see 
that ... the Duke is of opinion that we ought to ... compel the 
King of Ava ... by an advance upon and if necessary, the capture 
of his Capital'1.'1' The Herries correspondence suggests that Derby 
was iifluenced by public opinion in favour of the war. It is certain 
however th&t a settled fiscal and financial policy had not, as in 
the case of the Peel Ministry in l$f2, determined Derby’s attitude.
On the other great question of Indian policy facing the Derby 
Ministry, the forthcoming Charter Act, the same lack of a defined 
approach is apparent. Referring to Lord Derby's speech in the Lords
^dd. Mss. 57^09, ff. 69-7P, Derby to Herries, 27 August l8f?2.
^In a letter to Derby of 31 August 18^2 Disraeli objected to "this 
project of complete conquest" and used the Peelite argument: "The
Indian revenue has already a deficit of one million and a half ster­
ling. A prolonged war must increase it. We cannot distinguish Indian 
from English finance ultimately". Howypenny & Buckle, Disraeli.
Home Government was dependant upon the strength
p.398.
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upon moving for a Select Committee on the Indian territories,
Herries told Dalhousie: n I believe that the public mind runs 
strongly in favour of the continuance of the present Act (with 
some slight changes perhaps) for another twenty years11. While 
the general tone of Derby's speech in the Lords had been remark­
ably liberal, due in part to generous borrowing from Macaulay's 
speech on the 1833 Charter Act, it contained, apart from a de­
fense of the Court's patronage, no concrete proposals for the future 
governance of India at all. Though the workcbne at the Board and in 
the Committees was considerable, before the Derby Ministry left 
office there is no evidence that a concrete plan had been arrived 
at. The fact that Herries raised an objection to only one provision 
of the plan of the succeeding Ministry^ tends to confirm this view, 
and the fact, that Lord Stanley, supported by Disraeli, subsequently
brought forth a motion which amounted to support for the call for
if
the Company's abolition, is clear evidence of the very divided 
views on the subject entertained by members of Lord Derby's govern­
ment on the question.
Nor did Herries conduct of other matters display any marked 
departure from what had been done under the Russell Ministry. While 
it is true that Herries displayed a warm interest and support for
^Add. Mss. 37^11, f.2, Herries, to Dalhousie, 8 April l8f?2.
^Hansard, 3S, CXX, 5^6 seq., esp\ . » 2 April 1852.
^Hansard, 3S, CXXIX, ^3-7, House of Commons, 11 July 18^3.
^ Mftftypenny & Buckle, 3 PP* 3H-13* Derby strongly objected to 
Disraeli's approachto the "Manchester school".
1
works of public improvement, this was consonant with what any 
Ministry would have had to do, willingly or unwillingly, at a time 
when the whole question of Indian Government was coming before Par­
liament. Over policy towards the native states, where Herries him­
self had been one of those to condemn Charles Grant’s proceedings 
towards Oudh in l83*f, there is no evidence of any significant contri­
bution, any reversal or moderating of what was now a frankly annexation­
ist policy. The drafts and p-c.s at this time are mostly without 
comment by the Ministerial appointees of the Board: and the President’s 
remark which states ’’adopt the alterations proposed by Mr. Water- 
field ^Ehe Senior clerk in the Secret Department, privy to all Hob- 
house’s dealings over the states/^” seems to convey this absence of 
any new sense of direction resulting from the return of the Conser­
vatives under Derby.
The absence of an impact upon Indian policy from home during 
the Derby administration was due not tolndian considerations, but to 
the feeble nature of that administration.
A
The conduct of Indian policy during the first year of that 
coalition of Whig and Peelites which took office under Lord Aber­
deen at the end of 1832, provides the sequel to the previous section. 
Just as the tottering Derby Ministry had shown itself incapable of
^The Public Despatch of 3 March 1832, sanctioned under Herries, ap­
proved the formation of a separate public works department in India.
An experimental line of railway at Madras was also sanctioned, and 
over telegraphs Herries assured Dalhousie that he would ”do every­
thing in my power to ... promote your intentions”. See M.N.Das, 
pp. 67 & 127.
zSee ' vol. 1^0, p. 110, for Herries’ note.
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formulating effective policy, both as regards India and England, 
so now the Aberdeen Ministry, possessing both administrative skill 
and sufficient Parliamentary strength, was able to bring forth a 
triumphant budget and an effective India Act. Moreover as the Peel- 
ites brought with them the1: tradition of sound finance and concilia­
tory foreign policy there is an opportunity, once again, to observe 
their effect on the formulation at home of Indian policy. At the same
time an opportunity is provided by the Whig identity^! the President/
of the Board, Sir Charles Wood, to see where, and how much this fact
had anj^particular influence. Finally the Charter Act of 18^3 is the
last act of Indian policy to be discussed in this study.
In the long run the Aberdeen coalition of Peelites and Whigs
proved an unsatisfactoiy instrument for the maintenance of that pacific
foreign policy upon which the success of Peel*s fiscal policy^which
depended.-
was now being implemented and expanded by Gladstone^/The Cabinet 
discussions connected with the Crimean War showed only too clearly 
that Aberdeen's Whig colleagues had not become transformed into Peel­
ites over foreign affairs.^" Nevertheless the initial phase of the 
Ministry, when Gladstone was triumphantly carrying forward his bud­
get of 1853, saw the Government intent on adopting a pacific or at 
least a cautious stance internationally, and this included Indian
■^ See J.B.Conacher, The Aberdeen Coalition, pp. 233-88.
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concerns. In contrast with the Derlpy Ministry’s tardy arrival at 
a position on the Burmese War, a Secret Despatch was now sent out 
immediately after the Aberdeen Ministry took office, informing Dal­
housie that "We should deplore the necessity of further conquest; 
and we strongly feel the many serious objections to the annexation 
of any other portion of the Burman Empire".'*' This despatch would, 
the President observed, have the effect "of modifying in some de­
gree the instructions" of the previous Ministry, but such a course 
would have involved *'a vast esqpense of men and money". In 1833 
the same connection between sound financial policy and a pacific 
foreign policy, as existed during Peel's administrations, is apparent.
Similarly, with the native states, the initially moderate line 
taken in the case of Oudh can quite clearly be seen to have been in­
fluenced by considerations of British foreign policy. "That we must 
take Oudh sooner or later I have no doubt", Wood responded to an 
anxious Dalhousie, but then added in a characteristically Whig manner: 
"the only question in my mind is the opportunity and the pretext".
At present however "as it is very desirable not to show a grasping 
disposition... I am unwilling to occupy our principality. Brunnow 
attacked me the other day as to Pegu, saying that he did not see what
~*~L/P&S/3/5591 Secret Despatch of 23 December 1832, para. 3-
o
Wood Papers, Letter Book 3i Wood to Dalhousie, 2b February 1833-
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reason we had to complain of Russian encroachments on their 
neighbours11.”1'
In 1853 the renewal or otherin.se of the Company’s Charter, 
that is of the existing form of Indian Government, was one of the 
major questions facing the Aberdeen Ministry. The "state of public 
feeling and Parliamentary prospects with respect to the India Bill11 
were of course the crucial considerations and it was decided at 
length, and not without considerable division of opinion within 
the Cabinet, to legislate immediately rather than wait until the 
following session; that is, it was felt to be desirable to maintain 
the Company as an organ of Government. However if the Bill was to 
"pass through Parliament and secure the approbation of the country^
Aberdeen felt it was indispensable to provide for the "abolition
of all patronage" and an "improved composition of the Court of
Directors ... as well as various pother/ changes". The reduction
of the number of Directors to eighteen, three of whom were to be
Crown appointees, was therefore more of a political gesture than a genuine
administrative reform,and it certainly did nothing to increase the independence,
^W.P. Wood to Dalhousie, 21 October 1833- Wood had also shown a 
disinclination to comply with Dalhousie*s desire to annex the small 
state of Kerauli. "I am not impatient to annex all of India" he 
commented. W.P., Wood to Dalhousie, 22 January 1833*
^Add. Mss. ^3308,pp.7^ & 73, Aberdeen to the Queen, 20 March 1833*
Lord John Russell however attempted to disassociate himself from 
an early settlement of the question and hence a continuation o f the 
dual form of government as a means of courting Radical support in 
the same manner as Disraeli did over Stanley's motion.
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that is the effectiveness, of the Court. Nor, of course, did the 
abolition of their patronage, which was another "indispensable 
necessity" as regards the Parliamentaiy prospects of the Bill. 
Nevertheless, this change was regarded as beneficial, the "best 
feature" of the Charter in Gladstone's view. 1
The Company was given no fixed term of years for the contin­
uance of its Charter, in spite of the fact that it Iserved as 
something of a barrier against the too forceful intervention of 
Parliament ii Indian affairs. Nevertheless, the fact that the dual 
form of Government was preserved at all, is a testimony to the 
strength of the Aberdeen Ministry in face of the Radical demands 
for the abolition "of the anomalous formaf the Home Government".
So far as the Government of India was concerned, Wood's con­
tribution lay chiefly in maintaining unimpaired the authority of 
the Minister for India over the Indian Government. Dalhousie's 
memorandum and the evidence of the Select Committee provided materials 
on which the provisions of the act were drawn up^ but they did not
in themselves determine the shape of the changes in the Government 
p
of India. Had Dalhousie's suggestions been accepted uncritically
1Cona£her, p.82, Gladstone attributed this provision to Aberdeen.
The Duke of Argyll, Autobiography and Memoirs, I, p.420, attributes 
the Bill to Aberdeen and Sir Charles Wood.
2
In the case of the Select Committee's investigations the Bill was 
in fact drawn up before these were finished.
334
the centralization of power in the Governor General’s hands would
have been carried even further than what had been envisaged in the
recommendations sent home from India prior to 1833 thereby creating
Ma structure of government so imposing that,the home authorities
would find it difficult to resist11. Dalhousie recommended that
the subordinate Presidencies should be transformed into Lieutenant
Governorships and their Councils disposed of. The power of appointing
the Lieutenant Governors should be given to the Governor General.
Among suggestions in a similar vein Dalhousie suggested that his
power over the Royal Troops and the Royal Navy, serving in India,
1
should be increased. Wood however did not accept these suggestions. 
He did provide for a Lieutenant Governorship of Bengal, but this was 
on grounds of administrative efficiency rather than centralizing 
power in the Governor General’s hands.
Wood accepted the suggestions of Dalhousie and others that the 
Supreme Council should be enlarged for legislative purposes. How­
ever he was not disposed to speculate, as Dalhousie did, ”on the 
progress of events in the next twenty years”, and to consider the 
eventual appointment of Indians to the Council. He did not provide
that ’’other persons from time to time might be added to the Legis-
2
lative Council by the Governor General in Council”. Concerned as
^See Moore, pp. ^7-9. Dalhousie’s Memorandum is given in W.P. 78/11.
o
See Sections 89 & 99 of Dalhousie*s Memorandum.
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Wood was with problems of British politics and Indian administration, 
in this case the smooth working of the legislative machinery, anti­
cipating events was no part of his concern.
Where in fact Wood was willing to deal v/ith a prospective 
measure, over the provision of a second Law Commission, it is apparent 
that this was due primarily to British political considerations, 
particularly to his being a Whig. Dalhousie*s Memorandum had made no 
mention of the Law Commission and his recommendation that a legal func­
tionary in India should be appointed Fourth Member was consistent with 
his earlier exchanges with Hobhouse on the Commission and the Law 
Member.^- However the pressure exerted in England on the subject 
was very considerable: f,We have been a long time about Law Reform in
2
England but now we have a mania on the subject” Wood told Dalhousie11.
It appears from Wood’s correspondence that Whigs and Radicals were 
more or less exclusively concerned with the creation of the second 
Law Commission and the appointmentsmade to it are also an indication 
that Benthamite Radicals exercised a strong influence in Whig circles
over Indian law reform. In particular Wood looked to Sir Edward Ityan
3
and Cameron to perform ’’the heavy work of the Commission”.
^See sec-fcn 91 of Dalhousie *s Memorandum.
^W.P. t Wood to Dalhousie, 8 March l8f>3*
\ p .  % Wood to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Campbell, a Whig, 26
September 1833-
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For the most part the years of the Russell Ministry saw a 
negative influence exerted from home on the Indian administration. 
Hardinge's foreign and financial policies were carried on in spite 
of the views of the Minister and the Ministry rather than with their 
support, and his ambitious educational and public works programmes 
were actually curtailed. The arrival in India of the Russell Mini­
stry's appointee, Dalhousie, saw the return £<b the situation where 
the President of the Board and the Governor General worked in unison 
in pursuit of a frankly annexationist policy towards the native 
states. It saw, too, the annexation of the Punjab and the extinction 
of the first Law Commission, both with at least tacit approval from 
home. Towards the eiid of the Russell Ministry interest manifested 
itself at home in railways, public works and law reform. What is 
significant about this development is that it did not arise within 
the H:me Government as such, nor from the general policies pursued 
by the Ministry, but rather it came about in response to pressure 
exerted in Parliament, or the anticipation of such pressure. This 
of course is an important comment on 'policy* formation during a 
period of Whig government. It was not under the Whigfil nor under the 
feeble Derby Ministry, notwithstanding the considerable personal 
efforts of J.C.Herries on aspects of Indian foreign and financial 
policy, that this rather negative situation was to be fundamentally 
changed. It was following the advent, inl853» of a Ministry possess­
ing adequate strength in Parliament, abundant administrative ability 
and pursuing Peelite fiscal and foreign policies that a really profound
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effect was made from home on Indian foreign and financial policy, 
on public works, law as form and educational policy. That is to say, 
the quality of the policies of the Home Government of India appears 
to reflect the quality of the Ministry as a whole, something which 
the whole course of this study has tended to confirm.
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Conclusion
A SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERIOD
AS THEY RELATE TO THE ARGUMENT
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CONCLUSION
It was anticipated at the beginning cf this study that the 
course of British politics would be of fundamental importance.
Whether over foreign or financial policy, whether over policy to** 
wards the native states, on law reform or on matters more, briefly 
dealt with, the policies pursued by the Home Government, and con** 
sequently those pursued by the Government of India, bore to a 
greater or lesser degree the stamp of the Ministry in power. The 
most striking aspect of this has been the manner in which the Home 
Government’s policies have alternated as Conservative Ministry 
alternated with Whig^thereby bringing into strong relief the ex** 
tent to which Indian policy was determined by the course of British 
politics. This contrast has also supplied the essential perspective 
for judging the role of principles and personalities as they affected 
Indian policy.
Nowhere has the contrast between the policy pursued under 
Whig Ministries and that pursued under Conservative Ministries been 
clearer than over the native states, nowhere has the nature of the 
Ministry at home been more clearly the essential element in the con** 
tinuity of a policy. Under successive Whig Presidents of the Board 
a policy of intervention was steadily developed: from Grant's sup**
port of various creditors of native princes and his efforts to have 
the administration of Oudh assumed, through the close association
340
between Hobhouse and Auckland which saw the deposition of a number 
of native princes, the activity of the political agents and the sig­
nificant annexation of Colaba to the great, financially important, 
annexations of Dalhousie*s time. As a reflection on the role of 
personality in the development of policy it is remarkable that men 
of such different temperaments as Charles Grant and John Cam Hobhouse 
should have pursued fundamental^ the same course, and much the same 
could be said of the way in which the cautious Auckland worked to­
gether with the more assertive Hobhouse. In the latter instance 
the complementary nature of the presence of a Whig President of the 
Board and a Whig Governor General, as regards the furtherance of a 
fundamentally interventionist;, policy, shows how artificial the 
attempt to attribute responsibility for a policy to the one or to 
the other sometimes is.
Prom theoutset the Conservatives took an opposing stance to 
that adopted under the Whigs. While in opposition they attacked the 
transactions over Oudh in Grant’s time, and again during Auckland’s 
administration. With Ellenborough’s arrival in India there was a 
complete reversal of policy towards the states heralded by his in­
structions to the political agents. Hardinge too on his arrival 
took immediate steps to see that the most conciliatory line of policy 
would be pursued towards the native states. With the return of the 
Whigs in 1846 a large gulf in the attitude of the Whig President and
M i
the Conservative Governor General is apparent, one which is closed 
dramatically with the latter*s replacement by the appointee of the 
Russell Ministry.
The attitudes or principles over the states proper to Whig 
or Conservative statesmen respectively were likewise in complete 
contrast. What to Auckland might appear, as in the case of the Colaba 
annexation, to be the just claims of the Government, were to Fitz­
gerald a matter of grasping at every tenure or territory that might 
lapse. What Hobhouse could denounce as “ricketty systems11, “wretched 
governments*1 and “foolish phantoms11, Hardinge referred to as kingdoms 
in alliance with the British government by treaty. Whereas the First 
Afghan War might appear to a Whig President of the Board to be an oppor­
tunity for taking a more decided course of action that would be ex­
pedient in quiet times, a Conservative Governor General viewed the 
lenient peace he made with the defeated Sikh nation as a proof that 
“we don*t voraciously take advantage of the misfortunes of an ally11.
Most deeply significant was the fact that the Whigs consistently 
maintained the financial advantages of annexation from the cautiously 
worded statements of the Report of 1832 and the paper by B.S.Jones 
to the explicit statements of Sir Charles Trevelyan, Auckland and 
Dalhousie. The Conservatives on the other hand were equally consistent 
in maintaining that such financial considerations we£e not proper 
to considerations of the Government’s relations with the states for
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as Peel had said over Oudh f,If we were to usurp and assume to our­
selves the Government and territory of Oude, let us take care that 
we did not show an interested motive for doing son.^
The foreign policy of India closely paralleled that of Great 
Britain throughout our period. During the Melbourne Ministry there 
was a manifest connection between Palmerston’s policy of preventing 
the advance of Mehmet Ali in the Middle East, and ultimately the 
spread of Russian and French influence there, and the operations of 
the Government of India on the Euphrates, in the Persian Gulf, and 
in the Red Sea. In the case of the war with China the Government of 
India was simply instructed, by the Cabinet in fact, to act as an 
auxiliary to Britain. These and other examples testify to the manner 
in which the pursuit of a liberal foreign policy by the Whigs leaned 
heavily upon Indian resources. Similarly with the Conservatives,
Indian foreign policy was expected to complement that of Great Britain 
and therefore there was an almost complete reversal of the policies 
pursued under Auckland, a speedy end to the wars in Afghanistan and 
China, withdrawal from commitments in the Middle East, and a reduction 
of tension with Persia and the neighbouring countries of Nepal and Burma. 
Subsequently, the desire of the Ministry to maintain friendly relations
^Hansard, 3S, XXV, 63 ,^ House of Commons, 28 July 183 .^
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with Russia very largely determined Hardinge’s policy towards the 
Pun jab. After the return of the Whigs, in 1846, Russell’s over­
tures towards the Peelites inclined the Government against overtly 
reversing Hardinge’s policy yet that policy received no real support 
from a Ministry which had abandoned the previous Government’s entente 
with Russia. Nor did the Government of India receive any guidance, 
in a pacific sense, over relations with Burma until the Aberdeen 
Ministry, embodying the principles of Peelite foreign and financial 
policy, took office.
The position taken by the Whig Ministers in 1833 on Indian 
finances, that they should not constitute a permanent ’’burden on 
the finances of England”, is understandable against the background 
of the pressure they were under from Parliament to redeem Lord Grey’s 
pledge to reduce taxation and to economize upon the expenses of 
government. Grant’s dictum that once the profits from the Company’s 
trade were cut off ’’the administrators of the Indian ^ revenues” would 
find themselves ’’compelled to confine their expenditure within their 
proper income”, which was proved wrong in the event, was neverthe­
less consistent with this basic Whig position on Indian finances.
Their reliance on general formulae at this time, which so greatly 
favoured the progress of Utilitarian doctrines, is also evinced in 
the administrative arrangements for Indian finances under the Charter, 
for while all control was statutorily vested in the Supreme Government 
an effective machinery of financial control in the shape of a separate
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financial department or an Indian budget was not provided. Subse­
quently, successive Whig Chancellors of the Exchequer were con­
sistently to refuse aid to Indian finances not only as regards 
such financial operations as the temporary substitution of Ex­
chequer Bills for Company securities, but even as regards the prompt 
repayment of advances made by the Company on account of operations 
in China. Against the background of the enormous expenses India 
was incurring as a result of the active foreign policy pursued in 
Auckland*s time, the failure of the Home Government to offer any 
prescription for the relief of India* s ruined finances was an ad­
mission of the total bankruptcy of the Whig approach.
Strong financial administration was, of course, a central 
feature of the Governments of Sir Robert Peel and the more realistic 
approach to the problems of Indian finance displayed by the Con­
servatives followed from this. Ellenborough's criticism of the 
Whig arrangements for the sudden termination of the Company’s trade 
amounted to a charge that the Ministry had put political considera­
tions before financial ones. Ellenborough's creation of the Indian 
Finance Department in 18^3 w as consistent with his claim, made 
during his detailed attack on the financial aspects of the Charter 
Act of 1833* that the Whig plan had not provided adequately for an 
effective control of Indian expenditure. The great contrast between 
the Conservative and Whig approaches, however, emerged most clearly 
during the course of Sir Robert Peel's defence of his reimposition
of the income tax in l8*f2. Peel cited among the causes of this 
measure the financial burdens of warfare in Asia and he repudiated 
the idea that British finances had no interest in those of India 
since Britain was in fact their \ltimate guarantor. In contrast with 
his Whig predecessors Sir Robert moved swiftly to relieve the 
pressure on the Company's Home Treasury by repaying the British 
Government's debts to it arising from the China war, even going so 
far as to make advances to the Company on that account. The restora­
tion of India's finances was seen by Peel and his colleagues as one 
of the major tasks facing Ellenborough and the Governor General's 
efforts in this direction received the consistent support of the 
Ministry. The most profound contribution made by Peel's Government 
towards this end was of course the new direction in foreign policy 
which relieved Indian finances from the crushing burdens to which 
they had been subjected under Auckland. Despite the Russell Ministry1 
efforts, ostensibly at least, to comply with the financial and fiscal 
precedents set by the Peel Ministry, it was not until the advent of 
the Aberdeen Coalition that the relationship between sound financial 
policy and a pacific approach to foreign affairs was reestablished 
in the case of the Ministry's desire for a speedy termination of the 
Burmese War.
In the course of this study two alternative "sets" of Indian 
policy have emerged, one associated with the Conservatives and one 
with the Whigs. In the former set an insistence on sound financial
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policy has gone together with an emphasis on a pacific foreign 
policy and a conciliatory approach to the native states. Under the 
Whigs, on the other hand, an increasingly aggressive foreign policy 
during Auckland*s time was accompanied by the ruin of Indian finances, 
increased pressure on the land through resumptions, enhanced col­
lections, and the growth of a policy towards the states aimed ulti­
mately at their annexation. While during Russell's administration 
the influence from Home on Indian foreign policy was somewhat moder­
ated fthe same tendency towards increased military spending and an 
increased income from the land, particularly from annexations, is 
apparent.
The policy of "peace and consolidation" which Peel desired to 
see pursued in India was intimately connected with the foreign policy 
of his Ministry which in turn was the necessary accompaniment to his 
financial and fiscal policies. The foreign policies pursued by Auck­
land were due in part, at least, to the Whig tendency to lean upon 
Indian resources for the pursual of a foreign policy which, while 
popular enough, could not be supported by them from British resources 
alone. The Whig approach to problems involving Indian finances gener­
ally was af a more 1political1 nature than that of the Conservatives
under Peel, that is it inclined to making politically, advantageous
/
concessions or arrangements, whether over foreign policy, on the 
question of the continuance of the Company’s trade or over public
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works, A related tendency can be observed in the Whig influence 
upon Indian law reform.
The Law Commission had been conceived and created in Britain, 
and the progress of law reform can be seen to have depended pri­
marily upon the support and direction it received from home. The 
Commission's creation and the initial appointments made to it, as 
well as its Radical program, testify to the influence exerted upon 
the Whig Ministers and their appointees at the Board during the years 
of Lord Grey's Ministry. The subsequent history of law reform, how­
ever, shows that neither Hobhouse, Auckland nor Melbourne felt him­
self committed to a prompt realization of the comprehensive program 
of law reform the Commission was charged with. However, it was only 
with the advent of the Conservatives in 184-1 that a direct attack on 
the actual existence of the Commission, and of the Fourth Member of 
Council's position, was made. While during the Whig administration 
of Lord John Russell no effort was made to revivify the Commission's 
activities Hobhouse nevertheless rejected the Chairman's proposition 
that that body's existence should be terminated by statute.
The great difference between the Whig approach to law reform and 
that of the Conservatives does not appear to have been a doctrinal 
one. The views of A. Amos or W.E.D.Bethune, both Whig law reformers, 
were as empirical as those of Sir Lawrence Peel, and as far removed 
from the Benthami te principles of C.H.Cameron. The difference was 
essentially a political one; the influence which men imbued to a
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greater or lesser extent with Utilitarian views enjoyed in Whig 
circles seems to have been the decisive factor in the success of 
their approach.
In the course of this study the Court of Directors have been 
regarded primarily as a check within the system of Indian govern­
ment; any claim they might have to actually initiating policy via 
the preparation of despatches being considered either a formality 
or concerned with residual matters. It is true that the Court were 
involved in a number of cases involving the native states where the 
views of the Board were effectively checked: over the Lucknow bankers, 
and Grant's attempt to have the administration of Oudh assumed, over 
Auckland's treaty with the King of Oudh, the resumption of the Rohilla 
Jagirs, and the future of the Delhi succession. However it is noticeable 
in most of these instances that Parliamentary pressure had an import­
ant effect on the outcome. On law reform the Court who had had no 
voice in the creation of the Law Commission was unable even to cir­
cumscribe its activities, its views being expunged from the commentary 
despatch on the Charter. When, of course, the Count's views were in 
harmony with the Minister's, as was the case with the despatch pre­
pared in Fitzgerald's time calling the Commission's existence into 
question, then the Court's voice could be heard. On individual 
questions affecting the social orieligious life of Indians the Court 
might participate with the Board and the Governor General in bring­
ing about a slower and more cautious implementation of what Parliament
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had decreed; this was the case over slavery and the pilgrim tax 
but not with the question of removing restrictions to European 
entry into the interior of India. On foreign policy, a matter of 
vital interest to Indian finances, the Court were without an effect­
ive voice though on matters of supply such as the provision of 
steamships they could exercise an inhibiting effectjon the progress 
of foreign policies they were not in agreement with. Generally 
speaking ^ the great despatches on financial questions seem to have 
been predominantly determined by the Board's views or the actions 
of the Ministry and the Governor General^as was the case with the 
despatches sent out as a consequence of the cessation of the Company's 
trade. While on individual questions of revenue policy such as the 
extension of periodic settlements in preference to permanent ones 
or the resumption of rent free tenures^the Court's opposition has 
been seen to have been of little effect.
As the permanent body of Indian experience within the system 
of Indian Government, the Court, notwithstanding the fact that some 
of its members were politically identifiable as Whigs or Liberals, 
performed a fundamentally conservative function, one which its apo­
logists advocated to the end; the Director, Col. Sykes argumiicg in 
1858 that the Ministerial plan to abolish the Company would result 
in "utter recklessness with regard to native institutions".^ Nevertheless
^Debates at the East India House, W.H.Sykes, 15 January 1858, p.*f.
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it is apparent that over the annexation of native states and the 
resumption of rent free tenures, over the increased entrance of Euro­
peans into the interior of India, most especially of missionaries, 
and on other matters that interfered with the religious or social 
customs of Indians, matters upon which the Court felt deeply and 
which were among the major causes of the Indian revolt of 1837-38, 
the Directors lacked sufficient power effectively to check the 
policies which successive Ministers for India, especially the Whigs 
or Liberals among them, were mainly responsible for. A major, if 
unofficial, function of the Court was thus to act as a convenient 
scapegoat for the failings of the Home Government as a whole.^
The connection between Whiggism or Liberalism and British 
policy in India in the nineteenth century has generally received a 
larger and more sympathetic reception by historians than has that 
of Conservatism/This is partially explained by the fact that Whig­
gism and Liberalism lent itself more easily to expression in terms 
of general ideas, which while they often conflicted with political 
practice seem nevertheless to have been politically valuable to 
those who employed them. Indeed the author of a work on the British
constitution during the nineteenth century expresses its theory
2
entirely in Whig terms. Bias aside, it is true that Peelite
*4?he well known cartoon in the Liberal weekly Punch, the "Execution 
of John Company* which attributes the Mutiny to the Company’s 
"blundering", "misgovemment" etc., is in its way a masterpiece 
of misrepresentation. See Punch, vol. 33» P* 65, ^  August 1837.
2See H. J.Hanham, The nineteenth Century Constitution, pp. 1-3.
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Conservatism found its expression in questions of administration 
rather than in constitutional questions, in an empirical approach 
to reform rather than a radical or organic one. The approach of 
this thesis has been to examine the connection between the actual 
conduct of the Ministry of the day and that of the Government of 
India, yet on this basis it is possible to examine how much the 
generalizations about the connection between Whiggism or Liberalism 
and Indian politics hold for our period, and perhaps even to add a 
new perspective for the remainder of the century as well.
Considering the part played by Charles Grant, Hobhpusecaild 
Auckland in the policies of intervention and annexation at the ex­
pense of the native states and of the latter two over the resumption 
of rent free and other tenures it cannot be maintained that a 
"Whiggish conviction of the importance of the landlord class in 
society"'*' affected their conduct in these matters. Nor does it 
appear tenable to view the changes lfaade in the constitution of the 
Home and Indian Governments by Whig Ministers as being determined 
by the arguments put forward in their defense or in terms of Whig
consitutional theory generally inportant though these undoubtedly
2
are to the Whig Liberal historical tradition. Macaulay’s argument 
that the retention of the Conpany in 1833 would ensure an efficient 
check upon the "authority of the Crown" was manifestly hollow. Like­
wise the view that Sir Charles Wood’s failure to conply with Dalhousie’s
^See Moore, p.l80.
^R.J.Moore and H.J.Hanham are seen as representative of this tradition.
wish for the abolition of the Governorships of Madras and Bombay
in 1853 was the response of a mid-Victorian liberal to the problem
of despotism in India, the result of the desire to '‘protect India
from the abuses of despotism"1 raises the question of why the Whigs
carried centralization so far in 1833. In fact the Whig connection
with Utilitarian concepts of administrative centralization and law
reform flew in the face of their own political tradition; ability
or willingness to deal with changing political circumstances is not
the same as an application of principle per se. The most consistent
characteristic of the Whig attitude to constitutional changes in the
system of Indian government in 1833* 1&33 or in 1838 was the desire
to see the power of the Indian Minister preserved fwhether in face of
tie Governor General or of Parliament's increased power^and this went
together with the allowance of the least authority possible to the
coordinatecbody within the Home Government whether that was the
Court of Directors or the Secretary of State's Council,
Finally, the tendency on the part of historians, within the
Whig tradition, to attribute conscious positive Imperialism and 
2
'jingoism' to the Conservatives of the latter part of the cpuntry 
in particular does seem to ignore the very aggressive and inter­
ventionist character of the foreign and Indian policies of the Whig
1See P.J.Moore, Liberalism and Indian Politics, pp. 8 and 10.
2
See Hanham, pp. 1-2 , and Moore, Sir Charles Wood, pp. 176-7.
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Ministries of our period and the possible contribution they made to 
the situations with which subsequent Governments, Whig or Liberal, 
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